Euthanasia and counterfactual consent. by Barnbaum, Deborah R.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1996
Euthanasia and counterfactual consent.
Deborah R. Barnbaum
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation







Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment










Approved as to style and content by:






m Robison, Department Head
Philosophy Department
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost I wish to thank my advisor, Fred Feldman,
for his tireless efforts in helping me write this dissertation. Fred's
assistance ran the gamut from rote editing to making significant
suggestions on argumentation. Chapter 111 would not have existed
if Fred had not introduced the Rational Man problem in his Justice
Seminar, in the spring of 1994. After spending two years focusing
on the significance of counterfactuals, 1 can say with certainty that
if Fred had not been my advisor, then this dissertation would not
have been as good as it is.
1 also wish to thank the other members of my committee.
Professors Gareth Matthews, John Robison, and Gretchen Rossman.
Gareth Matthews has always been of great help to me. 1 also owe
a great deal of my professional success to John Robison.
Several colleagues and peers have also helped tremendously.
1 wish to thank my colleagues at the University of New Hampshire
for their suggestions on Chapter 111, a version of which 1
presented to the department. Countless discussions with Jennifer
Armstrong were of great help. Of my peers at the University of
Massachusetts, 1 wish to single out Owen McLeod. It was Owen,
while standing washing dishes in my kitchen, who first suggested
that 1 consider the significance of consent to acts of euthanasia.
Owen's suggestions also were invaluable to my work on Chapter V.
I also wish to thank my sister Laurie, my brother Michael,
and my father Gary, for their encouragement. Morgan Hott also
offered a great deal of intellectual and emotional support. Finally,
IV
I wish to acknowledge the memory of my mother, Phyllis. 1 don't
doubt that her death had a great deal of influence on my choice to






DEBORAH BARNBAUM, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
LOS ANGELES
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman
Counterfactuals about what a patient would consent to, if he
were able to consent, are often cited as justifications, or partial
justifications, for acts of euthanasia. In virtue of this fact, they
deserve special scrutiny by moral philosophers.
In Chapter I, I examine terminology that is essential to
further understanding the relationship between euthanasia and
counterfactual consent. I propose a definition of 'euthanasia', an
analysis of 'consent', and I present a brief description of
counterfactuals.
In Chapter II, I consider two questions. The first is, "When it
is appropriate to invoke counterfactual consent in an attempt to
justify an act of euthanasia?" By making use of an improved
version of the voluntary, nonvoluntary, and involuntary
distinction among acts of euthanasia, I am able to determine
when it is appropriate to cite counterfactuals about consent in an
VI
2.tt6mpt to justify a.n uct of Gutha.na.sia,. ThG second is, "to what
end is counterfactual consent used?" I contend that
counterfactual consent does morally justify some acts of
euthanasia, and defend an argument for this claim. Finally, I look
at the role of counterfactual consent as a possible legal
justification for acts of euthanasia.
In Chapter III, 1 use possible world semantics to analyze
counterfactual consent. Traditional counterfactuals are
determined to be true if in the closest world at which their
antecedent is true, their consequent is also true. Counterfactuals
about consent have a less straightforward reading. I consider
and reject several possible ways of reading counterfactuals about
consent, before settling on the correct reading of counterfactuals
about consent.
In Chapter fV, I consider evidence for the truth of claims
about counterfactual consent. I consider and reject the claim that
no counterfactual is either true or false. I examine both Living
Wills and the practice of surrogacy, neither of which offers
sufficient evidence for the truth of claims about counterfactual
consent.
In Chapter V, I contrast counterfactual consent with actual
consent. I review and refute the arguments for the claim that
actual consent is preferable to counterfactual consent. I conclude
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INTRODUCTION
A tragic car accident sends John to the hospital. John lies in
a coma in a hospital room. The doctors tell John's family that he
has no hope for recovery. The family is forced to make the
following decision: do they let John linger in the hospital room, for
days, months, or perhaps years? Or, do they ask the doctors to
shut off John's life support machines? Several considerations
seem to weigh in favor of terminating life support. "John was
always so athletic - it seems such a shame to see him like this."
"There is absolutely no hope for his recovery." "He feels nothing
right now, so turning off the machines would not deprive him of
anything he is currently experiencing." Finally, John's wife says "I
know John very well - if he could tell us, he would say it's okay to
turn off the machines." The rest of the family nods in agreement.
Some people have this to say about cases of euthanasia: "He
would have wanted it this way", or "Could she know the state that
she is in right now, she would just want us to turn these machines
off. Our intuitions are strong here. Something is added to the act
of euthanasia by the consent of the patient. But in many cases of
euthanasia, consent of the person who is being killed is not
available at the time of his death. In Jack's case, his wife stated
what Jack would have consented to had he been able to, even
though he was not able. Her statement was a counterfactual about
consent; counter-to-the-facts about Jack's inability to consent, this
is what he would have consented to if he were able to consent.
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Had Jack not consented to being killed, had he protested and
screamed and begged to live, then killing him may not have been
an act of euthanasia at all. Consent may be a necessary condition
for an act to be an act of euthanasia. If this is true, then the fact
that an agent would have counterfactually not consented may be
important. Or, perhaps while the patients who screamed and
begged to live were euthanized, it was nonetheless morally
impermissible to kill them without their consent. In this case,
consent is a necessary condition on an act of euthanasia being
morally permissible. The statement "If he were able to consent,
then he would consent to our killing him" appears to be either
true or false, but what are the truth conditions for such a
statement? Some people compose Living Wills, "an advance
declaration of your wish not to be connected to life support
equipment if it is adjudged that you are hopelessly or terminally
ill"i. Effectively the Living Will is saying "If 1 were to be in the
state of being hopelessly or terminally ill, then 1 would like you to
pull the plug." Other people sign Durable Powers of Attorney -
giving permission for a friend or relative to make life-and-death
decisions for them. The patient, in signing a Durable Power of
Attorney, is giving consent for another individual to make his
decisions for him. But are either of these sufficient to
demonstrate the truth of a counterfactual about consent? Is
counterfactual consent only a poor cousin of actual consent, never
^ Final Exit , Derek Humphry, The Hemlock Society, 1991, p. 21.
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3.S r0li3.bl0 or ci0sir3.bl0 3,s 2,ctu3.1 cons0nt? All of th0S0 3,r0
int0r0sting issuos that dosorvo furthor considoration.
Why Ar0 Th0S0 Important Quostions?
It might b0 argu0d that quostions about consont, and
countorfactual consont, aro irrolovant in making hoalth-caro
docisions. If a pationt is dying, or in immonso pain with no hop0
that th0 pain will oas0, thon tho physician, not tho pationt, will bo
th0 best judgo of what would bo host for tho pationt. If that is
truo, thon tho physician would bo doing what is host for tho
pationt by taking stops to outhanizo tho pationt basod on hor
knowlodgo alono, and not basod on any consont on tho part of tho
pationt. Why should consont, or countorfactual consont, bo a
factor whon making thoso decisions?
First, in considering if a patient would give consent, were he
asked for consent, the physician may more likely perform that
action that will be best for her patient^. What will be best differs
from patient to patient. There are some patients who will be
willing to live with far more pain than others. By considering
what a patient would counterfactually consent to, the physician
will be less likely to make broad judgments that do not take into
consideration each patient's individual beliefs and preferences.
Second, in considering what the patient would consent to,
were he able to consent, the physician demonstrates respect for
2Dan W. Brock, Life and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics ,
Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 24-28.
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the patient. Without considering what the patient would consent
to, were he able to consent, the physician would be behaving in a
paternalistic and authoritarian manner. Dan Brock observes that
consent can be valued for many reasons:
...such as the avoidance of frustration involved in
interfering with a person's liberty of action, the
development of individual judgment (especially since
people often learn best from their mistakes), the
satisfaction people often get from making decisions
about their life for themselves, and so forth.3
Brock makes the claim that giving people the opportunity to
consent to treatment is extrinsically good, for it ultimately results
in a better state of affairs for the patient, and those around him.
Finally, statements of counterfactual consent are actually
used to justify acts of euthanasia. Since it is a regular practice to
cite statements of counterfactual consent when justifying a
morally problematic act, it seems only appropriate to ask what
these statements mean, when it is appropriate that they are used,
and to what ends they are used. As an actual practice,
counterfactual consent's philosophical implications deserve
further scrutiny.
There may be a further question, however. It is clear that
counterfactual consent is interesting for philosophers to think
about. However, why have 1 restricted my discussion of
counterfactual consent to questions pertaining to euthanasia?
3Brock, p. 32.
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Counterfactual consent is philosophically interesting in many
contexts - not only in cases of euthanasia.
I agree. Many of the points I make about counterfactual
consent are not interesting only to those who are interested in
philosophical questions about euthanasia. Counterfactual consent
is a concept that has relevance in the philosophy of law, social
contract theory, all forms of medical paternalism, and many other
areas. However, there are three reasons why counterfactual
consent has special relevance to questions of euthanasia. First,
acts of euthanasia are unique in that they are permanent and
unrectifiable. Once an act of euthanasia is performed, it is not
possible to alter states of affairs so as to approximate the
circumstances before the act of euthanasia takes place. If I take a
pen off your desk without your consent, you may be upset, but I
can always return the pen. With a case of euthanasia, the damage
cannot be undone.
Second, cases of euthanasia deal with something far more
valuable than pens. Human lives are at stake. Some philosophers
have gone so far as to say that human lives bear intrinsic value.
Others claim that we have a right to life. Certainly, if we are no
longer alive, numerous experiences are denied us. Taking a
human life is a significant moral act, and the circumstances that
surround the taking of a human life should be carefully
considered. Thus, while counterfactual consent is philosophically
important in its own right, counterfactual consent's implications
for cases of euthanasia seems to be especially significant.
5
Finally, owing to the permanent and unrectifiable nature of
acts of euthanasia, counterfactual consent about acts of euthanasia
is able to illustrate important factors about counterfactual consent
that statements of counterfactual consent for other acts cannot
demonstrate. In Chapter III, I use possible world semantics to
demonstrate precisely what is meant by a statement of
counterfactual consent. Most statements of counterfactual consent
do not have the special features that the statements of
counterfactual consent about euthanasia have. For example,
statements of counterfactual consent require us to consider the
patient in very different circumstances than he is when the act of
euthanasia is about to be performed. Are we asked to consider
the patient's response in circumstances that are so different from
the patient's actual circumstances that the question of performing
an act of euthanasia is no longer relevant? These questions shed
light on counterfactual consent, not only counterfactual consent in
cases of euthanasia.
Two Tools in My Discussion
I am not presupposing any moral normative theory in my
discussion. 1 recognize that this may seem problematic, but 1
have limited my discussion to relatively clear cases, and hope to
make do with consulting my moral intuitions in determining what
is right in these cases. I recognize the difficulty in this strategy -
those who believe that acts of euthanasia are always wrong will
not agree with my conclusions. Flowever, there is an advantage in
taking this strategy. 1 have not limited my discussion of
6
counterfactual consent by chaining my conclusions to a single
moral normative theory. Hopefully, I have demonstrated some
interesting points about counterfactual consent which are relevant
regardless of the moral normative theor>' that the reader believes
is true.
Finally, 1 have assumed that if there are any benefits or
harms that come to the victim being euthanized or not euthanized,
those are benefits or harms that come to a person while he or she
is alive. 1 have not taken into account the benefits or harms that
may come to the victim after that individual is dead. For
example, when 1 define 'euthanasia' in Chapter 1, 1 will limit my
discussion of the cessation of suffering that results from an act of
euthanasia to the suffering that a person experiences when he or
she is still living, not the suffering he or she may experience in an
afterlife. The rare examples that make reference to benefits or





Pollyanna is confronted by a mugger on her first trip to New
York City. When she refuses to hand over her wallet, she is shot
to death by the mugger. At the trial, the mugger's attorney does
not argue that his client did not kill Pollyanna - the evidence of
this fact is overwhelming. Furthermore, the attorney does not
argue that his client did not intend to kill her - the motive to kill
is not in dispute. Rather, the attorney takes out a copy of
Beneficent Euthanasia
, edited by Marvin Kohl. The attorney also
has a copy of Biomedical Ethics , edited by Thomas A Mappes and
Jane S. Zembaty. Each is determined by the court to be a
reputable collection of philosophical essays. The attorney reads a
definition of 'euthanasia' presented by Tristram Engelhardt Jr:
I will use the term euthanasia in a broad sense to
indicate a deliberately chosen course of action or
inaction that is known at the time of decision to be
such as will expedite death. i
The attorney then proceeds to argue that his client ought to be
given the lightest possible sentence. While the mugger did
deliberately kill Pollyanna, he did not perform an act of murder.
Rather, he performed an act of euthanasia, as defined by
Engelhardt. Other individuals who have performed acts of
^Tristram Engelhardt Jr., "Aiding in the Death of Young Children",
Beneficent Euthanasia , ed. Marvin Kohl, p. 189-190. Also reprinted in
Biomedical Ethics , ed. Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S, Zembaty, McGraw Hill,
Inc., 1991, p. 413.
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euthanasia have been acquitted^ - at the very least his client
should receive a light sentence.
There are some bad definitions of 'euthanasia' in the
philosophical literature, and armed with one of these bad
definitions, one can prove almost anything. Before euthanasia can
be discussed appropriately, and the relevance of counterfactual
consent to cases of euthanasia can be discussed appropriately, I
first must explain what I mean by 'euthanasia' and 'counterfactual
consent'.
A Few Poor Definitions of 'Euthanasia'
A surprising number of philosophical articles about
euthanasia do not even give a definition of 'euthanasia'^. Among
the articles that do include definitions of 'euthanasia', many of
these definitions are quite different. Often an act that will be
picked out as an act of euthanasia according to one definition, fails
to be an act of euthanasia based according to another definition.
One definition of 'euthanasia' is proposed by Arthur J. Dyck,
in "An Alternative to the Ethic of Euthanasia":
2For a concise summary of both United States and International legal cases
in which individuals who performed acts of euthanasia were acquitted, or
never brought to trial, see Fred Rosner, "Euthanasia", Contemporary Jewish
Ethics and Morality , ed. Elhot N. Dorff and Louis E. Newman, Oxford
University Press, 1995, pp. 350-353.
^See, for example, "Should There be a Legal Right to Die?" by Robert F.
Drinan, and "Justifying the Final Solution" by Helge Hilding Mansson, all
reprinted in Ethical Issues in Death and Dying , ed. Robert F. Weir, Columbia
University Press, 1977.
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The term "euthanasia" is used here, exactly as in the
Voluntary Euthanasia Act of 1969, to mean "the
painless inducement of death" 4.
A similar definition is mentioned by Marvin Kohl, in The
Encyclopedia of Ethics
. Kohl proposes three definitions of
'euthanasia'. The first is:
It ('euthanasia') is often defined as "the act or method
of painlessly inducing the death of a nonfetal sentient
being" 5.
Dyck elaborates on his definition. Ele rejects definitions of
'euthanasia' that do not make a reference to the fact that a death
by euthanasia is one which is induced. Rather than a definition
that fails to make this important distinction, he considers the
Webster's New World Dictionary
.
1962 edition, definition of
'euthanasia':
an act or method of causing death painlessly so as to
end suffering^.
Kohl's second definition of 'euthanasia' seems to capture the
spirit of Dyck's second definition. Kohl writes:
^Arthur J. Dyck, "An Alternative to the Ethic of Euthanasia", reprinted in
Ethical Issues in Death and Dying , ed. Robert F, Weir, Columbia University
Press, 1977.
^Marvin Kohl, "Euthanasia", The Encyclopedia of Ethics , ed. Lawrence C.
Becker, Garland Pubhshing, Inc., New York and London, 1992, p. 335.
^Daniel Maguire, in "Deciding for Yourself: The Objections", uses this same
defmition of 'euthanasia' (also reprinted in the Weir volume).
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'Euthanasia' is sometimes defined as "the act or
method of directly causing or allowing the painless
and quick death of a nonfetal being, so as to end
suffering or an undesirable existence"
Of course, what is meant by an "undesirable existence" is very
vagues. Perhaps the most interesting question when determining
what an "undesirable existence" is, is "Undesirable for whom?" Is
this an existence that is undesirable for the family of the patient,
because the patient's continued care is costing a great deal of
money? Is it undesirable for the doctors who are spending a
great deal of time on a patient when they could be doing other
things? Perhaps Kohl believes that an "undesirable existence"
refers to the degree of the desirability of the patient's existence
for the patient, not the degree of desirability of the patient's
existence for those surrounding the patient.
Finally, Marcia Angell mentions a definition that is very
similar to both Dyck's and Kohl's definitions:
Euthanasia means purposely terminating the life of a
patient to prevent further suffering^.
What do Dyck, Kohl and Angell mean by these definitions?
1 would like to propose a condensed version of Dyck's and Kohl's
definitions of ' an act of euthanasia', which 1 will refer to as El:
El: a is an act of euthanasia =df 1) a is the painless
inducement of death of a non-fetal sentient being,
^Kohl, p. 336.
^Kohl considers what he calls "Conservative", "Moderate" and "Ubertarian"
views on the notion of an undesirable existence.
^Marcia Angell, "Euthanasia", Biomedical Ethics , ed. Thomas Mappes and
Jane S. Zembaty, McGraw Hill, 1991, p. 382.
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and 2 ) a is performed so as to end suffering or an
undesirable existence of the being that is killed lo
Phillipa Foot in her article, "Euthanasia", introduces but does
not endorse, the following definition:
Let us insist, then, that when we talk about
euthanasia, we are talking about a death understood
as a good or happy event for the one who dies....For if
we say that the death must be supposed to be a good
to the subject we can also specify that it shall be for
his sake that an act of euthanasia is performed^i.
This definition of 'euthanasia' may be taken literally to
mean a special type of act of dying. However, it is charitable to
mean by 'euthanasia' an act that causes a death, rather than the
death itself. Foot makes this clear later in her paper, when she
poses the question "If one man kills another, or allows him to die,
thinking that he is in the last stages of a terrible disease, though
in fact he could have been cured, is this an act of euthanasia or
not?" The action that is being questioned is the action of the
killer that caused the death of the other man - his mistaken
beliefs may have some bearing on whether this was euthanasia or
not. The action of the killed man (ie: dying) is the same.
Dyck does not say this, I believe that he meant that acts of
euthanasia are performed "so as to end (the) suffering of the person who
dies ". Were a doctor to be involved in a long, drawn-out malpractice
lawsuit, but realized that were he to painlessly kill his former patient that
his (the doctor's) suffering would end, such a killing would not be
euthanasia. 1 beheve Dyck would endorse this modification of his
definition.
11 Phillipa Foot, "Euthanasia", Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral
Philosophy . University of California Press, 1978, p. 34.
l^lbid, p. 35.
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regardless of the beliefs of the killer. 1 will consider this
definition of 'euthanasia' as E2:
E2: a is an act of euthanasia =df a the act of causing a
death which is 1) a good or happy event for the
person who dies and 2) a is performed for the sake
of the person who dies
Finally, 1 would like to consider a third definition proposed
by Kohl. He mentions a third, more substantial definition of
'euthanasia':
They [philosophers who find problems with Kohl's
earlier definitions] define 'euthanasia' as "the act or
method of inducing as painless a death as possible,
where the organism is acutely suffering or in an
undesirable state, where the relief of the latter
condition is the only primary motive and where there
is convincing evidence that the resulting death is a
greater good or lesser evil for the recipient than the
failure to actively intervene."
This definition may be adopted, almost verbatim, into a third
definition of 'euthanasia' which 1 will refer to as E3:
E3: a is an act of euthanasia =df a is 1) an act or
method of inducing as painless a death as possible,
2) the one who is killed is acutely suffering or in an
undesirable state, 3) the relief of the latter
condition is the only primary motive, and 4) there
is convincing evidence that the resulting death is a
greater good or lesser evil for the recipient than the
failure to actively intervene
l^Kohl, p. 336.
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Of course, what constitutes an "undesirable state" or an
"undesirable existence" differs from person to person. It may be
pointed out that E3 offers the patient a greater number of options
than El does. If you are leading an undesirable existence, the
only immediate option appears to be to cease existing. However,
if you are in an undesirable state, you presumably have the
option to change states, and not merely change whether you exist
or not.
I would now like to demonstrate that no two of these
definitions pick out exactly the same acts as acts of euthanasia.
Each of the definitions also picks out certain acts as acts of
euthanasia that are clearly not acts of euthanasia. I will
demonstrate this by considering several cases.
The Case ofJoe. Joe is a patient in a hospital. He is suffering
from a terminal and very painful illness. Joe requests that his
doctor assist him in killing himself. Joe's doctor agrees to help kill
Joe, but the only method of killing Joe available to the doctor is
fatal injection using a hypodermic syringe. There will be a very
small amount of pain when the injection is administered, but
shortly after that Joe will fall into a deep, comfortable sleep, and
die. All of Joe's suffering will be over.
According to El, this is not an act of euthanasia. Although
Joe's case did fulfill the second conjunct in El (the killing of Joe
was performed to end Joe's suffering), it did not fulfill the first
conjunct. This was not a painless inducement of death. Joe did
feel a small amount of pain when his death was induced - the pin-
prick of the hypodermic syringe.
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According to E2, this may have been an act of euthanasia.
The act was performed for the sake of Joe. Also, the death may
have been a good
,
if not "happy", event for Joe. Perhaps what
would have been best for Joe was for his suffering to be over,
even if that meant his death. In this sense, a 'good' is understood
to be better than any alternative, even if it is not a happy
alternative. The death of Joe may not have been a happy event for
him. It is unlikely that Joe was happy at the time of his death.
Relieved, perhaps, comforted in the thought that his suffering
would soon be over, likely, but "happy"? Probably not. The
badness of his death may have been outweighed by the goodness
of the end of his suffering. In that case, his death would have
been a good event for him, albeit not a happy one.
However, using Foot's own analysis of what makes an event
a "good" one for an individual, Joe's euthanasia fails to be a "good"
event for him. In saying that euthanasia is a "good or happy
event for the one who dies", one must elaborate on what is meant
by a "good or happy event". While Foot does not say much about
about what makes an event happy, she does discuss in detail what
makes something good for a human being:
The idea we need seems to be that life which is
ordinary human life in the following respect - that it
contains a minimum of basic human goods. What is
ordinary in human life - even in very hard lives - is
that a man is not driven to work far beyond his
capacity; that he has the support of a family or
community; that he can more or less satisfy his
hunger; that he has hopes for the future; that he can
lie down to rest at night...
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...It is not the mere state of being alive that can
determine, or itself count as, a good, but rather life
coming to some standard or normality. It was argued
that it is as part of ordinary life that the elements of
good that a man may have are relevant to the question
of whether saving his life counts as benefiting him.
Ordinary human lives, even very hard lives, contain a
minimum of basic goods, but when they are absent the
idea of life is no longer linked to that of good.i^
Using Foot's conception of what it means for something to be
"good" for a person, then there are no acts of euthanasia which are
good for anyone! Acts of euthanasia are performed to end the
life of individuals who are suffering, or who will be suffering, or
who are in a state in which they experience nothing at all (ie: they
are comatose, or in a persistent vegetative state). But after they
are killed, they will no longer be experiencing the "minimum of
basic human goods". They will be experiencing nothing at all!
Thus this is not a case of euthanasia according to E2, for it is not
the case that this is a "happy" event for Joe, and using Foot's own
conception of human good, it is not a "good" event either.
According to E3, this was an act of euthanasia, for this was
the only method of killing Joe (thus it was the method that
induced the least painful death possible), Joe is in an "undesirable
state", the hope of getting Joe out of the "undesirable state" is the
motive for the action, and Joe at least believes that his death is a
greater good or lesser evil than his failure to die.
The Case ofDoctor Lechter's Patient. Doctor Lechter
accidentally administers a fatal dose of aspirin to a young and
^"^Foot, pp. 42-43.
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happy patient, in an attempt to stop a migraine. The
administering of the aspirin was entirely painless, but ended the
patient s happy life. Certainly this would not be considered a
form of euthanasia!
In this case, the first conjunct in El is satisfied - this was a
painless inducement of death. The second conjunct is also
satisfied - the doctor performed the action in an attempt to stop
the suffering of his patient. The case of Doctor Lechter is a case of
euthanasia according to El! Of course, this is not an act of
euthanasia according to E2 - having his life cut short is not a good
or a happy event for Doctor Lechter's patient. Nor is this an act of
euthanasia according to E3. It is true that Doctor Lechter's
patient was acutely suffering and in a "undesirable state". Her
current state was one in which she was in great pain due to her
migraine. However, the final condition in E3 - that the "resulting
death is a greater good or a lesser evil for the recipient than the
failure to intervene" - is not satisfied in the Doctor Lechter case.
Had Doctor Lechter failed to intervene, the patient would have
continued to live in great pain for a short time. However, she
would have recovered from her migraine. Every reasonable
expectation indicates that she would have lived an enjoyable life.
His failure to intervene would have cost her a few days pain from
a migraine. In intervening, he cost her her life. The resulting
death is certainly a greater evil than his failure to intervene. The
final condition of E3 is not satisfied. This is not a case of
euthanasia according to E3.
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The Case ofMary. Mar>^ was on her deathbed, at the end of
a long illness. She asked her doctor to kill her, so that she might
end her suffering sooner. Her doctor had two possible methods by
which to kill her: sleeping pills, or lethal injection. He chose the
lethal injection, because another patient might need the sleeping
pills later. Mary felt a slight pin-prick, and died.
In many ways, the Case of Mary is very similar to the Case
of Joe. As with the Case of Joe, the Case of Mary fails to be a case
of euthanasia according to El. Since Mary felt a small amount of
pain when her doctor gave her the lethal injection, this was not a
"painless inducement of death". Thus, El fails to pick out the Case
of Mary as a case of euthanasia.
Similarly, E2 has problems in picking out the Case of Mary
as a case of euthanasia. Mary was probably not happy that she
was dying. As with the Case of Joe, Foot will also concede that the
Case of Mary was not a good event for Mary either, for it did not
enable her to enjoy the "minimum of basic human goods".
However, unlike the Case of Joe, the Case of Mary fails to be
a case of euthanasia according to E3. Mary's doctor did not
perform an act that was the "method of inducing as painless a
death as possible". Giving Mary sleeping pills would have been
less painful for her than experiencing the pin-prick of the lethal
injection.
In summary, the Case of Joe illustrates that in some cases El
does pick out the same acts as acts of euthanasia as E2; while both
El and E2 failed to pick out the act of causing death in the Case of
Joe as an act of euthanasia. The Case of Joe demonstrated that El
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and E2 pick out different acts as acts of euthanasia than E3. While
the case of Joe illustrated an act of euthanasia according to both
El and E2, it did illustrate an act of euthanasia according to E3.
Thus, the Case of Joe illustrated that El and E2 are not equivalent
to E3.
Additionally, E2 has been demonstrated to be deeply flawed.
E2 contends that acts of euthanasia result in deaths which are
"good or happy event(s) for the person who dies" - but this is odd.
It is unlikely that any deaths are happy events for the persons
who die. They may be events which are a relief, or a comfort.
The person's death may be the best possible option for him, under
his circumstances. It is odd to claim that such deaths are happy
events for the person who dies. Furthermore, using Foot's own
conception of "good", none of these events is good either, for none
of them allow the persons who die to then experience the
"minimum of basic human goods". In virtue of this fact, no
euthanasias are ever good or happy.
Furthermore, we intuitively recognize that the Case of Joe is
a case of euthanasia. But E3 was the only definition that picked
out the case of Joe as a case of euthanasia. Thus, E3 is the only
definition that may be correct, thus far.
In the Case of Doctor Lechter, El did pick out Doctor
Lechter's act of killing his patient as an act of euthanasia. Our
intuitions lead us to believe that the Case of Doctor Lechter was
not a case of euthanasia, demonstrating that El is flawed.
However, this was not an act of euthanasia according to either E2
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or E3. Thus, the Case of Doctor Lechter demonstrated that El is
not equivalent to E2 nor E3.
Finally, the Case of Mary was not a case of euthanasia
according to El, E2, nor E3. Many people would claim that the
Case of Mary certainly was a case of euthanasia. And yet not one
of these definitions picked it out as such. None of the definitions
offered so far has adequately captured our notion of what is
meant by ’euthanasia'.
The following chart summarizes the conclusions drawn from
the cases of Joe, Doctor Lechter and Mary:
Table 1.1: Cases of Euthanasia According to El, E2, E3, and
Intuitively Speaking
El E2 E3 Intuitions
Case of Joe no no yes yes
Case of Doctor Lechter yes no no no
Case of Mary no no no yes
Unless it is understood what is meant by ’euthanasia’, further
discussion of the topic would be quite difficult.
Better Definitions of ’Euthanasia'
I would like now to turn my attention to definitions of
’euthanasia’ that do not suffer from the over-simplicity that
resulted in the flaws of El, E2, and E3.
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Michael Wreen, in his "The Definition of Euthanasia"
,
considers a definition of 'euthanasia' is. His definition is in seven
parts (where A is a person, but it is not determined what B is). I
will refer to this definition as 'E4':
E4: Person A performed an act of euthanasia if and
only if 1) A killed B or let her die, 2) A intended to
kill B, 3) the intention specified in (2) was at least
partial cause of the action specified in (1), 4) the
causal journey from the intention specified in (2) to
the action specified in ( 1 ) is more or less in
accordance with A's plan of action, 5) A's killing B is
a voluntary action, 6) the motive for the action
specified in (1), the motive standing behind the
intention specified in (2), is the good of the person
killed, and 7) the good specified in (6) is, or at least
includes, the avoidance of evil.
There are several interesting points that I would like to
discuss in Wreen's definition. First, in part 1 Wreen says that an
act is an act of euthanasia if and only if 'A killed B or let her die'.
But in part 2 Wreen considers only that 'A intended to kill B'.
Why didn't Wreen say that 'A intended to kill B or let B die?'
Shutting off life support machines may result in death, but the
doctor who shuts off such a machine may only intend to let his
patient die, and not intend to kill the patient. Wreen's definition
is weakened by his failure to include the intent to let the patient
die in part 2, and focus only on the intent to kill the patiently.
l^Michael Wreen, "The Definition of Euthanasia", Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research , vol. 48, no. 4, June 1988, pp. 637-653.
^^James Rachels, in his famous "Active and Passive Euthanasia" (reprinted
in Biomedical Ethics , ed. Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S. Zembaty, McGraw-
Hill, 1991, 367-370) has argued that the distinction between the two is an
impertinent distinction. Rachels's claim is that there is no morally
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Wreen's claim in part 7, that the good that results from
the act of euthanasia "is, or at least includes, the avoidance of evil"
is also problematic. As stated in part 6, Wreen means to be
discussing the good and avoidance of evil of the person who is
killed, and not his doctors, family or friends. There are many
people who request to be euthanized if they fall into irreversible
comas in the future^^. For some of these people, living in a coma
is a life that is neutral, neither good nor bad. There is nothing evil
in their lives - there is nothing good in them either. Yet, Wreen in
claiming that acts of euthanasia "at least include[s], the avoidance
of evil" would be forced to rule out the terminating the life of such
an individual from being an act of euthanasia, because the good
that results from that person's being killed does not include the
avoidance of eviUS,
Finally, according to Wreen, some suicides, some acts of
abortion, and some martyrdoms are acts of euthanasia. Some of
these acts are occasionally voluntary, for the good of the person
involved, and in some cases the good that resulted from the
performance of the act involved the avoidance of evil. When Joan
of Arc was burnt at the stake, her death was voluntary,
intentional, and it may have even been good for Joan of Arc to
have been burnt at the stake; she subsequently achieved
relevant distinction between the two, not that there is no conceptual
distinction between the two.
l^See Chapter IV for the distinction between these options and their
possible application as evidence for the truth of a statement of
counterfactual consent.
^
^For a discussion of a case of a man who is in an irreversible coma, and his
desire to be euthanized if he were in such a case, see Chapter III.
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Saint±ioodi9. But burning an otherwise healthy 14 year old girl at
the stake is certainly not an act of euthanasia.
Wreen proposed his definition of 'euthanasia' in contrast to
another definition. That definition was proposed by Tom
Beauchamp and Arnold Davidson, in their "The Definition of
Euthanasia" 20. 1 will refer to Beauchamp and Davidson's definition
as 'E5':
E5: the death of a human being, A, is an instance of
euthanasia if and only if 1) A's death is intended by
at least one other human being, B, where B is either
the cause of death or a causally relevant feature of
the event resulting in death (whether by action or
by omission); 2) there is either sufficient current
evidence related to A's present condition such that
one or more known causal laws supports B's belief
that A will be in a condition of acute suffering or
irreversible comatoseness; 3) (a) B's primary reason
for intending A's death is cessation of A's (actual or
predicted) suffering or irreversible comatoseness,
where B does not intend A's death for a different
primary reason, though there may be other
relevant reasons, and (b) there is sufficient current
evidence for either A or B that causal means to A's
death will not produce any more suffering than
would be produced for A if B were not to intervene;
4) the causal means to the event of A's death are
^^The claim that Joan of Arc’s posthumous achievement of Sainthood was
good for her is only true if it is the case that things can be good or bad for
you even after you no longer exist. This notion was first discussed by
Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics (H01a23-1101b9). Aristotle beheves
that the lives of the dead are affected to some degree by what happens even
after they are dead. For further discussion of this question, see Fred
Feldman's Confrontations with the Reaper
.
Oxford University Press 1992,
and Thomas Nagel's "Death", Mortal Questions . Cambridge University Press,
1979.
20Tom Beauchamp and Arnold Davidson, "The Defmition of Euthanasia", The
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy , vol. 4, 1979, p. 294-312. The definition
is reprinted in Wreen, p. 640.
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chosen by A or B to be as painless as possible,
unless either A or B has an overriding reason for a
more painful causal means, where the reason for
choosing the latter causal means does not conflict
with the evidence in (3b); 5) A is a nonfetal
organism.
There are a few problems with this definition, also. Wreen
finds a problem with part 1 - the causal chain from B's intent to
cause the death of A has not been sufficiently established. "It is
killing and letting die, not merely causing of death, which figure in
the definition of euthanasia (sic)", says Wreen2i. it is not clear
that Wreen has argued sufficiently that there is a distinction
between "causing" a death and "killing (or) letting die", however.
If an agent's action is sufficient to cause a death, then is there
anything that that agent did in causing that death that would not
have fallen under the description of either "killing" or "letting
die"? Wreen offers this example: "If I were to walk into my house
one night and flip on the light switch, for example, a man tied to
an electric chair in the middle of my living room, hooked up to my
light switch, might meet his fate, and I would cause his death,
perhaps, but certainly not kill him."22 The example is not at all
persuasive. Wreen killed the man in his example. It may have
been an unintended killing, it may be one that he is not morally
responsible for, but certainly Wreen killed the man in the electric
chair in his living room. Wreen may disagree; he may claim that
didn't kill the man in the electric chair, for the person who
21 Wreen, p. 641.
2 2Wreen, p. 641.
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contrived this sadistic death-trap was a ieast partly responsible. I
answer that the efforts of both Wreen and the person who placed
the electric chair in the living room were jointly sufficient to have
killed someone. Certainly a killing took place. Wreen may reply
that since his efforts alone were not responsible for the killing, he
did not perform an act of killing. I would then ask him if acts that
looked like killing that he didn't perform alone
,
such as murders
with guns, knives and grenades, weren't acts of killing? They are
acts of killing, and Wreen is forced to concede that it is not
important that an agent alone be the sufficient cause of death to
have performed an act of killing. Wreen may reply that he
needed to be the sole agent involved to perform an act of killing;
non-living tools like guns and grenades don't count. Does that
mean that soldiers on the battlefield aren't killing, since without
their commanding officers they wouldn't be there, I ask. You can't
suggest that an act is an act of killing only if you alone intended it
as such! The mafia assassin who was following the Godfather's
orders is still a killer. Wreen's claim that the flick of his
lightswitch isn't an act of killing is impossible to defend.
Beauchamp and Davidson's mention of irreversible
comatoseness in part 2 eliminates the problem that Wreen
encountered in part 7 of his definition - the problem of the
euthanasia having to eliminate evil for the patient, and not merely
be a good. However, there are other problems with E5. What is
meant by the claim in part 3b that "there is sufficient current
evidence for either A or B that causal means to A's death will not
produce any more suffering than would be produced for A if B
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were not to intervene"? Does this mean that the act of euthanasia
will cause less suffering than the act of failing to euthanize the
patient? Or, does it mean that the act of euthanasia will cause no
suffering at all? If A is already comatose, then A is not suffering
at all. However, euthanizing a comatose patient by giving a
hypodermic injection may result in some pain, where the
comatose A was previously not feeling any pain at. According to
3b, the hypodermic injection of a comatose patient that results in
his death is not an act of euthanasia if it causes the patient even
slightly more suffering than he was feeling before the injection.
But this is a mistake - of course this would be considered an act of
euthanasia.
E5 eliminates the possibility that an agent can die of
euthanasia by his own hand. Is every case of euthanasia one in
which an agent kills someone else? Derek Humphry talks
extensively about killing yourself in case you are diagnosed with a
terminal, debilitating illness, before you are unable to perform the
act of killing yourself. Humphry calls himself an advocate for the
legalization of euthanasia - be it "suicide" or a case of "assisted
suicide" 23. According to Humphry, euthanasia includes acts of
killing in which an agent kills himself. Beauchamp and Davidson's
definition would eliminate such acts from being acts of euthanasia.
This is too strict a prohibition, however. Wreen agrees with this
point; "1 can see no reason for insisting that A and B be distinct
persons". 24
23Derek Humphry, Final Exit
.
The Hemlock Society, 1991, p. 149.
24wreen, p. 641.
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A final problem with E5 is the conspicuous defining of
euthanasia for human beings only. It is the case that animals can
be euthanized. Beauchamp’s and Davidson's definition defines
euthanasia only for human beings, and not for animals. This
raises the question why it is that they end their definition by
mentioning "non-fetal organisms (italics mine)", when they are so
clearly discussing only non-fetal human beings.
While E5 does have some problems, on the whole E5 is the
best of the definitions of 'euthanasia' thus far discussed. With a
few modifications, Beauchamp's and Davidson's definition of
'euthanasia' will be adopted.
A New Definition of 'Euthanasia'
Beauchamp and Davidson's definition of 'euthanasia' was a
fair one, with only minor problems. I will adopt a modified
version of their definition of 'euthanasia', that I call 'E6':
E6: the death of A is an instance of euthanasia if and
only if 1) A's death is intended by at least one
human being, B, where an action of B's is either the
cause of death or a causally relevant feature of the
event resulting in death (whether by action or by
omission); 2) there is sufficient current evidence
related to A's present condition such that either one
or more known causal laws supports B's belief that
A will be in a condition of acute suffering or
irreversible comatoseness; 3) (a) B's primary reason
for intending A's death is cessation of A's (actual or
predicted) suffering or irreversible comatoseness,
where B does not intend A's death for a different
primary reason, though there may be other
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relevant reasons, and (b) there is sufficient current
evidence for either A or B that causal means to A's
death will not produce any more suffering than
would be produced for A if B were not to intervene-
4) the causal means to the event of A's death are
chosen by A or B to be as painless as possible,
unless either A or B has an overriding reason for a
more painful causal means, where the reason for
choosing the latter causal means does not conflict
with the evidence in (3b); 5) A is a nonfetal
organism.
1 have made two more slight modifications to E5. 1 have
changed the definition so as to allow that human beings can die of
euthanasia by their own hands. While 1 will not be discussing
such cases in detail, it is important that any correct definition of
euthanasia include such a modification. Finally, I have removed
the claim that this is a definition of euthanasia for people. It is
the case that animals can be euthanized, and E6 does describe
euthanasia of animals as accurately as it describes euthanasia of
people. It may be noted that while a human being can die by his
own hand and such an act may still be called an act of euthanasia
according to E6, it is not the case that an animal can die of its own
hand and such an act be called an act of euthanasia, for at least
one of the parties (ie: the person doing the killing or letting, and
the individual who is killed or let die) must be a human being
according to part 1 of E6.
It should be pointed out that some people will take issue
with E6. They will single out 3b - the claim that there is sufficient
current evidence for either the patient or person performing the
act of euthanasia that the euthanasia will not produce any more
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suffering than would be produced if the euthanasia did not take
place. Some people will say that there is never sufficient current
evidence for this claim. For example, if you believe that all acts of
euthanasia will be punished by endless suffering in hell for the
person who is killed, then it is certainly better not to intervene, no
matter the amount of suffering the patient is undergoing. They
will say that this is not a problem for my definition, it is merely
evidence for the claim that there are no morally permissible acts
of euthanasia. 2 5 1 disagree. 1 did not wish to advance a definition
of 'euthanasia' in which all acts of euthanasia are by definition
morally right. 1 do not believe that all acts of euthanasia are by
definition morally right. By the same token, 1 do not believe that
by definition all acts of euthanasia are morally wrong.
Regrettably, 1 cannot see a way of altering E6 so as to
accommodate those who disagree with it on these grounds.
Consent and Informed Consent
While the term 'informed consent' refers to a more complex
concept than mere 'consent', when 1 refer to 'consent' 1 will mean
'informed consent'. What is the difference between 'consent' and
'informed consent', and why is the later preferred over the
former?
^^The importance of this objection is evident in Chapter II. Without the
claim in 3b, the argument presented in Chapter II, that counterfactual
consent can be used to morally justify acts of euthanasia, is not sound.
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Seemingly, any time a patient says "yes" when asked if he is
willing to undergo a treatment, that patient has consented to that
treatment. Yet, merely saying "yes" seems too weak a sufficient
condition for consent to that treatment. Imagine a delirious
patient, mumbling "yes" for a hour before being asked to undergo
a treatment. In that case, it was mere coincidence that the patient
said "yes" when asked if he would be willing to undergo a
treatment. Perhaps the patient was asked if he wished to undergo
a treatment, and said "yes". But even that statement of assent, or
"affirmative agreemenf'26 is not sufficient for consent.
Perhaps the patient felt undue pressure from his family, or
his doctors, to undergo a treatment that he would under other
circumstances refuse. In this case, the consent is not voluntary27.
The notion of 'consent' must be improved upon so as to eliminate
these cases in which a patient's mere utterance of the word 'yes',
or uninformed assent, or an unfree seeming assent, should not
count as true consent.
So as to eliminate these obviously false cases of giving
consent, I will now introduce a complete analysis of consent,
which I will call 'IC, for 'informed consent':
IC: A patient, S, gives informed consent to treatment x
for condition y iff 1 ) S assents to treatment x for y,
2) S is given sufficient information about x and y
and the effect x would have on y, 3) S comprehends
2^Ruth Macklin, "Autonomy, Beneficence and Child Development: An
Ethical Analysis", Social Research on Children and Adolescents: Ethical
Issues
,
ed. Barbara Stanley and Joan E. Sieber, Sage Pubhcations, 1992, p. 90.
27poot observes that persuading a patient to consent to euthanasia against
their will is a possible abuse resulting from the possible legalizing of
euthanasia (p. 59).
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the information given to him about both x and yand 4) the assent given by S for an agent to
perform treatment x for y is given freely and
voluntarily2 8
There are several terms that require further analysis before 1C
can be properly understood.
Sufficient information. How much must S know about both
his condition and the treatment for his condition before S has
sufficient information about his condition? It is important that S
not only know the details about the effect of x on y, but it must
also be the case that S know enough about y so as to know what
the possible alternative treatments are. If all that S knows is that
he has y , and that x is one possible treatment, but S is unaware of
other possible treatments, then S does not have enough
information so as to make an informed decision about treatment
x29. It is important that the patient not have too little information
on which to base his decision.
However, does the patient have to be aware of every
alternative? This would be prohibitive! The alternatives may be
too numerous to even name, let alone be described in any detaipo.
^^This analysis of 'informed consent' is based upon an analysis advanced
by the Office for Protection from Research Risks, National Institutes of
Health, Protecting Human Research Subjects . United States Department of
Health and Human Services, 1993, p. xxii. See also Dan W. Brock, Life and
Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics . Cambridge University
Press, 1993, p. 22. This analysis would also be endorsed by Joel Feinberg,
who claims that an agent can consent to relinquish any right as long as his
choice is fully informed, well considered, and uncoerced. See Joel
Feinberg, Harm to Others
.
Oxford University Press, 1984, pp 274-275.
29Brock, p. 22.
^^The Hastings Center appears to have overlooked this fact when they
claimed on page 21 that the patient or his surrogate should be careful to
consider all possible outcomes the patient might experience. The Hastings
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There is a point at which it is no longer reasonable to keep naming
alternative treatments. At what point is this? It is nearly
impossible to say. Suffice it to say that each of the reasonable
alternatives must be known to the patient for him to make an
informed decision that treatment x is the one to which he is
willing to consent.
Given that the patient knows that there are alternatives to
treatment x, how much more does he have to know? The doctor
would be irresponsible in merely naming the possible reasonable
treatments, without explaining what is involved in each of them.
Just knowing that there are numerous treatments, without
knowing what is involved in each is not sufficient for the patient
to make an informed choice. However, there is a limit to the
amount of information that is necessary for a patient to know
what is involved in each treatment. Another problem may arise if
a patient has too much information. It is possible that a patient is
told the details of his alternative treatments and possible side
effects in such detail that he will be paralyzed by fear at what is
involved. In this case, the patient may be too informed, and will
fail to chose an otherwise preferred treatment, out of fear^i.
Against this view, Humphry suggests that an agent is not
ready to die if he is questioning if dying his best alternative^^.
This seems misguided. The agent who is both rational and
informed enough about his alternatives so as to question those
Center, Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and the
Care of the Dying




alternatives seems best able to actualize the correct alternative.
If you failed to be both rational and informed about your
alternatives, it is possible that you would not be able to actualize
your best alternative, for you might not have the faculties to
actualize it, let alone recognize it! Just because an agent questions
if an alternative is his best does not eliminate that alternative
from being his best^^.
Brock recommends that the patient be told what a
reasonable person would want to know, and then have the
opportunity to ask for additional information that he might find
important to making his decision34. However, this raises an
interesting dilemma: how will the patient know what the
important additional information is that he needs to make his
informed decision unless he already has that information? It may
not occur to the patient to ask what the effects on his eyesight will
be if his leg is amputated, but that is not to say that there will not
be any effects on his eyesight. Putting the responsibility on the
patient to ask all the right questions, so that he might make an
informed decision, will not solve the problem of determining how
much information is enough. It is nearly impossible to say when
the patient knows enough so as to be properly informed.
Able to comprehend the information. This is not as complex
a notion as the notion of 'sufficient information'. For S to be able
to comprehend the information that has been given to him, it is
^^See Chapter IV for a discussion and rejection of a related view - that the
best alternative is defined as the one an agent chooses for himself.
^^Brock, p. 50.
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important that the information be stated in a way that S can
understand it. S's circumstances and mental abilities must be
taken into consideration when determining if the information is
presented in such a way that S can in fact understand the
information's, it is important to realize, however, that not every
patient has the ability to comprehend information given to him.
For example, infants or young children, as well as severely
retarded individuals, may have limited capacity to understand
anything at all. It makes very little sense to say that such
patients consented" to anything, for it is reasonable to assume
that they can not understand that treatment to which they give
their "consent"^^^
It is essential that the patient is rational to be able to give
informed consent to any treatment. Dan Brock considers a
thought experiment which illustrates the importance of rationality
in informed consent. Suppose that you are concerned for your
own well-being, and at the same time you value your ability to
make your own decisions. When would you want your own
decisions to be used to determine your fate, and when would you
want others to accept responsibility for determining your fate?
Brock claims that in those cases in which your own decision-
making abilities are severely limited by irrationality, and thus
you are unable to make rational decisions, on your own behalf.
^^Office for Protection from Research Risks, p. xxii.
^^However, while these agents never actually consent to anything, it may
nonetheless make sense to attribute true statements of counterfactual
consent to them, using either a "best interests" standard or a "rational
agent" standard, both of which are discussed in Chapter IV.
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you would want others to make decisions on your behalf37. Were
you irrational, you may consent to a treatment that would not
conform to your preferences.
A patient who is able to make a rational decision about his
treatments is one who is able to communicate and understand
what the treatment and the alternatives are, is able to deliberate
about those treatments, and is able to come to a decision about
those treatments which is in accord with his beliefs and
preferences38. it is not enough for the patient to merely have a
preference, rather, the patient must be able to connect that
preference to an alternative and understand how that alternative
best accords with his preference. It is important to note that it is
sufficient for the patient to make a rational choice if the choice is
in accord with his own preferences - it need not be in accord with
other people's preferences. The doctor may believe that what the
patient is choosing is wrong, for it is not the choice that the doctor
would have made were she in the patient's circumstances.
However, a choice is not irrational if another rational agent would
not have chosen the same thing. The choice is irrational if it does
not follow from the beliefs and preferences of the agent who is
doing the choosing. If the doctor believes that what the patient is
choosing is wrong, for what the patient is choosing does not follow
from the patient's own preferences, then the doctor can





Freely and voluntarily. It is important that a patient has not
been coerced into giving consent. However, the cases in which a
patient has been coerced into giving consent are often very
difficult to separate from those in which the patient has given free
and voluntary consent.
I will use the following test to distinguish between
circumstances that are truly coercive and those that are not truly
coercive. If the undesirable consequences of the patient's decision
are caused by the patient's illness, then those undesirable
consequences are not coercive; if those undesirable consequences
are caused by another agent, then they are coercive. The
following examples should illuminate the distinction. Imagine a
patient who is suffering from a disease, and he is told to accept a
treatment, or his medication will be withheld. "If you don't accept
this treatment," his doctor tells him, "I will withhold your
medication and you will end up in pain." In this case, another
agent would create the negative consequences that would result if
the patient did not consent to the treatment. If another agent
creates the negative consequences, then the patient is being
coerced. Thus, in the case in which the patient is threatened with
more pain by another agent unless he complies with the
treatment, the patient is being coerced.
However, consider a case in which a patient will suffer
equally painful consequences of not accepting the treatment, but
that pain will be a result of his disease, not a result of the actions
of any agent. The doctor may come to the patient and tell him, "If
you don't accept this treatment, you will end up in pain", but this
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is a warning about the results of his decision, not a threat. It is
an unfortunate circumstance, but it is not coercive. "That all
alternatives are "bad" and leave little or no "real choice" provides
no sound reason to set aside the patient's choice as involuntary
and to transfer the decision to another." 39
Counterfactuals and Counterfactual Consent
A counterfactual is a statement about what would, could,
might, or should be true, if some antecedent state of affairs were
true. David Lewis, in the famous first line of his book
Counterfactuals
. says:
'Ifkangaroos had no tails, they would topple over*
seems to me to mean something like this: in any
possible state of affairs in which kangaroos have no
tails, and which resembles our actual state of affairs as
much as kangaroos having no tails permits it to,
kangaroos topple over."^o
The sentence 'If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over' is
a counterfactual conditional - a conditional about what would,
could, might or should be true if its antecedent were true. The
truth value of a counterfactual conditional depends upon the truth





Harvard University Press, 1973, p. 1.
^dbid, p. 1.
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Lewis adopts two counterfactual conditional operators,
and which he believes to be interdefinable42. Lewis uses
’a->’ to abbreviate the counterfactual relation 'if it were the case
’
then it would be the case that The symbol '0->'
abbreviates the counterfactual relation 'if it were the case that
,
then it might be the case that Two statements about
the state of affairs, S, that an agent. A, would counterfactually
consent to would be symbolized in this manner:
If A were able to consent to S, then A would consent to
s*
A is able to consent to S d-> A consents to S
If A were able to consent to S, then A might consent to
S.
A is able to consent to S 0-> A consents to S
My discussion of counterfactuals about consent and their
relevance to euthanasia will be limited to the use of the '->'
counterfactual, not the '0->' counterfactual. While it may be
interesting to consider what an agent might have consented to,
had he been able to consent, I am primarily concerned with what
an agent would have consented to, had he been able to consent.
If an agent might have consented, there of course remains the
possibility that the agent might not have consented. Since I am
concerned with justifications of acts of euthanasia, considerations
about whether an agent might or might not have consented are
too weak for my philosophical purposes^B. The fact that
"^^Ibid, p. 2.
"^^Thus, I am eliminating the possibility that there are ties in comparative
similai'ities among worlds (ie: it is not the case that there ai'e two worlds
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an agent either might or might not have consented to his
euthanasia if he had been able to consent is not enough to justify
killing him - the fact that the agent would have consented to his
euthanasia if he been able to consent may have greater
justificatory power44. if it is a question between obtaining actual
consent and counterfactual consent - in which an agent either
might or might not give consent - the obvious choice is to obtain
actual consent. But if it is a choice between obtaining actual
consent and counterfactual consent - where it is clear that the
agent would give consent if he were asked - the choice is less
obvious45. Thus, my focus will be on the counterfactual
conditionals about what agents would have consented to, not
merely what they might have consented to.
To determine if a counterfactual conditional is true, consider
the closest possible world in which the antecedent is true. If in
that world the consequent is also true, then the counterfactual
conditional is true^^. if in the closest world in which an agent can
consent to being killed, he does consent to being killed, then the
which are both the closest to an agent's actual world, such that the agent
consents to being killed in one, and does not consent to being killed in the
other). Lewis does permit ties in orderings of worlds; Lewis, pp. 48- 52.
Robert C. Stalnaker's theory of counterfactuals is, in Stalnaker's words,
"essenti^y equivalent" to Lewis's, expect for allowing both a hmit
assumption and a uniqueness assumption, which allow that for for every
possible world i and every proposition which describes a change in the
state of affairs of a possible world
,
there is at least one A - world
minimally different from i and at most one A -world minimally different
from j
,
respectively. See Robert C. Stalnaker, Inquiry
. The MIT Press, 1979,
p. 133.
44see Chapter II for a discussion of the use of counterfactual consent to




counterfactual 'If he were able to consent to being killed, then he
would consent' is true. Certainly there are worlds in which the
agent does not offer consent, but not all worlds that have a true
antecedent are relevant. Only the closest possible world to the
agent's actual world in which he is able to offer consent is the
world that need be considered. If the agent is able to consent in
that world and does, then in his actual world it can be truly said
'If he were able to offer consent, then he would.'^^
Counterfactual Consent and the Definition of 'Euthanasia'
With a clear definition of 'euthanasia' and an understanding
of what is meant by "counterfactual consent" an important point
about the relationship between the two can be observed. The
definition of 'euthanasia' doesn't include anything about
counterfactual consent.
Acts of euthanasia are not acts that by definition are
consented to, either counterfactually or otherwise! Part 4 of E6
says "the causal means to the event of A's death are chosen by A
or B to be as painless as possible, unless either A or B has an
overriding reason for a more painful causal means". This is not a
question of choosing or consenting to the euthanasia itself, but
choosing a method of death. It may be argued that choosing a
method of death is tantamount to choosing death itself. This is a
Chapter III, I will elaborate on Lewis, demonstrating that
counterfactuals about consent require a more complex understanding than
first anticipated.
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mistake, however. I choose to die in as painless a way as possible.
This IS not the same as saying that I choose to die.
There is another reason for claiming that the concept of
counterfactual consent is not a part of the definition of
•euthanasia’. Part 4 of E6 talks about actual choosings, either by A
or B, not counterfactual choosings. A may not be in a position to
say what she consents to for herself at a particular moment in
time. Perhaps she is in a coma and can no longer can give consent,
or is a small infant who never was able to give consent. This is
not to say that the fact that she would have consented to being
euthanized, or would not have consented to being euthanized, is
irrelevant. Counterfactual consent' and 'euthanasia' are
conceptually distinct. However, there are interesting and
important philosophical connections between them.
In the next chapter, I will attempt to clarify the role of
counterfactual consent in acts of euthanasia. First, I will ask
when counterfactual consent is invoked. Which acts of euthanasia
make use of counterfactual consent? Second, I will ask why
counterfactual consent is invoked. When acts of euthanasia make
use of counterfactual consent, what are they relying on
counterfactual consent to do?
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CHAPTER II
THE USES OF COUNTERFACTUAL CONSENT:
ACTS AND JUSTIFICATIONS
In Chapter I, I answered the question, "What is
counterfactual consent?" In this chapter, I will attempt to answer
two more questions about counterfactual consent: "When is it
appropriate to use counterfactual consent?" and "Why do we use
counterfactual consent?"
Counterfactual consent is used to justify acts of euthanasia,
but which ones? Several philosophers have drawn distinctions
between different types of acts of euthanasia. One of the most
famous distinctions is between "active" and "passive" euthanasia.
However, I will demonstrate that this distinction is not helpful in
determining which acts of euthanasia invoke counterfactual
consent, as opposed to other forms of consent.
However, there is a distinction between types of acts of
euthanasia that proves to be more helpful. I will use Helga
Kuhse's and James Rachels' notions of "voluntary", "nonvoluntary"
and "involuntary" euthanasia to distinguish cases in which it is
appropriate to use statements of counterfactual consent from
those in which it is not appropriate to use statements of
counterfactual consent. I will summarize both Kuhse's and
Rachels' understanding of "voluntary", "nonvoluntary", and
"involuntary" euthanasia, and demonstrate the difference between
their understanding of these terms. Finally, after demonstrating
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several shortcomings in Rachels' terminology, 1 will adopt a
modified form of Kuhse's terminology.
After 1 have explained the types of acts of euthanasia for
which it is appropriate to invoke statements of counterfactual
consent, 1 will then consider the following question: if
counterfactual consent is used to justify an agent's actions, in what
sense does it justify those actions? Is counterfactual consent a
moral justification for an act of euthanasia, or might it succeed as
a legal justification for an act of euthanasia? 1 will examine each
of these questions in turn. 1 will conclude that counterfactual
consent does morally justify some acts of euthanasia, but it does
not and would not succeed as a legal justification for acts of
euthanasia. There are mistaken arguments for the claim that
counterfactual consent morally justifies acts of euthanasia,
including the "best judge" argument and the "Principle of Self-
Determination" or the "Principle of Autonomy" argument. 1 will
consider each of these, and demonstrate their shortcomings. Then,
using the definition of 'euthanasia' offered in Chapter 1 and T.M.
Scanlon's view on the value of choice, 1 will demonstrate how
counterfactual consent in fact does morally justify some, but not
all, acts of euthanasia. Finally, 1 will examine two questions about
counterfactual consent and legal justifications. Does
counterfactual consent legally justify acts of euthanasia? Should
counterfactual consent be used to legally justify acts of
euthanasia? The answer to each of these questions is 'no'.
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When is Counterfactual Consent Invoked?
An Impertinent Distinction
It is not the case that counterfactual consent is
appropriately invoked in all cases of euthanasia. Cases in which a
competent individual asks to be killed in his hospital bed are
cases in which actual consent is given, not counterfactual consent.
In such cases, it is not wondered what the patient would consent
to, were he able to consent. It is clear exactly what the patient
would consent to - he tells us. The justification for the act of
euthanizing such a person is not that this is what "he would have
wanted, were he able to tell us"; rather, the justification for the act
of euthanizing him is that this is "that to which he actually
consented."
The above case tells us one case in which counterfactual
consent is not used. In which cases of euthanasia is counterfactual
consent appropriately invoked to justify the act of euthanasia? To
answer this question, it would be helpful to try to distinguish
between different types of acts of euthanasia. Perhaps one of the
most famous distinctions between acts of euthanasia will be
helpful in determining when counterfactual consent is
appropriately used: the distinction between active and passive
euthanasia.
James Rachels introduces the concepts of active and passive
euthanasia, and attempts to draw a distinction between them:
The distinction between active and passive euthanasia
is thought to be crucial for medical ethics. The idea is
that it is permissible, at least in some cases, to
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withhold treatment and allow a patient to die, but it is
never permissible to take any direct action designed to
kill the patient. 1 ^
According to Rachels, active euthanasia takes place when direct
action designed to kill a patient is taken. Passive euthanasia takes
place when treatment is withheld, and patients are allowed to die.
Thomas D. Sullivan elaborates: "By "active euthanasia" Rachels
seems to mean doing something to bring about a patient's death,
and by passive euthanasia," not doing anything, i.e., just letting
the patient die."2 Of course, it is very difficult to draw the
distinction between direct action that is designed to kill someone,
and a non-action, the intended result of which is the termination
of life^. Rachels does not attempt to rigorously analyze these two
concepts. Instead, he offers several examples that supposedly
illustrate the difference between the two concepts. One of these
examples is of a patient who is dying of throat cancer, who asks to
die and whose doctor agrees to withhold life-prolonging
treatment. Withholding the treatment would hasten the patient's
death, and the withholding of such treatment would be a case of
passive euthanasia.^ However, were the doctor to inject the
Ijames Rachels, "Active and Passive Euthanasia", Biomedical Ethics , ed.
Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S. Zembaty, McGraw-Hill Inc., 1991, p. 367.
^Thomas D. Sullivan, "Active cuid Passive Euthanasia An Impertinent
Distinction?", Biomedical Ethics , ed. Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S. Zembaty,
McGraw-Hill, p. 371.
^For examples of attempts to draw a distinction between actions and non-
actions, see Jonathan Bennett's "Positive and Negative Relevance",
American Philosophical Quarterly , vol. 20, 1983, pp. 185-194; Daniel Dinello,
"On Killing and Letting Die", Analysis , vol. 31, 1971, pp. 83-86; and Bruce
Russell, "On the Relative Strictness of Negative and Positive Duties",
American Philosophical Quarterly , vol. 14, 1977, pp. 87-97.
^Rachels, "Active and Passive Euthanasia", p. 368.
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patient with some drug that would kill him, then such an act
would be an act of active euthanasia. In another example, a child
with Down's Syndrome and an intestinal obstruction is allowed to
die of starvation, rather than have the obstruction surgically
removed. This is a case of passive euthanasia, for the doctors are
merely withholding an operation that would save the infant,
rather than taking direct action designed to kill the infant.5
Does the distinction between passive and active euthanasia
help to draw the distinction between cases of euthanasia that
might appropriately be justified using counterfactual consent and
the cases that might appropriately be justified using actual
consent? It does not. In the case of the patient with throat
cancer, the patient certainly gave actual, and not counterfactual,
consent to his own death. He asks the doctor to help him die. The
doctor agrees to withhold treatment, and thus the patient dies
from passive euthanasia. In this case, the doctor may justify his
choice to perform an act of passive euthanasia by citing the
patient's actual consent to the withholding of treatment. It would
have been inappropriate for the doctor to justify his actions using
counterfactual consent; actual consent was available.
However, the doctor could have given the patient an
injection which would have killed him, after the patient asked to
die. This would have made the patient's death an act of active
euthanasia. The patient still gave his explicit actual consent. In
this case, the doctor may justify his choice to perform an act of
^Rachels, "Active cind Passive Euthanasia", p. 368.
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active euthanasia by citing the patient's actual consent to the
lethal injection. Again, it would have been inappropriate in this
case for the doctor to cite a statement of counterfactual consent
when actual consent was given.
It seems that actual consent may be used appropriately in
both cases of passive and active euthanasia. Thus, it is not the
case that either active or passive euthanasias are acts of
euthanasia that may appropriately be justified exclusively via
counterfactual consent. Is it the case that counterfactual consent is
appropriate in only passive, or in only active, acts of euthanasia?
No - neither of these is the case. Rachels' Downs Syndrome infant
case illustrates this fact. It is not the case that infants can offer
consent to anything. Yet, the parents of the infant, along with the
doctor, may reach the following conclusion: "Our child is not
healthy. The quality of her life will be forever compromised.
Furthermore, the time and resources that would be used in taking
care of this child would disproportionately subtract from the time
and resources that could be spent on our other children. Were she
able to understand this, and able to tell us what she wanted, she
would tell us that it is okay for us to allow her to die. Thus, it is
permissible for us to withhold treatment of this infant." If this is
the parents' and the doctor's line of reasoning, and they withhold
giving the infant the life-saving operation, then they will have
attempted to justify this act of passive euthanasia using
counterfactual consent. Such a line of reasoning is an appropriate
use of counterfactual consent in an attempt to justify an act of
euthanasia.
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A similar line of reasoning could be used for them to justify
the infant's active euthanasia using counterfactual consent. The
parents may consider that allowing the infant slowly to starve to
death would be needlessly painful. While the infant would have
wanted to die, they think, it is not the case that she would have
wanted to die like this. A painless injection that would kill her,
and save her days of slow starvation, is what any rational agent in
their daughter s circumstances would have preferred. Thus, the
parents justify their daughter's active euthanasia using
counterfactual consent. This too is an appropriate use of
counterfactual consent to justify an act of euthanasia.
1 have illustrated that neither active nor passive euthanasia
is appropriately justified exclusively using counterfactual consent
or actual consent. Actual consent is appropriate in both cases of
passive and active euthanasia. Counterfactual consent is
appropriate in both cases of passive and active euthanasia.
Another distinction between types of acts of euthanasia must be
drawn to distinguish those cases in which counterfactual consent
is appropriately invoked, and cases in which it is not.
Kuhse and Rachels on a
Three-Way Distinction Among Acts of Euthanasia
While the passive/active distinction between acts of
euthanasia has not proven helpful in determining which acts of
euthanasia appropriately use counterfactual consent as part of
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their justification, this is not the only distinction among types of
acts of euthanasia. Several philosophers draw another distinction
among types of euthanasia. This distinction is among voluntary
euthanasia, non-voluntary euthanasia, and involuntar>^
euthanasia^. Helga Kuhse explains the differences among these
three kinds of euthanasia:
The case of Mary F. is a clear case of voluntary
euthanasia; that is, euthanasia carried out by A at the
request of B, for the sake of B.... Euthanasia can be
voluntary even if the person is no longer competent to
assert her wish to die when her life is ended. You
might wish to have your life ended should you ever
find yourself in a situation where, whilst suffering
from a distressing and incurable condition, illness or
accident have robbed you of all your rational faculties,
and you are no longer able to decide between life and
’
death. If, whilst still competent, you expressed the
considered wish to die when in a situation such as this,
then the person who ends your life in the appropriate
circumstances acts upon your request and performs an
act of voluntary euthanasia.
Euthanasia is non-voluntary when the person
whose life is ended cannot choose between life and
death for herself - for example, because she is a
hopelessly ill or handicapped newborn infant, or
because illness or accident have rendered a formerly
competent person permanently incompetent, without
that person having previously indicated whether she
would or would not like euthanasia under certain
circumstances.
Euthanasia is involuntary when it is performed
on a person who would have been able to give or
withhold consent to her own death, but has not given
consent - either because she was not asked, or because
^James Rachels, "Euthanasia", Matters of Life and Death. New Introductory
Essays in Moral Philosophy , ed. Tom Regan, Random House, 1986, pp. 38-39.
See also Helga Kuhse, "Euthanasia", A Companion to Ethics , ed. Peter Singer,
Basil Blackwell, 1993, pp. 295.
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she was asked but withheld consent, wanting to so on
living^. ® ^
In summary, Kuhse claims that there are two kinds of
voluntary euthanasia: 1 ) when the person who is killed requests
to be euthanized at the time of death, and 2) when the person
who is killed had previously requested that were she to be in a
circumstance (c) such that she could not consent to being
euthanized, she would desire to be euthanized, and c obtains.
Hereafter, I will refer to these two kinds of voluntary euthanasia
as 'voluntaryr and 'voluntary2', respectively. The relevant
distinction between voluntary 1 and voluntary2 euthanasia is that
in cases of voluntary 1 euthanasia the patient requests euthanasia
at the time of death, whereas in cases of voluntary2 euthanasia
the patient requested euthanasia at some time prior to the time of
death. There are two kinds of nonvoluntary euthanasia: 1 ) when
the person who is killed had never previously been able to
consent to being euthanized, and is euthanized, and 2) when the
person who is killed had previously been able to consent to being
euthanized under condition (c), the person did not previously
consent nor deny consent to being euthanized under c, c obtains,
and the person is euthanized. I will refer to these two kinds of
euthanasia as 'nonvoluntaryl' and 'nonvoluntary2', respectively.
Finally, involuntary euthanasia occurs when the person is able to
consent or withhold consent to being killed. This person either 1
)
does withhold consent to being killed, or 2) is never asked for her
^Kuhse, p. 295.
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consent to being killed, and is killed anyway. I will refer to these
two kinds of euthanasia as 'involuntary 1 ' and 'involuntar>'2'
euthanasia, respectively.
It IS the case that the notion of counterfactual consent is
used, in part, to distinguish among the different types of
voluntary, nonvoluntary, and involuntary euthanasia. In several
of these types of euthanasia, agents are asked to consider what
the patient would have consented to, had he been able to give
consent. Which of the types of voluntary, nonvoluntary and
involuntary acts of euthanasia appropriately make use of
counterfactual consent? I will consider each of them in turn.
It is not appropriate to cite counterfactual consent in an
attempt to justify voluntary1 euthanasia. The first type of
euthanasia that Kuhse considers is voluntary 1 euthanasia. In
these cases, the patient is actually asked for consent, and actually
gives consent. It is not appropriate to cite counterfactual consent,
for it is not needed. Actual consent is obtained.
It can be appropriate to cite counterfactual consent in an
attempt to justify voluntary2 euthanasia. Counterfactual consent
plays an important role in some voluntary2 euthanasias, but not
all. Voluntary2 euthanasias are cases in which the patient says
explicitly, "I consent to my doctors and family killing me when (or
if) I am ever in condition c", and condition c later obtains. The
statement "I consent to my doctors and family killing me when (or
iO I um in condition c" is not a statement of counterfactual
consent, for the patient is actually giving consent; it is the case
however that the patient is giving consent to being killed when
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(or if) condition c obtains, long before condition c does obtain.
Perhaps the patients make these statements of consent known to
their families via Living Wills, or some explicit conversation in
which they state that when (or if) they were ever in the condition
they are in now, that their family and doctors have their consent
to euthanize them. Such a statement is a statement of assertoric
antecedent consent, or problematic antecedent consent, but not
counterfactual consent^. However, the euthanasias that
appropriately use assertoric antecedent consent or problematic
antecedent consent and those that appropriately use
counterfactual consent are not exclusive. The family and doctors
of patients who die of voluntary2 euthanasia may justify their act
of euthanasia by making reference to counterfactual consent.
"Were she able to give consent to her death right now, then she
would give consent," they will claim. They will take as evidence
for their claim the Living Will, or their earlier conversation with
the patient.
It is important to note that the Living Will, and the conversation in which
the patient stated that when she is in condition c in the future, then she
would hke for her relatives to kill her, are not statements of counterfactual
consent. They are evidence for the truth of a statement of counterfactual
consent, but they are not statements of counterfactual consent themselves.
Rather, they are statements of assertoric antecedent consent. Similarly,
the conversation in which the patient stated that if she is in condition c in
the future, then she would hke her relatives to kiU her, is not a statement
of counterfactual consent. Rather, such a statement is a statement of
problematic antecedent consent. The agent, in composing a Living Will, is
saying to her doctors and family, "When (or if) condition c obtains, you
have my consent to kih me." This is not a statement of counterfactual
consent. Consent has been given long before condition c has obtained (and
it is entirely possible that condition c will never obtain!). For a complete
discussion of the difference between assertoric antecedent consent,
problematic antecedent consent, and counterfactual consent, see Chapter
IV, "Evidence for the Truth of Statements of Counterfactual Consent."
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Of course, in cases of voluntaryZ euthanasia, it is entirely
possible that there was no use of counterfactual consent in
justifying the act of euthanasia. The doctor or family of the
patient may have consulted the Living Will and said, "This is a
clear statement of what the patient previously gave consent to,
thus it is permissible to euthanize this patient" without
considering what the patient would consent to now
,
if he were
able to consent. In such voluntaryZ cases, counterfactual consent
is not employed to justify the act of euthanasia. Thus,
counterfactual consent is appropriate in some, but not all, cases of
voluntary2 euthanasia.
It can be appropriate to cite counterfactual consent in an
attempt to justify nonvoluntary1 euthanasia. Deformed infants
are unable to consent to being killed. We may justify their deaths
by saying, "Were they to live, their lives would be unfulfilling. If
they could realize this, then they would choose to be killed."
Effectively, we are saying that if these infants were able to make
rational choices, they would choose to be euthanized. Such is the
case of the infant with Down's Syndrome and an intestinal
blockage, described by Rachels. Or, we may attempt to justify
their deaths by saying, "They can't make a decision, so we will
choose what is best for them. Certainly, they would want what is
best for themselves. Were they able to choose what is best for
themselves, they would choose death." In this case, we use a
best-interest criterion to determine what the infants would have
wanted, had they expressible preferences. Both the "rational
choice" model and the "best interest" model used to ascribe
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statements of counterfactual consent to the infant.^
Nonvoluntaryl euthanasias are performed on individuals who
lack decision-making capacities, such as infants and severeiy
retarded individuals. These are cases in which the patients are
unable to make a judgment about those actions to which they
would consent. Not all nonvoluntaryl cases of euthanasia are
justified using statements of counterfactual consent, but it is
appropriate to do so.
It can be appropriate to cite counterfactual consent in an
attempt to justify nonvoluntary2 euthanasia. Nonvoluntary2
euthanasias are acts of euthanasia to which the patient neither
gave assertoric antecedent consent or problematic antecedent
consent, nor denied assertoric antecedent consent or problematic
antecedent consent. Counterfactual consent may be appropriately
used to justify the euthanasia: were this individual to be asked
now, then he would consent to being killed. Alas, he did not
explicitly express his preference while he still could. Now that he
can't express his preferences, the best we can do is imagine what
he would say, were he able to tell us. Nonvoluntary2
euthanasias are performed on individuals who at one time were
able to express rational preferences. However, circumstances
prevent them from voicing rational preferences when the issue of
consent is actually discussed. Nonvoluntary2 euthanasia might be
^For further discussion of these two models, see Chapter IV, "The Truth
Conditions for Statements of Counterfactual Consent".
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performed on comatose persons who were formally rational, but
currently are unable to express a preference lo.
It can be appropriate to cite counterfactual consent in an
attempt to justify involuntaryl euthanasia. Imagine a case of a
person who might be unduly depressed by the thought of being
euthanized, even though he realizes that this is the best option
available to him. His family realizes this, and concludes, "Were we
to ask him, he would certainly consent to being euthanized. But
we ought not add more misery to his final hours. Instead, we
should just euthanize him without asking his consent." 1 1 In this
way
,
involuntaryl euthanasias may appropriately make use of
counterfactual consent.
It is not appropriate to cite counterfactual consent in an
attempt to justify involuntaryl euthanasia.
.
In cases of
involuntaryZ euthanasia, the patient explicitly denies actual
consent! Since the patient was able to make an actual decision
about consent
,
there is no need to determine counterfactually if
the patient would have consented, had she been asked. The
patient had been asked, and said no. However, consider the
patient who at one time was rational, but no longer is. For
whatever reason his judgment is impaired, and while when he
lOOne case of nonvoluntaryZ euthanasia which is currently being debated
that makes use of counterfactual consent is discussed in Michael deCourcy
Hinds's "Uncharted Law for a Man Between Life and Death", The New York
Times
,
June 6, 1994. The mother of 39 year old Joey Fiori claims her son
"Was an outdoors person. He was interested in sports, surfing and bowling.
If he could speak, there is no way he would want to hve this way [in a
persistent vegitative state for the past 23 years]."
^
^For a complete discussion of such a case, see Chapter V, "Counterfactual
Consent and Actual Consent".
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was rational, he would have consented to euthanasia, now that he
IS irrational he has denied consent. Might our euthanasia of such
an individual be a case of involuntaryZ euthanasia, justified using
counterfactual consent? I do not believe so, for 1 do not believe
that the irrational patient truly denied consent to being
euthanized. As 1 stated in Chapter 1, an agent gives consent to x if
and only if l)he assents to x, 2) he is given enough information
about X, 3) he is able to comprehend the information about x, and
4) the assent to x is given freely and voluntarily. An agent who is
not rational cannot meet the third criterion, and probably cannot
meet the fourth either. Thus, such an agent cannot consent, nor
deny consent, to anything. Such a case would more appropriately
be a case of nonvoluntary2 euthanasia, and not involuntary2
euthanasia.
But what if the patient is lying? Consider the the patient
who believes that asking for euthanasia is wrong, but if he is
killed, he would be better off. When asked, he denied consent.
But his family is able to say "If we were to do what is best for
him, we would euthanize him. It is what he wants for himself."
But the family hasn't justified his euthanasia using counterfactual
consent. The family has merely said what would be in the
patient's best interest. They never said, "And he would consent to
what he knows to be best for himself." This patient does not
consent, and would not consent. The family may justify his
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euthanasia using other methods, but not using counterfactual
consent 12.
The foilowing chart summarizes the roie that consent,
counterfactual consent, and lack of consent play in Kuhse's
distinctions between voluntary, non-voluntary, and involuntar>-
euthanasia:








voluntary2 no may be
appropriate
no
nonvoluntary 1 no may be
appropriate
no
nonvoluntary2 no may be
appropriate
no
involuntaryl no may be
appropriate
no
involuntary2 no no yes, ex-
plicitly
1 2xhe patient who is lying, and the patient who is irrational, were
mentioned to me by Fred Feldman as possible cases that tested the
boundaries of what counts as involuntary2 euthanasia.
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Kuhse is not the only philosopher to draw the
voluntary/non-voluntary/involuntary distinction. James Rachels
discusses these distinctions:
Vdiunfary euthanasia occurs whenever the patient
requests death. The cases of Barbara B. and Charles C.
are both examples of voluntary euthanasia, since both
patients asked to be killed. Nonvolunt3Ty euthanasia
occurs when the patient is unable to form a judgment
or voice a wish in the matter and, therefore, expresses
no desire whatever. The cases of Edward E. and
Frances F. are both instances of nonvoluntary
euthanasia; Edward was senile and only semiconscious,
while Frances was permanently comatose, so neither
could form a preference.
Finally, involuntary euthanasia occurs when the
patient says that he or she does not want to die but is
nevertheless killed or allowed to die. In this essay 1
will not be concerned with involuntary euthanasia.
My view is that it is simply murder and that it is not
justified. If a person wants to live on, even in great
pain and even with the certainty of a horrible end,
that is the individual's right
Rachels and Kuhse do not have the same notions of
voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. According
to Rachels, voluntary euthanasias are performed in cases where
the patients explicitly ask to be killed. Thus, there is no need to
appeal to counterfactual consent in these cases - the patients gave
actual consent. However, Rachels does not say when the patient
explicitly asks to be killed. In the cases he mentions, both
patients ask to be killed at the time of their deaths. What about
cases like Kuhse's voluntaryZ euthanasia, in which the patients
^
^Rachels, "Euthanasia", pp. 38-39.
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ask to be killed in possible circumstance (c), before (c) actually
obtains? Rachels will have to put cases of euthanasia which cite
statements of antecedent consent, like Living Wills, somewhere on
his list. While such cases of euthanasia aren't necessarily justified
using count0rfa.ctua.l consent, and may be justified using only
antecedent consent, some cases of voluntary euthanasia are
appropriately justified using counterfactual consent. These cases
belong with cases of voluntary euthanasia, although Rachels
doesn't mention them.
Rachels' discussion of nonvoluntary euthanasia more closely
parallels Kuhse's discussion. He discusses two kinds of non-
voluntary euthanasia, cases in which 1) a patient is unable to
make a judgment about his condition and cases in which 2) a
patient is unable to express his judgment about his condition.
The cases in which patients are unable to make a judgment are
co-extensive with Kuhse's nonvoluntary 1 cases, while the cases in
which the patients are unable to express a judgment are co-
extensive with Kuhse's nonvoluntaryZ cases. In both of these
cases of nonvoluntary euthanasia, it would be appropriate to cite a
statement of counterfactual consent in an attempt to justify these
acts of euthanasia. He says that without consent, what is
supposed to have been an act of euthanasia would in fact be
murder. While the patients who are euthanized in nonvoluntary
cases are unable to give consent, were they to deny consent they
would have been murdered. Thus, Rachels must assume that
patients who are nonvoluntarily euthanized would give consent,
were they able to do so. Thus, there is an implicit appeal to
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counterfactual consent in justifying both types of nonvoluntaiy'
euthanasia.
Finally, Rachels discusses involuntaty euthanasia. Here,
Rachels departs dramatically from Kuhse. Rachels’ claim is that
involuntary euthanasia takes place only when the patient is
asked, and denies consent to be euthanized. In these cases, the
patient actually denies consent. This notion of involuntary^
euthanasia corresponds to Kuhse's notion of involuntary2
euthanasia. What of Kuhse's involuntaryl euthanasia, in which
the patient could have consented or denied consent, but was not
asked? Involuntaryl euthanasia does not correspond to Rachels'
notion of involuntary euthanasia, for there may be cases in which
the patient would have consented had he been asked, only he
wasn't asked. Rachels claims that every case of involuntary^
euthanasia has a patient who is asked, but explicitly says no.
Certainly involuntaryl euthanasia is not a case of nonvoluntary
euthanasia, for the patient both can make a judgment and is able
to voice a judgment about his death in cases of involuntaryl
euthanasia. Finally, involuntaryl euthanasia is certainly not the
same as Rachels' voluntary euthanasia, for again, the patient is
explicitly asked and consents in Rachels' notion of voluntary
euthanasia. In cases of Kuhse's involuntaryl euthanasia, the
patient does neither. Rachels has no way to account for cases of
involuntaryl euthanasia.
The following chart summarizes the role that consent,
counterfactual consent, and denial of consent play in Rachels'
notions of voluntary, nonvoluntary, and involuntary euthanasia:
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involuntary no no yes, ex-
plicitly
Kuhse s 6-part distinction among the different types of
voluntary
,
nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia illuminates
distinctions that Rachels fails to observe. One of these distinctions
is the difference between actual consent given at the time of
euthanasia, and assertoric antecedent consent or problematic
antecedent consent, in the form of a Living Will. Statements of
antecedent consent may be invoked as evidence for the truth of a
statement of counterfactual consent. Kuhse's distinction between
voluntary 1 and voluntary2 euthanasia illustrates the difference
between actual consent and antecedent consent which may be
used as evidence for a claim of counterfactual consent. A second
distinction Rachels fails to observe is the difference between acts
of involuntaryl and involuntary2 euthanasia. Since Kuhse's
analysis does observe these distinctions, her analysis will be more
effective.
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The Use of Counterfactual Con.sent-
Tustifications
Now that it is clear which acts of euthanasia appropriately
make use of counterfactual consent, the next question is obvious:
how is counterfactual consent used? What does a statement of
counterfactual consent do for those who are considering
performing an act of euthanasia?
Statements of counterfactual consent are used in the
attempt to justify acts of euthanasia. In making reference to a
claim about counterfactual consent, an agent attempts to
demonstrate that this act was permissible. But how does
counterfactual consent justify an act of euthanasia? In Chapter 1,
1 demonstrated that counterfactual consent is not part of the
definition of 'euthanasia'. But counterfactual consent may add
something to the performance of acts of euthanasia. Does it give
a moral justification for the act? Or, is it possible that it could be
used to offer a legal justification for an act of euthanasia? 1
believe that when agents use statements of counterfactual consent
to justify their acts of euthanasia, they are using those statements
in an attempt to morally justify acts of euthanasia. However,
there are some interesting considerations in evaluating the legal
question.
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A Few Words on lustifirarinn
Before I can consider if counterfactual consent either
morally justifies an act of euthanasia or could be used to legally
justify an act of euthanasia, it is important to understand what I
mean by the claim that an agent justifies an action. What 1 will
mean by saying 'S justifies P by mentioning Q; is that an agent, S,
shows P is permissible by pointing out that a proposition, or set of
propositions, Q, is true. For example, if an agent considered the
following true propositions, "I am experiencing ordinary sensory
data", "1 am not taking hallucinogens", and "1 seem to see a cat on
yonder mat", he would then be "epistemically justified" in
believing that there is a cat on the mat. Such propositions would
convey that it is epistemically permissible to believe that there is
a cat on the mat. This conception of justification is similar to
William P. Alston's conception:
To be justified in believing that p is for that belief to
be based on adequate ground. The ground must be of
a sort that is typically directly cognitively accessible to
normal human subjects; and the adequacy is a matter
of the grounds being sufficiently indicative of the
truth of the belief.... (Justification) makes an important
contribution towards making a true belief into
knowledge 14.
In other words, an epistemic justification gives an agent sufficient
reason to believe that the proposition he believes is true. Alston
l^william P. Alston, Epistemic Tustification: Essays in the Theory of
Knowledge
. Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 10.
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observes that epistemic justifications contribute to knowledge by
helping us to "attain the true and avoid the false". is
If an epistemic justification is a proposition or a set of
propositions about a proposition p that gives you a sufficient
reason to believe that p is true, then a moral justification is a
proposition or a set of propositions about an action a that gives
you sufficient reason to believe that a is morally permissible.
Similarly, a legal justification is a proposition or a set of
proposition about an action a that gives you sufficient reason to
believe that a is legally permissible.
It is important to note that while counterfactual consent
may serve as one type of justification for an act of euthanasia, it
may not serve as another. Counterfactual consent may morally
justify an act of euthanasia, but would fail to succeed as an
appropriate legal justification of the same act of euthanasia.
Phillipa Foot claims that while some acts of euthanasia may be
morally justified, it may be impossible for the practice of
euthanasia to be legally justified. it is not the case that every
act which is morally justified is legally justified. Thus, the same
proposition may serve as one type of justification, but not another.
When considering if counterfactual consent could serve as a
moral or legal justification for an act of euthanasia, the question
being asked is this: Is counterfactual consent a sufficient
justification? Alston's notion of an 'epistemic justification' is of a
sufficient justification. The true propositions expressed by the
1
^Alston, p. 10.
l^Foot, "Euthanasia", p. 59.
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sentences "I am experiencing ordinary sensory data", "I am not
taking hallucinogens", and "I seem to see a cat on yonder mat" are
jointly a sufficient epistemic justification for believing that a cat is
on the mat. This question ought not be confused with asking if
counterfactual consent is a necessary, but not sufficient, part of a
complete justification. Typically, when we ask if some
proposition serves as a justification, we are asking if it serves as a
sufficient justification. When I ask the question, "Can
counterfactual consent morally/legally justify this act of
euthanasia?", I am asking if counterfactual consent is a sufficient
justification for the act in question.
Counterfactual Consent: TustiWing the
Moral Permissibility of Euthanasia?
The following argument may be presented to demonstrate
that counterfactual consent does not morally justify acts of
euthanasia. We often consent to acts that are not morally right.
Consent, either actual or counterfactual, does not entail moral
rightness. There is no moral normative theory that says that an
act is right if and only if the agent/s affected by the performance
of that act would have given consent to the performance of that
act. Thus, it is not the case that counterfactual consent is
sufficient to justify acts of euthanasia.
However, the conclusion that counterfactual consent is not
sufficient to determine the moral rightness of an act of euthanasia
may be too hasty. It is true that in general it is possible to
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consent to an act that is not morally right, but perhaps the act of
euthanasia is peculiar in that consent, either actual or
counterfactual, is sufficient for that act to be morally permissible.
A definition of 'euthanasia', E5, has already been advanced in
Chapter 1. Parts 3 of E5 reads:
3) (a) B's primary reason for intending A's death is
cessation of A's (actual or predicted) suffering or
irreversible comatoseness, where A does not intend
A's death for a different primary reason, though there
may be other relevant reasons, and either (b) there is
sufficient current evidence for either A or B that
causal means to A's death will not produce any more
suffering than would be produced for A if B were not
to intervene, or (c) there is sufficient current evidence
for B that the causal means to A's death, when A is
irreversibly comatose, will not result in any more
suffering than would be appropriate to cease A's
irreversible comatoseness;
and part 4 of E5 reads:
4) the causal means to the event of A's death are
chosen by A or B to be as painless as possible, unless
either A or B has an overriding reason for a more
painful causal means, where the reason for choosing
the later causal means does not conflict with the
evidence in (3b) or (3c).
Significantly, 'euthanasia' is defined as an act that is performed
with the intention to prevent actual or future suffering, and is
performed in such a way so as to promote the smallest amount of
suffering as possible. 'Euthanasia' is defined as the act that is
among the best actualizable alternatives. Perhaps it is the case
that the patient's consent, either actual or counterfactual, is
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sufficient to make an act of euthanasia not merely one that is
among the best actualizable alternatives, but makes euthanasia
the best alternative. Why do we believe that consent contributes
to determining which is the best alternative?
One reason is that we often believe that a person is the
best judge of his or her own happiness. Ronald Dworkin cites this
view as one of the reasons given for respecting the autonomy of
persons: "We should respect the decisions people make for
themselves, even when we regard these decisions as imprudent,
because each person generally knows what is in his own best
interests better than anyone else."^^ If a person would have
consented to ending her own life, we often believe that ending
that life is the right thing to do^s. if a person is the best judge of
the amount of happiness that her life or death will bring her, and
she consents to terminating her life, then we take her at her word.
Similarly, if she didn't actually consent to terminating her life, but
we have evidence to believe that she would have consented to
terminating her life, we use this as evidence that her death truly
would be what is best for her.
However, it is important to recognize that each person is not
always the best judge of her own happiness. There are three
possible reasons for an agent's failure to be the best judge of her
own happiness. First, people often change their minds as to what
1
^Dworkin, p, 223.
l^For a consideration and subsequent denial of a similar view, see Phillipa
Foot, "Euthanasia", Virtues and Vices
.
University of California Press, 1978,
pp. 40-41. Foot considers If a necessary condition on the life of an agent
being a good be that the agent beheve it to be a good.
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will maximize their happiness. Dworkin points out that this is a
problem with Living Wills and surrogates, "There is no guarantee
that he [the patient] did not change his mind sometime after the
last formal or informal declaration, or that he wouldn't have
changed his mind if he had thought about the matter again."
Given that people can and do change their minds, they can not
always be relied upon to settle on a course of action that will
maximize their happiness. Second, people are often mistaken
about what will bring them the most happiness. Third, despite the
fact that we think that a person is often the best judge of what
makes her happy, she may not be in a position to know what
those things are. Dworkin finds the claim that others may be
better judges of a patient's happiness than she is to be
paternalistic^o. Whether this claim is paternalistic or not, a
mistake is made when a patient chooses for herself that which
would not be best for her.
It is possible to object to the claim that each person really
isn't the best judge of her own happiness. The objection is this:
what is meant by "the happiness of S" is "what S wants". What a
person wants precisely is that which makes her happy, and what
makes her happy is what she wants. 1 think that this is
wrongheaded. The implication is that no one can ever make a
mistake about what makes her happy. But this is foolish - we
make mistakes all the time! 1 need not come up with dozens of
1
^Dworkin, p. 191. See also Chapter IV, "The Truth Conditions for
Statements of Counterfactual Consent".
^Ooworkin, p. 193.
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examples in which people have thought that what they wanted
was what would make them happiest, and they were wrong. The
reader can certainly consider several examples from his or her
own
A variation on the notion that "what S wants" is "what
makes S happiest" is the Principle of Self Determination, or the
Principle of Autonomy. These principles state that a patient has
the right to make all of her own treatment decisions22. why
should a patient have the right to make all of her own treatment
decisions? Presumably, the patient should not have the right to
make all of these important decisions if it were thought that the
patient would be making wrong choices. Instead, it is believed
that the choices that the patient makes are by definition the best
choices for the patient: "The patient is the best judge of his or her
own interests. 23 The Principle of Autonomy is motivated by an
attempt to avoid medical paternalism - doctors making decisions
without the patient's input based solely on what would be "best
for the patient". If what the patient decides determines what is
best for the patient, then it is impossible for the doctor, without
patient input, to determine what is best for the patient.
Tti0 legal term for the right of an agent to choose an alternative that is
not in the agent's best interest is the "right of folly". An example of the
right of folly is that an agent has the right to give all his money away to a
corrupt charity, without his family preventing the transaction. Implicit in
the right of folly is the notion that what an agent wants, and what would
make the agent happiest, are not always identical, for it is possible to
choose one without choosing the other.
22see Dworkin, p. 188, 190, on the Principle of Autonomy; the Hastings
Center Report, p. 7, on the Principle of Autonomy; Dan Brock, Life and
Death
,




The Principle of Autonomy and Principle of Self
Determination, while admirable, are too strong. Even defenders of
these principles will admit that it is possible for patients to be
mistaken about what is in their best interests. Dan Brock
discusses the circumstances in which it is permissible to waive the
right to Self Determination. One of these circumstances is when
the patient admits that she is not in a position to know what is
best for herself24. t. M. Scanlon observes that "the demand to
make outcomes depend on people's choices and the demand to
promote their welfare are quite independent, and they can often
pull in opposite directions. "25 Phillipa Foot argues that in making
the mistake that what is good is what an agent has chosen, that
we are often confusing a prudential and a moral sense of
goodness26. it may be the case that embezzling millions without
getting caught is good for an agent in a prudential sense, but
embezzling millions without getting caught is not good in a moral
sense; hence, the pull in opposite directions.
T. M. Scanlon on the Value of Choice and Consent .
Those who still think that counterfactual consent does
morally justify acts of euthanasia may respond in this fashion: in
fact, consent has intrinsic value. If there are two agents, and in
the first case one is given consent to the performance of an act,
24Brock, p. 33.
25t.M. Scanlon, "The Significance of Choice", The Tanner Lectures on
Human Values
, ed. SterUng M. McMurrin, Cambridge University Press, 1988,
p. 189.
26philhpa Foot, "Goodness and Choice", Virtues and Vices. University of
California Press, 1978, pp. 132-147.
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and in a second case the other agent is not given consent to the
performance of a similar act, the case in which the agent
consented is better than the case in which no consent was
obtained. The case in which the agent had consented to the
performance of the act is better because the consent has some
Intrinsic value, tipping the scales in favor of the act that was
consented to. If this is true, then counterfactual consent has some
value, for consent has some value in itself. Thus, if acts of
euthanasia are already defined as those that will be among the
alternatives that will result in the least suffering, and they are
consented to (where consent has some intrinsic value), then an act
of euthanasia that is consented to is the best available alternative
(when it is an alternative).
The view that consent has some value in itself is expressed
by T.M. Scanlon27. Scanlon offers two senses in which consent and
choice are valuable's. First, those acts that agents consent to are
more likely to coincide with what those agents actually want.
Scanlon's example is this: if he (Scanlon) is presented with a menu
in a restaurant and the food brought to him coincides with the
^^Scanlon, pp. 151-216.
28while Scanlon primarily discusses acts of choosing, and 1 am interested
in acts of consenting, many of Scanlon's points are relevant to my
discussion. Both choosing and consenting involve free and informed
assent to alternatives. The difference between choosing and consenting is
this: if an agent chooses an alternative, it is commonly understood that the
agent who does the choosing is the one who effects a change (in that his
choosing is sufficient to actualize an alternative). If an agent consents to
an alternative, it is commonly understood that the agent exercises
permission-granting power in offering his consent (but his consent is not
sufficient to actualize an alternative). If 1 choose the next speaker, my free
assent is sufficient for the next speaker to come to the podium. If I consent
to the next speaker, my free assent contributes to the legitimacy of the next
speaker to take the podium. See Chapter 1.
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food he chose from the menu, the food brought to him is more
likely to be the food he really wants29. This demonstrates that
consent has instrumental value - if an agent chooses or consents
to something, that which he consents to is likely to be the option
that best serves the agent. This example roughly parallels the
intuitions behind the Principle of Self Determination and the
Principle of Autonomy. Scanlon, however, rejects the intuition
behind the Principles of Self Determination and Autonomy - it
isn't always the case that the option the agent chooses is that
which would coincide with his preferences. Scanlon offers an
example that describes his experience in an exotic restaurant,
when he is faced with a menu in a language that he can't read.
Here, choice fails to have instrumental value^o.
However, there is a second way in which consent has value.
Consider agent S, who values personality traits such as awareness,
memory, imagination, skill, loyalty, and resourcefulness. S is
confronted with task of buying an anniversary gift for her
husband. S could just ask her husband to pick something out that
her husband would like, or S could pick something out herself.
Scanlon claims that if S picks out the gift herself, then the gift has
"demonstrative value", for it demonstrates those personality traits
that S holds valuable^k If S were to go out and choose a terrible
gift, the gift would have low instrumental value, but it would still





alternatives that follow from an agent's choices do have some
demonstrative value, Scanlon concludes "People reasonably attach
intrinsic significance to having outcomes depend on their
choices." 32
One problem with Scanlon's account is that isn't clear that
there is a distinction between "instrumental" and "demonstrative"
value. Might the demonstrative value that attaches to S's choosing
a gift herself be cashed out in terms of instrumental value? If S
chooses the gift herself, then she is happier because she did so on
her own, her husband has the experience of being surprised, and
her husband doesn't know precisely how much the gift cost, which
he would have had he picked it out himself. S may have
demonstrated some of her positive personality traits, but isn't
there instrumental value in that? It may be true that the
distinction between instrumental and demonstrative value is
unclear, but this isn't a great problem for Scanlon. All that he
needs to establish is that an action that follows from an agent's
free choice, or an action to which the agent offered his free
consent, is somehow better than a similar action that the agent did
not choose or consent to. Scanlon has demonstrated this.
What happens if S is not available to pick out a gift, and she
asks her sister to do her shopping for her? S's sister comes across
a gift, and thinks to herself, "This isn't the gift I would have
chosen for my boorish brother-in-law, but it looks to be exactly
the kind of thing that S would have chosen herself. It is true that
32scanlon, p. 189.
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s isn’t picking out the gift herself, but as her surrogate shopper, it
IS my responsibility to pick out a gift that will both please my
brother-in-law and would be something that S would have
chosen. S's sister justifies her choice by citing a counterfactual
about what S would have chosen. Without such a counterfactual
to support her choice, S's sister may not have been justified in
making her purchase. The instrumental value of the gift is
almost entirely intact - the gift is one that S is proud to give, and
one that S s husband is pleased to receive. Some of the
demonstrative value of the gift may have been lost, for S did not
find the gift herself. However, if the counterfactual "If S could see
this gift, she would purchase it" were false, then both the
instrumental value and the demonstrative value of the gift would
be yet smaller.
Scanlon's account does demonstrate why alternatives that
agents choose/consent to are often better than those alternatives
that agents neither choose nor sanctioned with consent. Applying
Scanlon's arguments to cases of euthanasia, it is easy to see that if
an agent actually consents, or would have given consent had she
been asked, that this is enough to elevate the status of an act
which is already among the best alternatives to the best
alternative
. In this way, counterfactual consent can morally
justify acts of euthanasia - the fact that this act is one that the
agent would have consented to, had he been able to consent,
marks this act out as the best alternative for the agent.
However, it is important to recognize that counterfactual consent
only justifies those acts of euthanasia that are already among the
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best alternatives for the patient
. If it is not the case that a
patient's euthanasia would in fact be among the alternatives that
would be best for the patient, then the instrumental and
demonstrative values of the agent's euthanasia following from
what she would would have chosen will not morally justify the
euthanasia. If euthanasia is not among the best alternatives for
the patient, then counterfactual consent does not justify the act.
A final objection may be raised, however. Has the lesson of
Scanlon s experience in the exotic restaurant been forgotten?
Scanlon observed that the best outcomes don't always follow from
an agent s own choice - Scanlon himself admits that his choice
from a menu that he could not read might end in disaster. Might
the instrumental value of choosing a bad alternative be so low
that no amount of demonstrative value would make up for the
poor choice? This is absolutely the case - if Scanlon would find
some of the choices off the menu repulsive, then the
demonstrative value of choosing his own meal may not outweigh
the negative result of having a terrible meal. But I have already
established that counterfactual consent only justifies acts of
euthanasia that are among the best alternatives for the agent.
Imagine Scanlon with an illegible menu of only the most pleasing
choices. Scanlon chooses one - the meal is extraordinary^! Not
only was it pleasing to the palate (instrumental value), but
Scanlon's dish was one he chose himself, as a competent and
responsible adult (demonstrative value). Agents for whom
euthanasia is already among their best alternatives, who actually
consent to euthanasia, or for whom it can be truly said that they
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would have consented had they been able to consent, will have
the act of euthanasia transformed from a good choice to the best
choice. Having consented makes a good choice all the better.
Thus, counterfactual consent can and does morally justify some
acts of euthanasia.
Counterfactual Consenti justifying the
Legal Permissibility of Euthanasia?
Counterfactual consent morally justifies some acts of
euthanasia. Might it also be used to legally justify acts of
euthanasia?
The question I am asking is not, "Does counterfactual
consent in fact serve as a sufficient legal justification for acts of
euthanasia in the United States?" or "Is counterfactual consent in
fact necessary to legally justify acts of euthanasia in the United
States?" These are straightforward empirical questions, that can
be answered by looking into a law book. In fact, counterfactual
consent is neither sufficient, nor necessary, to legally justify
euthanasia in the United States33.
It is not in fact a sufficient legal justification. There have
been many highly publicized court cases of men and women who
wanted to die, asked for assistance in dying, and yet the agents
who helped them die performed acts which were legally wrong.
If actual consent is not sufficient to legally justify an act of
33Marcia Angell, "Euthanasia", Biomedical Ethics , ed. Thomas Mappes and
Jane S. Zembaty, McGraw-Hill, 1991, p. 382.
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euthanasia, it seems improbable that the same act could be legally
justified using counterfactual consent.
Without a Living Will, or a surrogate established by a
Durable Power of Attorney, to speak on behalf of a patient, it is
legally impermissible to terminate that patient's life34. Living
Wills contain statements of assertoric antecedent consent or
problematic antecedent consent that can presumably demonstrate
the truth of a statement of counterfactual consent. Durable
Powers of Attorney sanction the use of surrogates to speak on a
patient s behalf. Since the surrogate is supposed to give voice the
patient s beliefs and preferences, the surrogate presumably is in a
position to utter a true statement of counterfactual consent on
behalf of the patient. A patient whose life is terminated as per
the directions in a Living Will or the order of a surrogate does
have support for a claim about counterfactual consent to legally
justify his death. As mentioned earlier, the surrogate bears a
special relationship to the patient. This relationship intimates that
the surrogate's claim that the patient's life may be terminated is
based in part on a belief about the patient's counterfactual
consent. But it is not the case that a Living Will or Durable Powers
of Attorney themselves are statements of counterfactual consent.
A surrogate may say many things to legally justify an act of
euthanasia. A statement of counterfactual consent need not be
one of them. Thus, counterfactual consent is in fact not
necessary to legally justify acts of euthanasia in the United States.
^"^Hastings Center Report, pp. 6-8.
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1 am asking a more interesting philosophical question than
the straightforward empirical question, "is counterfactual consent
in fact sufficient or necessary to legal justifications for
euthanasia?" I am asking if counterfactual consent ought to be
considered as either a sufficient legal justification, or a necessary
part of a legal justification, for acts of euthanasia?
One of the most important distinctions between moral and
legal justification is provability. For something to serve as a
sufficient legal justification, it would have to serve as sufficient
legal evidence. Ronald Dworkin says that legal evidence must be
"clear and convincing". 35 Unlike a moral justification, which
merely asks if it is true that the act in question is morally right, a
legal justification must be one that can establish proof of the
legality of the act. The problem with using counterfactual consent
in this manner is that while there is a fact of the matter about
what a person would have consented to, had he been able to offer
consent, it may be difficult to provide sufficient legal evidence for
this claim.36
Living Wills and Durable Powers of Attorney that establish
surrogacy are legal documents, but they are contestable, thus the
claim that they in fact provide "clear and convincing" evidence is
disputable. It is possible to argue that the agent who signed the
Living Will was not in a position to determine what she would
35Dworkin, p. 187.
3<3Drew Christie has argued that there is no fact of the matter about what a
person would have consented to, had he been able to offer consent. For a
reply to the objection that these counterfactuals don't have a truth value,
see Chapter IV.
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have wanted were she to be come gravely ill. After all, at the
time that she wrote the Living Will, presumably she was not
gravely ill. She was consenting before the fact to a state of affairs
about which she could not possibly be able to offer informed
consent. Thus, she could not accurately state what her wishes
would have been in the very situation she describes.37 Similarly,
an agent may believe that in signing over a Durable Power of
Attorney to a relative or close friend, that she has chosen someone
who best represents her interests. But she may be mistaken
about this fact - the individual may not represent her interests at
all. Finally, Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme Court has
claimed that a state is not legally required to honor a Living Will
if it has decided that the precedent it sets in honoring the Living
Will would be an insult to the sanctity of life.38 The
counterfactual consent that agents ascribe to patients on the basis
of the Living Will may still be legally disputed.
Without a Living Will or surrogate, it would only be more
difficult to legally justify an act of euthanasia using counterfactual
consent. It has been argued in the Missouri Supreme Court that
the "informal, casual statements" of friends and family do not
offer the same "clear and convincing" evidence of a patient's
wishes as a Living Will.39 Questions about why the person acting
as a surrogate is best qualified to represent the interests of the
patient could be raised^o. it appears that counterfactual consent
37This and other problems with Living Wills are discussed in Chapter IV.
38Dworkin, p. 198.
^^Dworkin, p. 187.
'^'^See Chapter IV for a discussion of the qualifications of surrogates.
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should not be used as a sufficient legal justification for acts of
euthanasia.
Similarly, counterfactual consent should not be necessary to
a legal justification for acts of euthanasia. Our evidence for the
truth of claims about counterfactual consent is simply not up to
the legal standard of "clear and convincing". Living Wills, one of
the best indicators of what a person would have consented to
under trying circumstances, can be contested. If they are, and it
is legally impossible to determine if there is counterfactual
consent or not, then it would be impossible to determine if the act
of euthanasia in question would be legally permissible or not. If
this were true, then there would be no legally permissible acts of
euthanasia. Insofar as there are some morally permissible acts of
euthanasia, it is wrong to hold a legal standard that is so high that






Often we consider cases in which the patient is actually
unable to consent to euthanasia. We attempt to justify
euthanasia in these cases by use of the concept of counterfactual
consent: if the patient were able to consent, then he would
consent. However, what if the very conditions that prevent the
patient from consenting are those conditions that determine what
the patient’s choice would be? There are cases in which the
closest possible world where the patient is able to consent, the
very property of being able to consent is sufficient for the patient
to withhold consent. How then is counterfactual consent to be
understood?
I will begin this chapter by considering a problem for
counterfactual consent: the Rational Man paradox. I will then
offer a number of solutions to this problem: odd-worlds solutions,
the ideal surrogate solution, several versions of the double
modality solution, and the implicit actuality solution. I will
demonstrate the mistakes in each of the odd-worlds solutions, the
ideal surrogate solution, and the double modality solutions.
However, the double modality solutions will illustrate an
important point about any true interpretation of counterfactuals
about consent - the need for a cross-world comparison. I will
then consider a final reading of counterfactuals about consent, the
implicit actuality solution. The implicit actuality solution succeeds
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as a reading of counterfactuals about consent. The Rational Man
paradox is solved. I will conclude this chapter with a
reformulation of precisely what is meant by counterfactual
consent.
The Problem of Counterfactual Consent and the Rational Man
Statements of counterfactual consent typically take this
form: If A were able to consent to S, then A would consent to S.
As stated in Chapter I, one of the necessary conditions on an act
being an act of consent is that the person consenting is rational. If
an individual is not rational, then it makes very little sense to say
that he/she is consenting to anything. As discussed in Chapter I,
the truth conditions for a statement of counterfactual consent
require us to travel to the closest possible world in which the
subject is able to consent to some state of affairs. If, in that world,
the subject does consent to that state of affairs, then the
statement "If A were able to consent to S, then A would consent to
S" is true. In other words, if in the closest possible world in which
the antecedent is true, the conclusion is also true, then the
counterfactual is true. True statements of counterfactual consent
are often cited as justifications for performing euthanasia.
However, there may be a problem with our conventional
understanding of the truth conditions for statements of
counterfactual consent. The Rational Man illustrates this problem.
Imagine a man who values his rationality to such a degree that
being rational is both necessary and sufficient for him to think
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that life is worth living. Pleasures of life like eating, traveling,
studying, and any experience you could name may come and go,
but as long as he is able to think, the Rational Man believes that
life is worth living. While such a view seems odd to many, it is
certainly metaphysically possible that such a man exist. For the
Rational Man, losing his rationality is enough that we would say
truly of him, "If he were able to consent to being euthanized now
that he has lost his rationality, then he would consent to being
euthanized."
According to the conventional method of determining truth
conditions for counterfactuals, we have to go to the closest
possible world in which the Rational Man is able to consent to
being euthanized, and we ask him, "Do you consent to being
euthanized?" But in that world, he is rational, for rationality is a
necessary condition of his being able to consent. Being rational is
both necessary and sufficient for him to refuse consent to our
euthanizing him. Life is worth living for the Rational Man in the
world in which he is able to consent. So, even if the rational man
loses his rationality, we have nonetheless spoken falsely when we
claim "If he were able to consent, then he would consent to being
euthanized." And yet, it seems that we are able to say truly of
the Rational Man "If he were able to consent, then he would
consent to being euthanized" in those cases in which he is no
longer rational
.
1 Edward Wierenga introduces a version of the Rational Man paradox in
"Proxy Consent and Counterfactual Wishes", The Toumal of Medicine and
Philosophy , vol. 8, no. 4., November 1983, pp. 405-416. Wierenga describes
an 83 year old priest. Brother Fox, who made known during his lifetime his
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It would seem that counterfactuals about consent are more
complex than ordinary counterfactuals. The Rational Man paradox
demonstrates that the conventional analysis of counterfactuals is
not always sufficient to give the truth conditions for all
counterfactuals about consent. A new means of determining the
truth conditions for counterfactuals about consent must be found.
How do we solve the problem of the Rational Man?
A First Solution: Odd Worlds
A possible solution to the problem of the Rational Man is to
claim that there are some very odd worlds, in which the Rational
Man is both rational and not rational at the same time. In these
worlds, the Rational Man has the rationality to perform an act of
consenting, and yet he is arational enough to desire that he be
euthanized because his life is no longer worth living. Thus, the
Rational Man, in being both rational and arational, both can
consent to being euthanized, and has sufficient motivation to
consent to being euthanized.
A second odd world solution may be to posit a world in
which the Rational Man was rational for a brief period after the
belief that the withdrawing of hfe support machines from some
unconscious patients was morally permitted. When Brother Fox lapsed into
a coma, the court concluded that "were Brother Fox competent, he would
direct the termination of the respirator that presently supports him"
(Wierenga, p. 410). Wierenga points out however that if Brother Fox were
competent, that he would not allow the respirator to be turned off, for it
was not part of Brother Fox's view that conscious patients need not be
assisted by hfe support machines. "Accordingly, it is false that if Brother
Fox were competent he would direct the termination of the use of the
respirator." (Wierenga, p. 411).
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accident that rendered him comatose. In this world, he regained
consciousness and rationality for just enough time for his doctors
to ask him, "Do you consent to being euthanized? We may lose
you again in another few seconds, so answer quickly!" In this
world, the Rational Man is about to face a life of arationality, but
he is rational for just enough time to consent to being euthanized.
This solution does have some appeal. Certain facts have to be
fixed for the question, "Do you want to be euthanized?" to have
any relevance. The Rational Man would have to have lost his
rationality, or at least be sure of losing it very soon, for such a
question to have any relevance. In this world, that fact is fbced.
Furthermore, in this world the Rational Man is able to consent to
being euthanized, because he is rational for just enough time to
consent. In this world, the Rational Man both is able to consent to
being euthanized, and has sufficient motivation to truly give
consent to being euthanized. Perhaps this is how many of us
understand the plight of those suffering from Alzheimer's disease.
Those patients have short moments of lucidity as the disease
progresses. Might the closest world in which the Rational Man
consents be one of these worlds in which he moves in and out of
arationality?
However, both the odd worlds solutions have only limited
appeal. The first solution is nonsensical - it is meaningless to say
that anyone is both rational and arational at the same time. It is a
logical contradiction for anything to be both rational and arational;
this state of affairs cannot obtain at any possible world.
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I do not believe that the second odd worlds solution is an
appropriate solution to the Rational Man paradox. The Rational
Man paradox illustrates an interesting problem. What are the
truth conditions for a counterfactual, C, if in traveling to another
world to find a true antecedent for C, you have eliminated the
very conditions that must be held fixed for the consequent of C to
obtain? Counterfactuals about consent are precisely the
counterfactuals that suffer from this problem. Consider this
example: "If Nixon could consent, then he'd consent to our
cremating him". This counterfactual is false: in the closest possible
world in which Nixon is alive and able to consent he does not
consent to being burned to ashes. Yet, it may true that Nixon
would have wanted to be cremated. Considering a world in which
Nixon is alive, and then dead, doesn't help us to better understand
this counterfactual; rather, it masks the problem of the true
antecedent that eliminates the possibility of a true consequent.
Briefly rational worlds offer an ad hoc solution to the Rational
Man paradox. There is no true paradox in the briefly rational
worlds - we can just wait it out until the Rational Man is rational
again, and the paradox disappears. This is no way to solve the
Rational Man paradox.
Edward Wierenga offers a second objection to the second
odd worlds solution. In briefly rational worlds, the Rational Man
who comes out of his arationality for a brief moment may make
the following claim: "1 seem to be in a world in which miracles
happen. 1 remember being rational, then they told me 1 became
arational, and now my rationality is back! If such miracles can
86
happen, I am a fool to consent to my own euthanasia - another
miracle may occur, and 1 could get my rationality back,
permanently. 1 will not consent." In the briefly rational world,
the Rational Man does not offer consent, and the counterfactual "If
he were able to offer consent, then he would" is false, not true^.
The briefly rational world is too miraculous to give a solution to
the Rational Man paradox.
I believe that neither of the odd world solutions to the
Rational Man paradox resolves the problem. A better solution
must be offered.
A Second Solution: Ideal Surrogates
Consider this counterfactual: "If I traded stocks. I'd buy low
and sell high." How do we determine whether this counterfactual
is true? We go to the closest possible in world in which my
counterpart trades stocks. Certainly / am not trading stocks in
that world - 1 am here, in the actual world. But there is someone
very much like me in that world - an individual more like me
than anyone else in that world. She is my counterpart. Whenever
we say of someone that he/she does something in another
possible world, what we mean is that his/her counterparts do
those things in other possible worlds. We are not trans-world
individuals - we exist in one world, and one world only^.
^Wierenga, pp. 411-412.
^David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds . Basil Blackwell, 1986, p. 213. Lewis
denies the possibility that there are trans-world individuals. There are
views about trans-world individuals, counterparts, and the interpretation
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There is a counterpart of mine who trades stocks in another
possible world. This world is the closest possible world to the
actual world that has a counterpart of mine who trades stocks.
This counterpart is the individual in her world who is more like
me than anyone else in her world. We watch her movements
very carefully. One day my counterpart places an order. "By low
and sell high," my counterpart whispers into the phone. The
counterfactual "If 1 traded stocks, 1 would buy low and sell high"
is true after all, for in the closest possible world in which 1 have a
counterpart who trades stocks, she does buy low and sell high.
Consider the following counterfactual, "If 1 were you. I'd buy
low and sell high." One way to analyze this counterfactual is to go
to the world in which your counterpart holds your position, but in
that world your counterpart has many of my beliefs and
preferences. Perhaps your counterpart has the same job as you
do now, lives in the same house, has the same breakfast in the
mornings as you do. But in that possible world your counterpart
has many of the relevant characteristics that 1 have in the actual
world that incline me to buy low, and sell high. In that world,
your counterpart has my extensive knowledge of the stocks, my
impressive connections in the bonds market. In that world, your
counterpart is still your counterpart
,
but your counterpart thinks
about stocks the same way that 1 do in the actual world. This is
the way that we understand the counterfactual, "If 1 were you, 1
of counterfactuals other than Lewis'. However, in the interest of sunplicity
and brevity, I have chosen to consider the Rational Man paradox solely
from Lewis' perspective.
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would buy low and sell high." We imagine one of your
counterparts - the counterpart who also has some of my beliefs
and preferences.
Perhaps in the case of the Rational Man, we ought to
interpret the counterfactual "If the Rational Man were able to
consent to his euthanasia, then he would" in the same way that we
understand counterfactuals like "If I were you, then I would buy
low and sell high." We ought to go to the closest possible world in
which the Rational Man's counterpart is still comatose, but an
individual with all of the relevant beliefs and preferences of the
Rational Man is standing close-by. This individual is the Rational
Man's counterpart's ideal surrogate: someone who has the Rational
Man's counterpart's desires, for these desires are the same desires
that the ideal surrogate has himself. The Rational Man's
counterpart's ideal surrogate would want to be euthanized in
those cases in which he were to lose his rationality. As he stands
over the Rational Man's counterpart, he gives consent for the
Rational Man's counterpart's euthanasia. Thus, it is true that the
Rational Man would have wanted to be euthanized if he were
comatose, for in the case that the Rational Man's counterpart was
comatose, the Rational Man's counterpart's ideal surrogate would
consent to the Rational Man's counterpart's euthanasia. Positing
an ideal surrogate might solve the Rational Man paradox -
perhaps it is the case that if the Rational Man were able to consent
to his euthanasia, then he would consent, for his ideal surrogate
does consent to the Rational Man's counterpart's euthanasia.
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There are advantages to the ideal surrogate solution over
the previously considered odd-worlds solutions. First, the use of
the ideal surrogate in solving the Rational Man paradox is not
logically impossible, like the first odd-world solution. Nor does
the ideal surrogate solution fail to address one of the problems for
all counterfactuals about consent, like the second odd-worlds
solution. Second, in the ideal surrogate solution, the Rational
Man's counterpart is comatose in the world in which his ideal
surrogate consents to the Rational Man's euthanasia. Thus it is
still relevant to ask if euthanasia is an appropriate option for the
Rational Man.
However, despite these advantages, the ideal surrogate
solution has deep problems. First, consider what the ideal
surrogate says of the Rational Man's counterpart in the world in
which he consents to the Rational Man's counterpart's euthanasia.
He probably says something like "If 1 were in his position, then 1
would want to be euthanized." The ideal surrogate believes that
he is speaking truly when he utters this counterfactual. How do
we determine the truth of this counterfactual? We can determine
if it is true only by going to the closest possible world in which the
ideal surrogate's counterpart is comatose, and determine if in that
world the ideal surrogate's counterpart would consent to being
euthanized. But the only way to determine this is to have yet
another individual standing at the ideal surrogate's counterpart's
bedside - the ideal surrogate's counterpart's ideal surrogate. This
second ideal surrogate then looks down at the counterpart of the
first ideal surrogate and says, "If 1 were in his position, then 1
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would want to be euthanized." Yet a third ideal surrogate is
needed, at a fourth possible world, to determine if this
counterfactual is true. This goes on infinitely. It seems we can
never determine if the ideal surrogate speaks truly about whether
or not he would want to be euthanized.
However, this may not be what the ideal surrogate is
thinking. Perhaps he thinks this: the previously rational agent in
front of me has ceased being rational. Rationality is a necessary
condition for life being worth living. Since this person has lost a
necessary condition for life being worth living, then he should be
euthanized. This may be the ideal surrogate’s line of reasoning,
but it runs against another problem - the problem of the
egocentric person. Imagine that the Rational Man and any
counterpart of the Rational Man is incredibly conceited. The
Rational Man has great faith in himself, and his own strength of
will, but he hasn't much faith in anyone else. He believes,
mistakenly, that his counterpart does not share the beliefs that he
has, even though his counterpart certainly does have those beliefs.
The conceited Rational Man says truly, "1 want to be euthanized if
1 am ever comatose, but 1 wouldn't put such words into other
people's mouths. Other people just don't have the strength of
character that 1 have." Imagine the possible world in which the
conceited Rational Man's counterpart is lying comatose, as his
conceited ideal surrogate stands at the bedside. The conceited
ideal surrogate who speaks on the Rational Man's counterpart's
behalf would say truly that he believes that the Rational Man's
counterpart would not want to be euthanized, although it is still
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the preference of both the ideal surrogate, the Rational Man's
counterpart, and the Rational Man to be euthanized under these
circumstances. So even though the ideal surrogate speaks on
behalf of the Rational Man's counterpart, the ideal surrogate gives
the wrong answer! Having an ideal surrogate does not solve the
Rational Man paradox in the case of a conceited Rational Man.
But the Rational Man and his counterparts may not be
egocentric. This brings me to a final problem with the ideal
surrogate solution. Who is this ideal surrogate anyway? Why do
we require such a complicated apparatus to interpret a seemingly
straightforward counterfactual like "If he were able to consent to
being euthanized, then he would consent to being euthanized."
The world in which ideal surrogates exist is very far away from
ours. Do we have to travel such a great distance to understand
what is meant by counterfactuals about consent? It is implausible
that ideal surrogates are required to understand otherwise simple
counterfactuals. There has got to be a more natural interpretation
of counterfactuals about consent than one that requires traveling
to very distant worlds and the postulation of an ideal surrogate.
A third solution to the Rational Man paradox is required.
The First Double Modality Solution
Perhaps we ought to reinterpret counterfactuals about
consent altogether. Up until now, 1 was content to read
counterfactuals about consent in the conventional way of reading
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all counterfactuals. A conventional counterfactual about an agent,
X, consenting to x's euthanasia, would read:
If X were able to consent to x's euthanasia, then x
would consent to x's euthanasia
Formalized using David Lewis' 'a->' symbol for counterfactual
implication, the above reads:
X is able to consent to x's euthanasia iih> x consents to
x's euthanasia"^
Those who endorse the double modality interpretation believe
that we ought to read counterfactuals about consent with a double
modality, which 1 will call 'DCl' for the 'Double Counterfactual
Solution One':
DCl: If X were able to consent to x's euthanasia, then x
would consent to being euthanized if x is ever
arational
Formalized, DCl reads:
X is able to consent -> x consents to (x is arational
-> X is euthanized)
According to DCl, the consequent is a counterfactual about what x
would consent to about situations in which x is in a coma in
another possible world. In other words, rather than going to the
closest possible world in which x 's counterpart is able to consent
and ask him what he would want in that world, we ought to go to
the closest possible world in which x's counterpart is able to
^David Lewis, Counterfactuals . Basil Blackwell, 1973, p 1.
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consent, and then ask him what he would consent to for his
counterpart in the closest possible world to that world in which
he is comatose. As 1 have just described counterfactuals about
consent, the Rational Man’s counterfactual consent requires us to
consider three possible worlds:
world 1 world2 worlds
The Rational



















Figure 3.1: The Rational Man Across Three Worlds
According to this solution, the Rational Man is lying
comatose in his actual world. However, it is the case that we can
say truly of him that if he were able to consent to his euthanasia,
then he would consent. For we look to the the closest world in
which he is able to consent, and in that world he utters the
counterfactual, "I consent to being euthanized, if 1 were comatose."
Thus, the Rational Man paradox is solved using the double
modality solution.
This solution does not require the postulating of an ideal
surrogate. It is true that it is complex, but its complexity is in the
analysis of the counterfactuals and the postulating of other
possible worlds, not in the postulating of some fantastic ideal
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surrogate. This solution requires both a double modality and two
cross-world analyses to understand counterfactuals about consent.
While the conceptual apparatus in understanding these
counterfactuals is slightly complex, it is philosophically mundane
to use counterfactuals in this way, whereas the postulating of
ideal surrogates is far more extraordinary. This is one reason
why this version of the double modality solution to the Rational
Man paradox has merit.
There is a second reason why the double modality solution
has merit. The above description of the double modality solution
suggests that the world in which the Rational Man actually exists
(worldl), and the world in which his counterpart's counterpart
exists (worlds) are not the same world. This is not necessary. It
may be that the closest world to worldl in which the Rational Man
has a counterpart who is conscious is world2, and the closest
world to worldZ in which world2's Rational Man has a counterpart
who is comatose is worldl. Since the counterpart relation is
symmetric, it makes sense that one of the counterparts of the
actual Rational Man's counterpart is the actual Rational Mans.
There is not even any guarantee that the counterpart of the actual
Rational Man's counterpart has any other counterpart besides the
actual Rational Man. It is possible that the entire double modality
scenario requires only two worlds, and not three. In this case, the




The Rational Man is The Rational Man's counter-
comatose and we look to —> part who is able to consent
the euthanasia of
I
The Rational Man <
Figure 3.2: The Rational Man Across Two Worlds
With this interpretation, the double modality reading of
counterfactuals about consent makes a great deal of sense. This
does seem to intuitively capture what we mean when we utter
statements of counterfactual consent on behalf of those who in the
the actual world can not consent themselves, but whose
counterfactual consent does relate to something in the actual
world. When we say "If he were able to consent to his own
euthanasia, then he would" we picture a scenario much like Figure
3.2. We are in the actual world, with the Rational Man, thinking
about those actions to which he would give his consent. We
consider the closest possible world in which he isn't comatose, and
is able to consent. In that world, he consents to his euthanasia in
the closest possible world in which he is comatose. That world in
which he is comatose is the actual world - we can cite
counterfactual consent in an attempt to justify the Rational Man's
euthanasia in the actual world. This captures our common-sense
intuition about what happens when we attempt to justify^
someone's euthanasia via counterfactual consent. The double
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modality reading of counterfactuals about consent offers a
solution to the Rational Man paradox^.
However, there are several problems with this version of
the double modality solution to the paradox of the Rational Man.
The first problem is that it isn't clear that seemingly simple
counterfactuals like If she were able to consent, then she would
consent" require the complex apparatus of a cross-world
comparison and a double modality. Isn't there a more straight-
forward approach to these counterfactuals than moving across two
worlds and including two counterfactuals in a sentence that
appears on the face of it to include only one? Those who have not
been trained in philosophy would never think to consider that an
otherwise simple statement of counterfactual consent really
means something far more complex.
A second objection to this solution considers the difference
between the solution that pictures the Rational Man across three
worlds and the solution that pictures the Rational Man across two
worlds. It is simpler to consider the two worlds solution - in that
solution the actual Rational Man's counterpart is consenting to his
counterpart's euthanasia in the actual world. But that solution
assumes that the closest "comatose Rational Man" world (worldl)
to the "conscious Rational Man world" (world2) is the same world
^There is another advantage to the double modality solution. It offers a
straightforward parallel to cases in which patients have written Living
Wills that offer statements of assertoric antecedent consent or problematic
antecedent consent. For example, when there is assertoric antecedent
consent, the Living Will states "1 consent now ("now" corresponding to the
condition of the patient in world?) to being killed in those cases in which 1
am comatose ("the cases in which 1 am comatose" corresponding to the
condition of the patient in worldl). See Chapter IV.
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as the Rational Man's actual world. Hence the arrow in the Figure
3.2 that points back to worldl, instead of pointing out yet a third
world. But it is not necessarily true that the closest comatose
Rational Man world to the closest conscious Rational Man world in
fact is the first comatose Rational Man world. What if the closest
comatose Rational Man world to the closest conscious Rational Man
world is not the actual world? How would this change the double
modality solution?
Figure 3.1 illustrates a case in which the Rational Man's
counterpart is not consenting to the euthanasia of the actual
Rational Man, but instead he is consenting to the euthanasia of
someone else. It is possible that the actual Rational Man's
counterpart is consenting to the euthanasia of a counterpart who
is many worlds away. This version of the double modality
solution doesn't allow that the Rational Man's counterpart is
consenting to the euthanasia of all of his counterparts - he may
only be consenting to the euthanasia of his very closest
counterparts. If the double modality solution guarantees
counterfactual consent only in the closest possible world to the
world in which the Rational Man's counterpart is able to give
consent, and that world is not the Rational Man's actual world,
then the double modality solution does not guarantee
counterfactual consent in the Rational Man's actual world. In fact,
the double modality solution does guarantee counterfactual
consent only in the closest possible world to the world in which
the Rational Man's counterpart is able to give consent; the actual
world is not necessarily the closest world. Therefore, the double
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modality solution does not guarantee counterfactual consent in the
Rational Man's actual world. Any solution that does not guarantee
counterfactual consent in the actual world is not an appropriate
analysis of counterfactual consent, for the point of the analysis is
to determine what a statement of counterfactual consent on behalf
of the actual Rational Man means. Thus, the double modality
analysis is not an appropriate analysis of statements of
counterfactual consent.
A Revised Double Modality Solution
However, it is possible to breathe some life into the double
modality solution. The greatest problem with the double
modality solution is that it is not necessarily the case that the
Rational Man's counterpart is consenting to the euthanasia of the
actual Rational Man. Rather, the Rational Man's counterpart is
consenting to the euthanasia of one of his counterparts, who is
not necessarily the actual Rational Man. One way to remedy this
problem is to qualify the counterfactual in the consequent of the
larger counterfactual with a necessity operator. 1 will call this
revision of the double modality solution DC2:
DC2: If X were able to consent to x's euthanasia, then x
would consent to necessarily being euthanized if x
is arational
DC2 may be open to several interpretations, but 1 take it to read:
X is able to consent -> x consents to UKx is arational
-> X is euthanized)
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How does the DC2 reading succeed over the DCl reading? The DCl
reading does not say anything about the world in which the
patient should be euthanized. The counterfactual consent given
according to DCl is for any world that is the closest comatose
world to the consent world - and this world is not necessarily the
actual world. The Rational Man's counterpart may be giving
counterfactual consent, but not to the euthanasia of the actual
Rational Man, but to one of his other counterparts. The DC
2
reading does say something about the comatose world in which
the Rational Man's counterpart consents to being euthanized: all of
them! The Rational Man has counterfactually consented to being
euthanized in every possible world in which he is comatose. The
actual world is one of those worlds. Thus, the Rational Man's
counterpart has consented not merely to his counterparts'
euthanasias several worlds away, but he has consented to his
counterpart's euthanasia in the Rational Man's actual world.
However, DC 2 is much too strong to be a true reading of a
counterfactual about consent. Imagine if a counterpart of the
Rational Man were in an irreversible coma, but the existence of
life on his earth would be destroyed by his euthanasia. According
to DC 2, that Rational Man would still consent to euthanasia if he
were in those circumstances. But obviously this is false - the
Rational Man's counterpart would not have consented to
euthanasia if his entire earth hung in the balance. While he may
have thought that life was no longer worth living once he was no
longer rational, it is not the case that he would have consented to
being euthanized and taking his entire planet with him. In the
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world in which the Rational Man's counterpart is comatose, but his
euthanasia would have resulted in the destruction of his entire
planet, he would have hoped for a speedy, but natural death.
Thus, DC2 is an incorrect reading of counterfactuals about consent.
DC2 is too strong - a further revision will have to be made to the
double modality solution for it to stick.
It is possible to revise the double modality solution by
altering the second counterfactual. If the second counterfactual
stated "If no one else's harm would result from his euthanasia,
then the Rational Man would consent to his euthanasia", would
this solve DC2's problems? I don't believe so. It may solve the
problem that I stated above - the reluctance of the Rational Man's
counterpart to be euthanized in those worlds in which his entire
earth would be destroyed by his euthanasia. But this solution is
also unsatisfactory. Consider the possible worlds in which there
is life after death, acts of euthanasia are punished by endless
suffering in hell for the person who dies as a result of euthanasia,
and those people who are alive in that world are entirely aware of
these facts. In those worlds, the Rational Man's counterpart would
not look forward to his body lingering in a meaningless existence
without rationality. However, he certainly would not have
consented to euthanasia either, for fear of what awaited him. The
Rational Man's counterpart in that world would hope for a speedy
natural death if he were to end up in a coma, just as the Rational
Man's counterpart whose euthanasia would result in the
destruction of his entire planet would hope for a speedy natural
death if he were to end up in a coma. Any attempts to fix DC2 by
101
merely changing the circumstances that are described in the
second counterfactual will not be sufficient to cover all the cases.
One can always come up with a counterexample in which the
Rational Man in that world would not have consented to his
euthanasia, and would have preferred a natural death if he were
to end up in a coma.
The problem with DC2 is that it is too strong. In including a
necessity operator in the consequent of the larger counterfactual,
the result was that statements of counterfactual consent
committed us to consent to acts of euthanasia in situations that
clearly would not merit consent. The necessity operator made
counterfactuals about consent too strong. However, the necessity
operator did do some important work in the double modality
solution. Including the necessity operator guaranteed that the
Rational Man's counterpart, in giving counterfactual consent, was
counterfactually consenting to the actual Rational Man's
euthanasia in the actual world.
A true solution to the Rational Man paradox would not have
the Rational Man consenting to his counterpart's euthanasias in
worlds which are significantly unlike the actual world: worlds in
which the entire earth would be destroyed if the Rational Man
were to be euthanized, or worlds in which he knows that he would
linger in hell forever if he were to be euthanized. The necessity
operator picked out too many conditions under which the
individual known as the Rational Man is euthanized. However, it
is possible to limit the conditions under which the Rational Man is
euthanized to the conditions he is in at the actual world. An
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actuality operator will perform this function. 1 believe that
implicit actuality solution offers both the most elegant, and
ultimately the most intuitive, reading of counterfactuals about
consent.
The Implicit Actuality Solution
Consider the following counterfactual conditional: If 1 were
six feet tall, then 1 would be taller than 1 am. How do we
understand this counterfactual conditional? It doesn't make sense
to say that I travel to the closest possible world in which my
counterpart is six feet tall, and see if she is taller than she is.
Obviously no one is ever taller than she is - no matter which
world you choose. Yet, this counterfactual does make sense.
The way we understand such a counterfactual is by
recognizing an implicit modal operator in the consequent of
counterfactual conditional. This modal operator is the adjective
'actual', and it operates on sentences. Instead of the
counterfactual literally reading 'If I were six feet tall then I would
be taller than I would have been (at six feet tall)', we read this
counterfactual in this way: 'If I were six feet tall, then the height I
would have would be greater than the height that I actually have.'
We interpret this counterfactual by looking to the closest possible
world in which my counterpart is six feet tall. In that world, my
counterpart is taller by seven inches than I am in the actual
world, at five-feet, five-inches. There is a cross-world comparison
in understanding this counterfactual - we compare my
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counterpart s height in another world with my height in the actual
world^. The implicit actuality reading of a counterfactual about
consent, 'lA', will read as follows:
lA: If X were able to consent to x's euthanasia, then x
would consent to being euthanized if x should ever
be in the medical condition x is actually in
Formalized, using to symbolize the actuality operator, the
above reads:
X is able to consent to x's euthanasia p-> x consents to
(x is in the condition, C, such that @(x is in C) -> x is
euthanized)
Using the actuality operator, it is possible to come up with
another solution to the Rational Man paradox. When we say of the
Rational Man "If he could consent to his euthanasia, then he would
consent" we recognize an implicit actuality operator in the
counterfactual. The Rational man's counterpart who is able to give
consent does give consent, but he gives consent if he should ever
be in the Rational Man's actual condition. The lA solution picks
out precisely the conditions under which the Rational Man's
counterpart would consent to euthanasia - the Rational Man's
actual condition. The lA solution is illustrated in the following
way:
^Lewis’ example, "If I had turned to crime, (the world) would have been
worse than it is" captures the same idea. Certainly no world is worse than it
is - this is logically impossible. Rather, the world in which Lewis had
turned to crime is worse than the actual world is. A cross-world
comparison is needed to properly understand this counterfactual
conditional (Lewis, p. 124).
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world 1 world 2
The Rational Man is The Rational Man's counter-
comatose and we look to —> part who is able to consent
the euthanasia of
I
The Rational Man (if he
|
is in the condition that he
|
is in here) <
Figure 3.3. The Rational Man's Counterpart Consents to the
Euthanasia of His Counterpart in the Rational Man's Actual
Condition
Unlike many of the double modality solutions, the lA
solution does not confuse the conditions the Rational Man's
counterpart picks out when he consents to being euthanized. One
of the problems with DCl was that it was unclear under which
conditions the Rational Man's counterpart was offering consent to
be euthanized in, because he was only offering consent to acts in
the closest world. It was not necessarily the case that the closest
world was in fact the actual world. DC2 attempted to remedy the
problem, by using a necessity operator to allow the Rational Man's
counterpart to consent to euthanasias in every world in which he
had a counterpart in a coma, including the actual world. However,
in solving one problem, DC2 created another. It is true that DC2
guaranteed that the Rational Man's counterpart consented to the
actual Rational Man's euthanasia while he was in the condition of
being in a coma, but the counterpart also consented to the
euthanasia of many counterparts for whom consent would be
inappropriate, and even disastrous! Any attempt to solve this
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problem would allow that the Rational Man offer consent only in
those conditions that were similar to his own. But which
conditions were these? The lA solution clearly picks out
precisely which conditions the Rational Man's counterpart picks
out - the Rational Man's actual conditions. Just as including an
implicit 'actuality' operator in counterfactuals like "If I were six
feet tall, then I would have been taller than 1 am" helps us to
better understand these counterfactuals, it seems that the Rational
Man paradox can be solved by including an implicit actuality
qualifier in the statement of counterfactual consent that we utter
on behalf of the Rational Man«.
Figure 3.2 demonstrated the very best DCl scenario.
Optimally, the closest world to the world in which the Rational
Man's counterpart is able to consent in which the Rational Man's
counterpart has a counterpart who is in a coma is the Rational
Man's actual world. If this is true, then the Rational Man's
counterpart consents to the euthanasia of the actual Rational Man.
However, it is not always the case that the DCl solution will have
this result. The lA solution will always have this result, though.
With the lA solution, the world that the Rational Man's
counterpart picks out as the world in which he would consent to a
counterpart being euthanized is always the actual world, for the
®The lA solution assumes that the 'actual world' always refers to the
Rational Man's actual world, and not to the actual world of the counterpart
who is offering consent. This is a rigid reading of the word 'actual', one
that always refers to a single world, as opposed to an unrigid, indexical
reading of 'actual'. Lewis, pp 92-94.
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Rational Man's counterpart consents to the euthanasia of the
Rational Man only if he is in the Rational Man's actual conditions.
Counterfactuals about consent often are stated in the
following manner: 'If x were able to consent to being euthanized,
then he would consent to being euthanized.' However, this
chapter establishes an important fact about counterfactuals about
consent: while you may have to travel to another world before a
person is able to consent to something (the world in which the
consequent is true), you must hold fixed the conditions such that
he is consenting to to be euthanized if ever in them (the facts that
make the antecedent true). It may be the case that in traveling to
another world to find a true consequent, you have eliminated the
very conditions that must be held fixed for the antecedent to be
true. This problem, illustrated by the Rational Man paradox,
forced me to pursue another way of reading counterfactuals about
consent.
Given the lA's success in solving the Rational Man paradox,
it is important to recognize the double modality and implicit
actuality operator in every counterfactual about consent.
Counterfactuals about consent should be read to literally mean: If
he were able to consent to being euthanized, then he would
consent to being euthanized if ever in the condition that he
actually is in.9
would like to thank Fred Feldman, Phil Bricker, Willem deVries, Ned
Markosian, Morgem Hott and Jennifer Armstrong for their invaluable help
in writing this chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
EVIDENCE FOR THE TRUTH OF
STATEMENTS OF COUNTERFACTUAL CONSENT
Actual statements of consent are performative utterances,
and as such have no truth valued
. Counterfactuals about consent
appear to have a truth value - it is either true or false that an
agent would have consented to an act, if he were asked. But the
evidence for the truth of these counterfactuals is difficult to sort
through. The Rational Man paradox, discussed in Chapter III,
demonstrates that counterfactuals about consent are not analyzed
in the same manner as counterfactual conditionals that are not
about consent. In Chapter I, I considered the counterfactual
conditional 'If kangaroos had no tails, they would fall over.' If at
the closest possible world to the actual world in which kangaroos
have no tails, they in fact do fall over, then the counterfactual 'If
kangaroos had no tails, they would fall over' is true.
Counterfactuals about consent can be analyzed using the
same possible world semantics. However, it is not the case that
we consider the closest possible world in which the counterpart of
the patient is able to consent to being killed and see if he consents
to his death in that world to determine if the counterfactual 'If he
were able to consent to his own death, then he would' is true.
Rather, the counterpart is consenting to a death of a patient in
^J. L. Austin, "Performative Utterances", The Philosophy of Language . ed.
A.P. Martinich, Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 115-124.
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that patient's actual circumstances, not the counterpart's own
circumstances.
However, it is the case that we must determine what the
patient s counterpart would say to the question 'Would you
consent to being killed if your circumstances were such that you
were in a coma?' In this chapter 1 will consider possible sources
of evidence for claims that a patient's counterpart either consents
or denies consent. 1 will first consider two objections that have
been raised to the claim that there are truth values for
counterfactuals about consent. These are objections from either
the lack of a fact of the matter about the consequent of any
statement of counterfactual consent, or the overabundance of facts
of the matter about the consequent of any statement of
counterfactual consent. Neither of these objections will prove to
be very strong. 1 will then explore assertoric antecedent consent,
problematic antecedent consent, surrogacy, the "best interest" test
and the "rational agent" test as possible evidence for the truth of a
claim about counterfactual consent. 1 will conclude that none of
these offers sufficient evidence to support a claim about what a
patient's counterpart consents to.
Two Objections: No Truth Values, or Too Many
Some philosophers claim that possible world semantics are
too weak to determine the truth values of any counterfactual.
Those who believe this claim may cite one of two possible
objections to the claim that there is a fact of the matter about
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what a patient's counterpart counterfactually consents to. The
first is an objection from the ciaim that counterfactuals about
consent have no truth value at all. The second is an objection
from the claim that counterfactuals about consent have too many
truth values.
The objection from the claim that counterfactuals about
consent do not have truth values is as follows. Counterfactuals
about consent are propositions about states of affairs that, except
in very special circumstances, have not obtained. Very rarely do
we say "If he were able to consent to our killing him, then he
would" in those cases in which the patient is able to consent to
being killed^. It is not that there are no counterfactual
conditionals with antecedents that obtain in the actual world.
Such counterfactual conditionals do have truth values. But let us
focus on the ones that do not - specially, the ones about
individuals like the Rational Man of the previous chapter, who is
in an irreversible coma when we say of him "If he were able to
consent to being killed, then he would." There will never be a
case in which a patient in an irreversible coma will consent to
anything. The antecedent of a counterfactual about what such a
patient would consent to, if he were able to consent, never obtains
in the actual world.
Some philosophers claim that such counterfactuals have no
truth value at all. Drew Christie has offered the example of
determining what should be done about a terminally ill relative.
^Such a case is diseased in the following chapter.
no
No one will be able to agree that any course of action is "What Dad
would have wanted", because "there is no objective truth and to
say there is is to falsify the moral situation."
3
This objection is closely tied to a type of objection from
paternalism against using counterfactual consent to justify acts of
euthanasia. If there is no fact of the matter about what a patient
would have consented to, had he been able to consent, then those
agents who try to use counterfactual consent to justify their act of
euthanasia are not acting based upon what the patient would
want for himself, but what they want for themselves. If what
they want is to "further the patient's best interests", then it can be
said that they are performing a paternalistic act - intervening on a
person's behalf so as to promote his best interests without that
person's permission^.
When the objection is raised that counterfactuals about
consent do not have truth values, it seems that the objection has
more to do with the moral weightiness of performance of an act of
euthanasia than with the lack of a fact of the matter about the
truth value of counterfactual conditionals. Would these
philosophers object to the truth of the claim "If I were to let go of
this pen, it would fall down"? No. However, very little is at stake
in the dropping of a pen. Much more is at stake when we utter a
3Drew Christie offered these comments at a reading of a version of Chapter
III at the University of New Hampshire on November 17, 1994. Professor
Christie went on to argue that the project undertaken in Chapter III, an
attempt to analyze what counterfactuals about consent mean, is a fruitless
one precisely because there is no fact of the matter about the truth of any
counterfactual.
"^This objection was also raised at the reading at the University of New
Hampshire, by Professor Val Dusek.
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counterfactual about consent in an attempt to justify the taking of
a life. Perhaps the reluctance of an agent to assign a truth value
to a counterfactual about consent will lead him to erroneously
believe that there is no fact of the matter about the truth value of
counterfactuals about consent. Or, it may be argued that since we
can never actually test the truth of a counterfactual about consent,
such statements must be neither true nor false. A radical
empiricist may argue that if the truth values of counterfactuals
about consent cannot be tested for, then they simply do not exist.
It would be prohibitive for me to argue against this radical
empiricist view at this point, but suffice it to say that such a
radical empiricist view is at the least controversial. Regardless of
the reason for the mistake, it is nonetheless a mistake to claim
that there is no fact of the matter about what an agent would
consent to, if he does not consent.
The objection from the claim that counterfactuals about
consent have too many truth values is as follows. If in the closest
possible world in which the patient's counterpart is able to
consent to being euthanized, he consents to being euthanized if he
were comatose in the actual world, then the counterfactual "If he
were able to consent, then he would" is true. But consider the
case in which there is more than one world which is the closest
world in which the patient's counterpart is able to consent.
Consider two worlds, wl and w2, and their relation to the
patient's actual world. Let us say that both wl and w2 are
equally close to the patient's actual world, and that there is no
other world that is closer to the actual world in which the
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patient s counterpart can consent than either wl or w2. Imagine
that in wl the patient's counterpart does consent to being
euthanized if he were comatose in the actual world. In w2,
however, the patient's counterpart refuses to consent to being
euthanized if he were comatose in the actual world. We can no
longer say that the patient either would or would not consent to
being euthanized if he were able to consent - at best we can say
that he might consent. It is not the case that there is no fact of
the matter about what the patient's counterpart consents to;
rather, there are too many. He might have consented, he might
not have; each state of affairs is equally possible in the actual
world.
If the patient merely might have consented to being
euthanized, then we can not use a counterfactual about consent in
an attempt to morally justify his euthanasia. As 1 have discussed
in Chapter II, counterfactual consent can morally justify some acts
of euthanasia. But that is true only if it can be said that a patient
would have consented. If the patient might, and at the same time
might not, have consented, then it cannot be said that the patient
would have consented. Without the true claim that the patient
would have consented, the counterfactual may not be invoked.
Hence, my adoption of Robert C. Stalnaker's uniqueness
assumption - for every non-empty proposition A and for every
possible world i, there is at most one A-world minimally different
from i .5 Thus, there is no more than one world which is the
^Robert C. Stalnaker, Inquiry, MIT Press, 1987, p. 133.
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closest world to the actual world in which the patient's
counterpart can consent to being euthanized if he needed to be
euthanized.
Although 1 have adopted Stalnaker's methodology in
determining the truth conditions for counterfactuals, this is not to
say that the counterfactual "If he were able to consent to his
death, he might have consented" is false, or meaningless. In such
a counterfactual, the word 'might' could have one of two
meanings. First, those things that "might" have happened may be
those states of affairs that possibly happen in some world,
perhaps the closest possible world, perhaps one a little further
away. This way of reading "might" counterfactuals establishes a
metaphysical point about the possibility of the truth of such
counterfactuals. When 1 say "If 1 had bought 1 ticket this week, 1
might have won the lottery," I mean that there is some possible
world in which my counterpart does win the lottery. That world
is not necessarily very close though; rather, the state of affairs is
not logically impossible. That is not the same as saying "If 1 had
bought a ticket this week, 1 would have won the lottery." The
latter statement implies that the world in which 1 won is rather
close. Perhaps the winning numbers were 04-22-67, my birth
date, and if only I had played those lucky numbers this week, 1
would have won, because in fact those were this week's winning
numbers. Second, those things that "might" have happened may
be those states of affairs that happen in some possible world, but
in saying they "might" have happened 1 concede that 1 have no
idea how far away the world in which those states of affairs
114
obtain is. This way of reading "might" counterfactuais establishes
an epistemic point about such counterfactuais. "If Harry and Sally
hadn't gotten a divorce, then they might have been happy
together." I don't know enough to say if they would have been
happy, but I won't rule the possibility out. The closest possible
world in which their counterparts didn't get a divorce may have
been one in which they were happy, and it may be one in which
they were not. Both of these are readings of the "might"
counterfactual that do not incorporate ties for closeness among
possible worlds. Either one, or both, may be what is meant by the
counterfactual "If he were able to consent to being killed, then he
might have consented". However, given Stalnaker's uniqueness
assumption, it is a mistake to assume that the "might"
counterfactual implies that the worlds in which the patient
consents to being killed and denies consent are equally near.
Antecedent Consent: The Living Will
Derek Humphry introduces the notion of a Living Will:
If you have not already done so, sign a Living Will and
have it witnessed. Get the one that is valid for your
particular state. This document is an advance
declaration of your wish not to be connected to life-
support equipment if it is adjudged that you are
hopelessly and terminally ill^.
^Humphry, p. 21. PhiUipa Foot, who calls Living Wills "eminently
sensible", would concur with Humphry's view that if you have not already
done so, you should sign a Living Will. PhiUipa Foot, "Euthanasia", Virtues
and Vices
.
University of Califomia Press, 1978, p. 59.
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If a patient is able to make a declaration of his wishes ahead of
time, while he is still able to make a rational and informed
decision, his statement would be either one of assertoric
antecedent consent, or problematic antecedent consent.
Immanuel Kant introduces the distinction between assertoric
hypothetical imperatives and problematic hypothetical
imperatives:
A hypothetical imperative thus says only that an
action is good for some purpose or other, either
possible or actual. In the first case it is a
problematic practical principle; in the second case
an assertoric practical principle.
^
By 'assertoric antecedent consent' I mean a statement of consent
that an agent gives before the state of affairs that would result in
the agent's need to give consent has obtained, when it is clear that
such a state of affairs will obtain. For example, the patient with
Lou Gehrig's disease may say, "I consent to your killing me if I am
ever in a coma and am relying solely on life machines to survive"
is a statement of assertoric antecedent consent. Lou Gehrig's
Disease will inevitably result in the patient lying in a coma,
relying solely on life support machines to survive. The patient
consented for you to perform an action before the fact, and it is
sadly inevitable that the time will come that such consent will be
needed. By 'problematic antecedent consent' I mean a statement
of consent that an agent gives before the state of affairs that
^Immanuel Kant, The Groundwork of the Metaphvsic of Morals , ed. H.J.
Paton, Harper and Row, 1964, p. 82.
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would result in the agent's need to give consent has obtained,
when it is not clear that such a state of affairs will obtain. For
example, consider a man with cancer whose doctors predicted that
he would end up in a coma, but such a state of affairs was not
guaranteed as part of his prognosis. If such a man said to you, "1
consent to your killing me if 1 am ever in a coma and am relying
solely on life machines to survive", he would be offering you
actual consent about a possible, but not guaranteed, state of
affairs. He has actually consented to your performance of an
action, but it is not clear that the state of affairs that would result
in the action he has consented to will obtain. Either assertoric
antecedent consent or problematic antecedent consent may be
used as evidence to support the truth of a statement of
counterfactual consent.
A Living Will may be either an expression of assertoric
antecedent consent, or problematic antecedent consent. If an
agent writes a Living Will with no expectation that the state of
affairs will obtain such that the Living Will will be invoked, then
the Living Will documents the agent's problematic antecedent
consent. The agent is giving consent to a course of action if a
certain state of affairs obtains, but he has no expectation that such
a state of affairs will obtain. He just wants to be prepared for that
contingency. If, however, the agent writes a Living Will with the
expectation that the state of affairs will obtain such that the
Living Will will be invoked, then the Living Will is a statement of
assertoric antecedent consent. The agent recognizes that the time
will come that others will have to decide whether or not to
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terminate his life support, and he offers them consent to do so
before the time has come for the life support to be terminated.
Of course, there are other forms of assertoric antecedent
consent or problematic antecedent consent than Living Wills. A
patient may have merely discussed what he would want, without
writing it down, if he ever were on a life support machine. An
accurate reporting of that conversation could serve as evidence
for the truth of a statement of counterfactual consent. But such
informal statements of assertoric antecedent consent or
problematic antecedent consent are of course very difficult to
verify.
Problems for Antecedent Consent
One problem for both assertoric antecedent consent and
problematic antecedent consent is that both are statements of
consent that are made long before the patient is faced with a
mortal decision. Consider the Living Will that states '1 consent to
my life support machines being turned off, if 1 am ever in a coma
and am relying solely on machines to survive.' The agent who
thus consents is not in a coma when he consents to having the life
support machines turned off. In most cases the agents who are
making such a prediction have never been in a coma. How can the
agent make an informed decision about a state of affairs he has
never experienced? Both assertoric antecedent consent and
problematic antecedent consent are offered long before the
patient has experienced the state of affairs that directly precedes
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the action to which he is consenting. Can such consent possibly be
informed?
There are two replies to the objection that assertoric
antecedent consent and problematic antecedent consent to acts of
euthanasia are not informed, and thus should not be used as
evidence to support the truth of a claim about counterfactual
consent. The first is that it may be true that most people who
give assertoric antecedent consent or problematic antecedent
consent have never been experienced states of affairs similar to
those they describe in their Living Wills, but some of them have
experienced similar states of affairs. There are some people who
have been in comas or have relied on life-support machines, have
recovered, and after their ordeals have written Living Wills. It is
the case that their consent to be killed in case they are in a coma,
or have their life support machines turned off, is informed.
However, it is the case that not every individual who writes out a
Living Will has experienced being in a coma or relying on life
support machines. I contend that this reply is not a very strong
one - it does not demonstrate that all cases of assertoric
antecedent consent and problematic antecedent consent are
informed.
The second, stronger reply, is that we often offer statements
of antecedent consent before the fact, even if we are consenting to
something we have never experienced before. We have no
problem offering consent in many of these cases. For example, I
will offer this statement of antecedent consent: I hereby consent
to your invading my personal space and giving me CPR, if you
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ever rescue me from drowning'. I've never drowned; I've never
even come close. I've never been given CPR. Yet, despite my
ignorance in these matters, I am confident that if such a situation
arose, that my antecedent consent would still stand. The objection
that statements of antecedent consent ask agents to make
judgements about states of affairs they are ignorant of, and thus
they are not statements of informed consent, is not very
convincing.
Or perhaps it is more convincing than my drowning analogy
would let on. I don't know what it is like to drown, or to be given
(or not given!) CPR in such an instance. But I do know what my
life is like - I'm pretty pleased with it. I am well acquainted with
at least one of the alternatives, and feel I could do much worse
than to have that alternative actualized. But the healthy agent
making out his Living Will is choosing among alternatives that he
has never experienced
. The Hasting Center Report claims that
the patient is responsible to "consider all possible alternative
futures that the patient might experience." ^ How is this even
possible? A patient simply can not be responsible to consider all
possible alternative futures and appropriately plan for them.
There is just too much to consider. At least I am somewhat
acquainted with what one of my alternatives holds for me when I
consent that you try to keep me alive. In cases of antecedent
consent to acts of euthanasia, the agent who is offering consent is
unable to make an informed choice.
^Guidelines on the Tennination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and the Care
of the Dying. Hastings Center, 1987, p. 21.
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There is a second problem for both types of antecedent
consent that is closely related to the problem of the agent making
an uninformed choice. What if the writer of the Living Will
changes his mind? Consider the agent who makes out a Living
Will that says "If I am ever relying solely on life support
machines to keep me alive, please remove them and allow me to
die peacefully". After making out the Living Will, she meets with
an accident and is forced to rely solely on life support machines to
stay alive. While she is unable to respond to her doctors, she has
a complete understanding of everything that is going on around
her. She changes her mind, however. She realizes that this is not
so horrible an existence for her. What happens when the doctors
meet in her hospital room to discuss the fact that they have
located her Living Will and are planning to shut off the life-
support machines? They cite her antecedent consent in her Living
Will as evidence for a claim about counterfactual consent - they
believe that if she were able to consent to having the machines
shut off, then she would. They are wrong, of course. Now that she
has changed her mind, her Living Will does not reflect what she
currently wants for herself. If she were able to withdraw the
consent she had given in the Living Will, she would do so.
The Hastings Center Report considers the problem of
changing your mind. It advises that "the individual should review
the directive (eg: the Living Will) eveiy^ one or two years to
ensure that it continues to represent his or her wishes. The
individual may make additions, changes, and deletions at any
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time. 9 Similarly, the person may revoke the directive at any
time. However, this recommendation doesn't say enough. Our
preferences may change more rapidly than once "every one or
two years" - this is not enough to ensure that it represents our
preferences. More importantly, the moment when it is most
important to make changes to the Living Will, or perhaps revoke
it altogether, is probably the very moment when it is no longer
possible to do so. Only after it is too late will the patient be
qualified to know if the directive in the Living Will is what she
wants at that moment.
Dan Brock does not believe that the changing of a patient's
mind is as serious a problem as I have claimed, when the patient's
decision-making capacities have been impaired:
At least when our future decision-making capacities
will be impaired, there is nothing morally
objectionable, in itself, in our present self binding our
future self in a way which will be contrary to the
desire of the future self. This is a function in part of
the fact that we each view ourself as one single self
that continues over time, so that it is my future that
my present action seeks to control. Odysseus lashed
himself to the mast for just such purposes... lo
Brock's point is that sometimes we desire things for our future
selves, that we nonetheless are unable to recognize as the things
we desire when the time comes to actualize our choice. Today 1
may resolve to go on a diet. Tomorrow 1 may be tempted by
9, The Hastings Center, p. 81.
l*9Dan Brock, Life and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics
.
Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 104.
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chocolate, but by resisting the chocolate I am true to myself and
my desires. When we are likely to be tempted away from what
we truly want, it makes sense for us to make antecedent claims
about what we want, even if we appear to change our minds in
the future. Brock's argument works only in cases in which our
future decision-making capacities are impaired, however. In the
case I described above, in which the patient changes her mind
after realizing that her circumstances are not so bad, what will
Brock say? What if the patient's decision-making capacities are
fine, but the patient's decision-expressing capacities are not?
This remains a problem for all statements of assertoric antecedent
consent and problematic antecedent consent.
The Hastings Center Report claims that a Living Will dictates
"what form of care (the patient desires) under various
circumstances." Unfortunately, however, the best that the
Living Will can do is dictate the form of care that the patient
desires at the time that he composes the Living Will There is
no guarantee that a statement of assertoric antecedent consent or
problematic antecedent consent reflects the patient's desires at
the time that the directive in the Living Will is carried out.
Problems such as the fact that a patient can not know what his
views will be until after he is unable to change his Living Will, or
the agent's changing his or her mind, prevent the Living Will from
effectively demonstrating what a patient would counterfactually
11 Hastings Center, p. 13.
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consent toi2. in light of this, assertoric antecedent consent and
problematic antecedent consent cannot be used as accurate
predictors of the actions to which we can ascribe an agent's
counterfactual consent.
Durable Powers of Attorney and Surrogacy
There are three cases in which a patient is not able to make
a rational and informed choice for himself. A patient (a) may no
longer be able to express his rational and informed choice. In
this case, the patient has preferences, but is unable to articulate
them. The patient (b) may have lost his both his ability to make
and to express rational and informed decisions. In this case,
while the patient is able to express some things, he is no longer
able to express rational or informed wishes about his case, for his
capacity for rational thought has left him. In these cases, it is
often assumed that someone else will either articulate the
decisions, or make decisions, for him. Finally, a patient (c) may
have never been able to make a rational and informed choice for
himself. In each of these cases, either a Durable Power of
Attorney will be cited to name a surrogate, or a surrogate will be
assigned.
Humphry introduces the notion of a Durable Power of
Attorney:
l^Brock mentions two other legal and/or practical problems with the type
of antecedent actual consent or antecedent predictions of consent found in
Living Wills: not enough people have Living Wills, and the legal effects of
advance directives are often hmited by the language of Living Wills. See
Brock, pp. 154-155.
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A more potent document [than the Living Wili] is the
Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, which, in
different forms, is available in all American states.
Here you assign to someone else the power to make
health care decisions if and when you cannoti^.
Durable Powers of Attorney allow for a friend or relative,
someone who is/was aware of the values and preferences of the
patient, to be asked to make the decision for the patient. In these
cases, the patient is unable to make such decisions on his own, but
the patient at one time was able to express and make his own
decisions. No Living Will exists - there is no formal statement
from the patient about his wishes now that the current state of
affairs had obtained. Instead, such circumstances have occurred,
it is up to friends and relatives to make a choice on behalf of the
patient. Effectively, the Durable Power of Attorney allows agents
to give consent on behalf of the patients they represent. Those
individuals who are given decision-making power by Durable
Powers of Attorney are called "surrogates".
All cases of Durable Power of Attorney are cases in which
the patient previously consents to having someone else make his
decisions on his behalf. The use of a Durable Power of Attorney to
assign surrogacy demonstrates one of two types of cases in which
surrogacy may be employed. In the first case the patient is
unable to express and/or articulate a rational preference. Perhaps
the patient has become senile - at one time he was able to express
a rational preference, but no longer. In such cases, the patient
l^Humphry, p. 22.
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may have explicitly named his surrogate (with a Durable Power of
Attorney ) , or a surrogate may be chosen for the patient. These
cases represent (a) and (b), introduced at the beginning of this
section. In the second case the patient never was able to express
a rational preference. Perhaps the patient is an infant, with no
rational capacity, or a severely retarded individual of any age. In
such cases, the surrogate was obviously chosen for the patient.
These cases represent (c), introduced at the beginning of this
section.
It should be noted that there is a crucial difference between
a Living Will and the use of a surrogate. A Living Will states the
wishes of an individual if or when certain states of affairs obtain
in the future. When writing a Living Will, a person will ask
himself, "What do I want (now), if c were to obtain in the future?"
In this case, the person projects himself into the future, changing
as little as possible about himself so as to accurately be able to
assess his circumstances. The person imagines the closest possible
world in which c obtains, and determines what he presently wants
for himself in those future circumstances.
The surrogate states what he believes the wishes of the
individual he represents to be as certain states of affairs obtain in
the present. The surrogate asks himself, "What would my friend
want done now that c has obtained, if he were able to tell me?"
When the patient lacks the capacity to make the
treatment decision, so that a surrogate decisionmaker
has decisionmaking authority instead, the surrogate
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should seek to choose as the patient would if he or she
were able (italics mine)
It is important to stress that the surrogate chooses not what
he wants for the patient, but rather "decide(s) as the patient
would have decided if he or she had been competent." is The
surrogate is the patient's advocate. Optimally, the surrogate has a
close personal relationship with the patient, so that the surrogate
will be a good predictor of the the patient's beliefs and
preferences. Of course, it is possible that the closer the surrogate
is to the patient, the more the surrogate's assessment of what
should be done with the patient will be shaped by his own
preferences, and not the preferences of the patient. For example,
a parent may be the best judge of what a child would want for
herself, but the parent's recommendation may be closer to what
the parent wants for the child, not what the child would want for
herself.
Another crucial difference between a Living Will and a
surrogate lies in the distinction between a patient giving consent
for his own treatment, and someone other that the patient giving
consent for the patient's treatment. The Hastings Center
summarizes the distinction: in Living Wills the attending physician
"follow(s) the patient's explicit directive", whereas surrogates
determine what should be done by "applying the patient's
preferences and values".
^
"^Hastings Center, p. 27. See also The Boston Globe . Thursday, May 26, 1994,
"Drop Presumption to Live, Journal Urges", about the role of the surrogate
to consent to what the "person would have wanted".
l^Brock, p, 155.
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In one case the patient seemingly has made a claim about
what he wants for himself, whereas in the other case the
surrogate makes a claim about what he believes the patient would
want for himself. 1
6
Problems for Surrogacy
There are several problems for surrogacy. The first is a
problem of agents whose preferences are in principle unable to be
expressed by a surrogate. The following case serves as an
example:
The Case ofScrooge . Scrooge was an unkind, curmudgeonly
old man. Everyone who knew him knew that two things were
certainly true of him: he hated to do what other people told him
to, and he hated when people tried to predict his behavior. If
someone said, "Scrooge will want the cherry pie," he would choose
the apple pie, just to spite the person who tried to guess his tastes.
When he fell into a coma, a surrogate was appointed to make
decisions about Scrooge's health care. All the surrogate knew was
that whatever he chose on Scrooge's behalf, Scrooge would have
wanted something different. After a night of deliberation, the
surrogate declined his role as a surrogate. No matter what he
would have chosen, it would have been contrary to Scrooge's
wishes. The case of Scrooge illustrates one way in which
l^See Chapter II for Thomas Scanlon's discussion of the value of an agent
choosing for himself over having another individual make a choice on his
behalf.
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surrogacy can fail to represent a patient's wishes. If a patient’s
wishes are in principle unable to be expressed by others, then no
surrogate can ever speak on his behalf.
While I believe in principle that this is a problem for the
notion of surrogacy, it may not be so great an issue. The case of
Scrooge may be too esoteric - perhaps there are no Scrooges, and
the lesson of Scrooge has no practical application. This may be
true, and the case may not demonstrate sufficiently that
surrogacy is flawed. However, there remain other problems with
surrogacy.
Presumably the surrogate knows the beliefs and preferences
of the patient for whom he is uttering a statement of
counterfactual consent. However, two points may be called into
question. First, how well must the surrogate know the patient
before he is qualified to speak on the patient's behalf? The
surrogate is expected to know the patient's "preferences and
values" 17, but sometimes this is impossible. As with assertoric
antecedent consent and problematic antecedent consent, the
patient is not always in a position to know what he would consent
to, if he is forced to choose among alternatives with which he is
not acquainted. How is the surrogate supposed to state what the
patient would want for himself, if the patient himself would not
have known?
A second problem involves the surrogates for individuals
who never had preferences about euthanasia. Small infants.
l^Hasting Center, p. 28.
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chUdren, and mentally incapacitated individuals who never made
decisions and never had preferences nonetheless have surrogates
who make important decisions about terminating these
individual s life support machines. These are the nonvoluntcuy^2
cases that were discussed in Chapter IP^. in many cases the
surrogates may not consider what these individuals would have
consented to, had they been able to consent. However, in some
cases such considerations are made^^. When they are made,
there are two possible means for determining what such
individuals would have consented to, even though they never had
consented to anything previously. These are the Best Interests
Standard and the Rational Agent standard.
The Best Interests Standard. In some cases in which the
patient is unable to consent, and never had consented to anything
in the past, we make the following claim about what he would
have consented to: he would have consented to this course of
action, because this is what would be best for him^o. what else
would an agent have consented to, but that which is best for him?
This line of reasoning is faulty, however. As mentioned in Chapter
II, it is a mistake to say that what an agent consents to is by
definition what is best for him. Similarly, what is best for an
^^See David H. Smith’s "On Letting Some Babies Die", Killing and Letting Die
,
ed. Bonnie Steinbock, Prentice-Hall, 1980, pp. 92-108, for the view that all
cases of euthanasia of newborns are involuntary euthanasia, not
nonvoluntary euthanasia.
l^James Rachels claims that in cases in which infants or mentally
handicapped people are euthanized, there is no sense in which the
patient's wishes were taken into account. See James Rachels, The End of
Life: Euthanasia and Morality
.
Oxford University Press, 1986. p. 60.
^^Hastings Center, p. 28.
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agent is not by definition what the agent would have consented to.
Consent may be one of several factors that contributes to the
goodness of any alternative, but consent alone is not sufficient to
determine which alternative is the best.
Furthermore, what is 'best" for an individual differs from
one to the next. Some individuals believe that living without
physical pain is their best alternative. Others value autonomy and
strength, and believe that fighting death every step of the way is
best. Ronald Dworkin recounts the story of a seventy-six year old
widow who refused to give consent to a "do not recessitate" order,
and whose family upheld the woman's wishes based on a family
"tradition to fight to the bitter end".2i For this woman, the Best
Interest standard seems to indicate that a great deal of pain and
suffering were in her best interests, counter to our intuitions
about what is in a person's best interest. The doctors needed to
know about the woman's history and beliefs before they could do
what was best for her. How can we apply a Best Interests
Standard though to infants and the mentally handicapped, about
whom we know so little?
The Rational Agent standard. A variation on the Best
Interests Standard is the Rational Agent standard^2. Using the
Rational Agent standard, individuals who are killed by
nonvoluntary2 euthanasia have the property of being rational
21 Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion.
Euthanasia, and Individuail Freedom
.
Alfred A. Knopf, 1993, pp. 186-187.
22Michael J. Resnik claims that "rational actions [are], in other words,
[those] that [are] in one's best interest" to perform. See Michael J. Resnik.
Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory. University of Minnesota Press,
1987, p. 6.
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agents counterfactually ascribed to them. Hence, we say of them,
"If they were rational agents and able to consent to their own
death, given their present circumstances, then they would consent
to their death. Brock says "Lacking any knowledge of this
particular patient's wishes, such decisions will inevitably involve
asking what most reasonable persons would want for themselves
in the circumstances." 23 The Hastings Center says that in these
cases the surrogate should "choose as a reasonable person in the
patient's circumstances would." 24
The Rational Agent standard may in fact just collapse into
the Best Interests Standard. If a rational agent is merely one who
always acts in accord with his best interests, then the two are the
same. It makes little sense to say that a rational agent is merely
one who is able to make informed judgments about his
circumstances, without also incorporating some criteria of
preference ordering into the notion of the rational agent. If this is
true, then all of the problems for the Best Interests Standard will
be shared by the Rational Agent standard.
A final problem with both the Best Interests Standard and
the Rational Agent standard is that both may be too objective2s.
For example, if the Best Interests Standard is useful in
determining what ought to be done for a small infant, then
presumably anyone can make a claim about counterfactual
consent on the infant's behalf. However, this is not what is
23Brock, p. 155.
24Hastings Center, p. 28.
25xhis problem was raised by Fred Feldman.
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commonly done. Parents are believed to have a privileged status
in these cases - their judgment about what an infant would
counterfactually consent to is held in higher regard than that of
the infant's doctor26. But if both are using a Best Interests
standard for determining what is best to do for the infant, why
should the parent's statement of counterfactual consent be
necessary? Why couldn't the parents show up at the hospital one
afternoon to find their dead infant, and the doctor calmly telling
them that his euthanasia of the infant was permissible because
after all, the infant would have wanted what was best for
himself?27
Ruth Macklin argues that since there is a distinction
between who is authorized to give consent and who is the best
advocate for the child, that perhaps in this case the doctor was
authorized to kill the infant without the parent's permission's.
Macklin may be taking too radical a "rational agent" standard,
however. Our intuitions may lead us to believe that what the
doctor did was wrong because we counterfactually not only
ascribe rationality to the infant, but also some of the parent's
beliefs and preferences. For example, if the parents are Catholic
and would have raised their child to be Catholic, then we would
counterfactually ascribe Catholic views, including the view that
^^Smith upholds the view that the parents have the right of surrogacy
over the iiifant's doctor; p. 95.
2^The Hastings Center, which says that one of the doctor's obligations is to
respect the considered choice of the patient or the patient's surrogate,
would find this to be morally wrong, Hastings Center, p. 19.
^®Ruth Macklin, "Autonomy, Beneficence and Child Development", Social
Research on Children and Adolescents Ethical Issues, ed. Barbara Stanley
and Joanne Sieber, Sage Publications, 1992.
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euthanasia was morally wrong, to the infant. Thus, the child is
understood not merely as a rational agent, but one with many
potential beliefs and preferences along with rationality.
Brock would agree with this reply to Macklin. Brock gives
two reasons for preferring statements of counterfactual consent
from the patient's own family members over that of the doctor,
despite the fact that the doctor may be in a better position to
access the patient's case. First, if the only concern is the continued
life of the patient, then it would appear that the doctors alone
should make the judgements. However, the medical well-being of
the patient alone is not the sole concern. Quality of life, which
takes into account a variety of very personal facts about the
patient, is the primary concern^^. The patient would not be
merely a rational agent, were he to survive. Presumably he
would be much more than that, and it is important to consider
what that would be before a decision is made on his behalf. It is
important to note that Brock, in making this claim, seems to be
arguing against the application of both the highly impersonal Best
Interests standard and the equally impersonal Rational Agent
standard. Second, there are social concerns, such as the "value of
the family" that is preserved when the family makes a decision
for one of its own, and the fact that "the family member will care
most about the patient's well-being and so be most concerned to




and the Rational Agent standard are not as solid as they first
appeared.
These problems demonstrate that the practice of surrogacy,
even when legally sanctioned by a Durable Power of Attorney, is
flawed. If the practice of surrogacy is flawed, then statements of
counterfactual consent that rely on surrogates to demonstrate
their truth value must also be called into question. We can not
rely on surrogates to tell us what patients would have consented
to, had they been able to consent.
In conclusion, there are many problems in trying to
determine the evidence for the truth of statements of
counterfactual consent. The arguments that counterfactuals about
consent have no truth values or too many are not convincing.
However, assertoric antecedent consent, problematic antecedent
consent, and surrogacy are rife with problems. Surrogacy for
those individuals who never had or never expressed beliefs or
preferences is especially problematic. While counterfactual
consent has the power to morally justify some acts of euthanasia,
its practical application may be less than successful.
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CHAPTER V
A PRINCIPLE ABOUT COUNTERFACTUAL CONSENT
AND ACTUAL CONSENT
In the case of a patient without decision making
capacity, this discussion [about the termination of life-
sustaining treatment] should involve a surrogate for
the patient. If possible, however, the health care
professional and patient should talk together.... any
patient who can participate to any extent in the
decisionmaking process should be encouraged to do
soL
Some people will make this claim: if you can justify an act of
euthanasia by obtaining actual consent from a person, it would be
wrong to rely on counterfactual consent to justify that act of
euthanasia. In the passage quoted above, the consent of the
surrogate is secondary to actual consent. The Hastings Center
Report notes "It is the patient who is the key decisionmaker, with
the power to give binding consent or refusal. When the patient
lacks the capacity, the key decisionmaker is someone else, a
surrogate. "2 In cases in which the patient is unable to give actual
consent, the strength of the surrogate's consent is derived from
the surrogate's belief that were the patient able to express
consent, then his statement of consent would be in keeping the
surrogate's expression of consent. As stated in the previous
chapter, the surrogate's responsibility is to express what the
patient would have wanted for himself, not what the surrogate
^The Hastings Center, Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining




wants for the patient. But according to the Hastings Center, the
surrogate should be relied upon to give consent only if the patient
is not competent to give actual consent. If the patient is able to
give actual consent, then relying on the surrogate's statement of
consent would be wrong. The surrogate may offer a statement of
counterfactual consent as one of her reasons for the termination of
life support. I knew him all his life, he would never want to live
this way, I know that if he were able to offer consent to our
killing him now, he would." While not all surrogates will rely on a
statement of counterfactual consent, some will. And yet, all
consent by a surrogate is considered by the Hastings Center to be
secondary to actual consent. Hence, there is a significant
relationship between actual consent and counterfactual consent,
assuming that both are in fact available to the person/persons
performing the act of euthanasia. Actual consent is always better
than counterfactual consent.
In this chapter, I will attempt to do four things. First, I will
state a principle that has been endorsed by many philosophers
about the relationship between actual consent and counterfactual
consent. I call this principle the Superiority of Actual Consent
Principle (SACl). Second, I will review many of the arguments in
support of SACl. Third, I will consider an argument that
demonstrates that SAC 1 is false. Finally, I will present a second,
far weaker principle about the relationship between actual
consent and counterfactual consent, called SAC2. Despite (or
perhaps because of) SAC2's being far weaker than SACl, I will
endorse SAC2.
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The Superiority of Actual Consent Principle
In Chapter I an analysis of informed consent was
introduced. However, the analysis of informed consent did not
distinguish between actual consent (AC) and counterfactual
consent (CC):
AC: A patient, S, gives actual consent to treatment x for
condition y iff 1) S assents to treatment x for y, 2) S
is given sufficient information about x and y and
the effect x would have on y, 3) S is able to
comprehend the information given to him about
both X and y, and 4) the assent given by S for an
agent to perform treatment x for y is given freely
and voluntarily
CC: Counterfactual consent is offered on behalf of a
patient, S, to treatment x for condition y iff it can be
said truly that if S were able to offer AC to the
treatment x for y, then S would offer AC to the
treatment of x for y
The difference between AC and CC is that while CC relies on
determining what the patient would have consented to, had he
been asked, with AC consent is given by the patient who is to be
euthanized.
In Chapter II, I introduced the categories of voluntary 1,
voluntary2, nonvoluntaryl, nonvoluntary2, and involuntaryl and
involuntary2 euthanasia. Involuntaryl euthanasia cases are of
particular interest to the AC and CC distinction. Involuntaryl
euthanasias are cases in which we can get actual consent for a
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person's euthanasia, but fail to do so. Involuntaryl euthanasia
cases are cases in which a rational, capable person is euthanized,
but the person did not offer either assertoric antecedent consent
or problematic antecedent consent (in the form of a Living Will, or
some other informal statement of consent), nor give actual consent
to being killed at the time of death3. Despite the fact that the
agents who kill the patient in cases of involuntaryl euthanasia
could have gotten actual consent from the patient, they fail to do
so, and euthanize him without actual consent. However, even
without actual consent, they may nonetheless be secure in
attributing counterfactual consent to the patient. Even if he did
not actually consent to being killed, might it still be the case that
if he were asked, that he would have consented?
With actual consent, in the voluntary 1 cases, we have no
worries that we have made a mistake. If a person is rational and
able to consent, we don't have to consider what he would consent
to, if he were able to consent. We can go to the source, and ask
him what he will consent to. In this respect, actual consent is
superior to counterfactual consent. This is the intuition behind
the Hastings Center's remark at the beginning of the chapter. The
patient's actual consent is preferable to the surrogate's
pronoucement of counterfactual consent. If this is true, then the
^Again, voluntary? euthanasias are euthanasias that rely upon antecedent
actual consent or predicted consent on the behalf of those persons being
killed - typically in the form of Living Wills. These cases are justified by
making reference to the statement of consent as found in the Living Will,
and not counterfactual consent per se, although the Living Will can then
be used as evidence to support a claim about counterfactual consent. See
Chapter fV.
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performance of acts of involuntaryl euthanasia, in which we can
get consent, but don't, is wrong. Our attempts to justify acts of
involuntaryl euthanasia by employing a notion of counterfactual
consent are misguided, if actual consent is in fact superior to
counterfactual consent. Actual consent was available, but we
relied on counterfactual consent instead.
People who believe that all acts of involuntaryl euthanasia
are morally wrong believe a principle about the superiority of AC
over CC. 1 will call this the first Superiority of Actual Consent
Principle (SACl):
SACl: If a person is able to offer AC, then it is morally
wrong to rely upon CC
Richard Brandt compares actual consent with counterfactual
consent, and in doing so endorses SACl:
The patient's own expression of preference or consent,
then, seems to be weighty. But suppose he is unable
to express his preference; suppose that his terminal
disease not only causes him great pain but has
attacked his brain in such a way that he is incapable of
thought and of rational speech... Must a person suffer
simply because he cannot express consent? There is
evidence that can be gathered about what conclusions
a person would draw if he were in a state to draw and
express them.^
Brandt believes that counterfactual consent can and ought to be
considered, but counterfactual consent is secondary to the
"^Richard Brandt, "A Moral Principle About BCilling", Beneficent Euthanasia ,
ed. Marvin Kohl, Prometheus Books, 1975, p. 112.
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patient's "own expression of preference or consent".
Counterfactual consent may be considered, but only when the
patient is unable to give actual consents. Hence, while it is not
always wrong to rely on counterfactual consent to justify acts of
euthanasia, if actual consent is available one ought to obtain actual
consent rather than rely upon counterfactual consent.
Arguments for SACI
Several arguments have been made, or could be made, for
SACl. Some of the arguments for SACl include the Argument
from Utility, the Argument from Rights, the Argument from
Paternalism, the Argument from Misinterpretation, and the
Argument from Prediction. Each of these arguments will be
discussed in turn.
The Argument from Utility. Michael Slote agrees that actual
consent is better than counterfactual consent. Slote believes that
in employing counterfactual consent, the consequences of your
action may have lower utility than the consequences had you
relied on actual consent. If you presume the wishes of someone,
they "may feel resentment and feel unfairly treated" by virtue of
the fact that they weren't asked for actual consent^. Relying on
5
"If the patient cannot give consent, is the proxy consent of relatives
ethically valid?" asks Barry F. Brown in "Proxy Consent for Research on
the Incompetent Elderly", Biomedical Ethics , ed. Thomas A. Mappes and Jane
S. Zembaty, McGraw-Hill, 1991, p. 225. The presumption is that actual
consent is primary, and proxy/counterfactual consent is secondary,
echoing Brandt's views.
^Michael Slote, "Dessert, Consent and Justice", Philosophy and Public




CC, when AC is available, might insult them, or cause them to feel
slighted. Insulting a person by relying on counterfactual consent
would result in lower utilities, whereas relying on actual consent
and involving him/her wholeheartedly in the decision-making
process would not result in any lower utilities. Of course, this
assumes that there is no hidden positive or negative utility in
performing the act of asking the person (no deep moats have to be
braved to get actual consent, no dragons need be slain). Asking
for actual consent will merely prevent the lower utilities accrued
by insulting the person when counterfactual consent is employed.
AC is thus determined to be superior to CC.
Slote's argument is similar in many respects to T.M.
Scanlon's view, as presented in Chapter IP. Scanlon claimed that
consequences that follow from our choices may have both
instrumental value (the consequences are most likely to be the
ones we desire) and demonstrative value. Scanlon believes that if
a choice has instrumental value then the consequences of that
choice are most likely to be the ones that we desire. Scanlon
believes that if a choice has demonstrative value then the free
choice reflects traits that we value in ourselves, such as autonomy,
independence, and creativity. Not every free choice has
instrumental value - it is possible for an agent to make a choice
better left to someone else. However, Scanlon believes that every
free choice has demonstrative value. An agent's exercise of his
^T.M. Scanlon Jr., "The Significance of Choice", The Tanner Lectures on
Human Values , ed. Sterhng M. McMurrin, Cambridge University Press, 1988,
pp. 151-216.
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free choice never fails to assert the agent's independence,
creativity, and control. If there is some utility which attaches to
the asserting of these traits, then those acts that an agent actually
consents to will have higher utility in virtue of their
demonstrative value than those that are merely counterfactually
consented to, and have no demonstrative value at all.
The Argument from Rights. While Slote argued for SACl on
utilitarian grounds, he also argued for SACl from a consideration
of rights. It may be the case that relying on CC, and not on AC,
violates the patient's rights. Dan Brock argues in favor of SACl
by invoking "his (the patient's) right to decide."8 Slote's election
example captures this intuition:
Rawls seems to think that certain sorts of hypothetical
free consent suffice for justice, so that if people would
have consented to a certain social arrangement in an
original position of equality, then such an arrangement
is just even when people have not actually consented
to it. But the difference between actual consent and
hypothetical (free) consent is very important in
matters of justice. To give an example of this (that
Rawls would, presumably, be able to agree with,
consistent with his principles), consider a situation
where certain people somehow manage to call off an
election whose eventual winner, the incumbent,
everyone knew would win in advance, and then
simply arrange for the incumbent to remain in office.
Clearly an injustice has been done here by denying the
people their right to give or withhold their actual
consent to the incumbent's remaining in office^.
^Dan Brock, Life and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics
.
Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 33.
^Michael Slote, "Desert, Consent and Justice", Philosophy and Public
Affairs , vol 2, no 4, Summer 1973, pp. 343-344,
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Here, Slote is arguing against John Rawls' concept of justice as
fairness. Rawls considers that the just society is the one that
would have been chosen by individuals in the original position.
The original position is a hypothetical place behind a veil of
ignorance, in which "no one knows his place in society, his class
position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence,
strength, and the like."io According to Rawls, a society is a just
society if the society is the one that would have been consented to
by its population, if they were asked which society they wanted
while in the original position. Slote argues against Rawls by
calling into question the notion of counterfactual consent in
choosing a perfectly just society. After all, each member of
society is around to give actual consent in choosing a perfectly just
society. It is wrong to rely on counterfactual consent, when actual
consent is available. It is not the case that the people in Slote's
election example would merely be insulted by not having the
chance to cast their vote. Rather, their legal right to cast their
vote would be violated. It may be the case that relying on CC,
rather than AC, would be a violation of the patient's moral right to
actually consent to his/her own death. Thus, AC is superior to CC,
for it preserves the patient's right to actually consent to his/her
own death, and SAC 1 is true.
The Argument from Paternalism. Similar to the argument
from rights is the argument from paternalism. Some philosophers
lOjohn Rawls, A Theory of Justice
.
Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1971, p. 12.
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may prefer AC over CC because relying on counterfactual consent
when actual consent is available may be paternalistic^. Acting in
a paternalistic manner is often unjust, for acting in such a manner
fails to respect the autonomy of the patient. However, justifying
an act of euthanasia by making reference to actual consent is
never paternalistic, for in actually asking for consent from a
patient, the patient's autonomy is respected. Brock endorses SACl
using the argument from paternalism, claiming that relying on
counterfactual consent rather than actual consent infringes on a
patient's "self-determination" 12. if the choice is between
performing an act that respects the patient's autonomy (getting
actual consent), and performing an act that fails to respect the
patient's autonomy (relying on counterfactual consent), then it is
better to perform that act that respects the patient's autonomy.
Thus, actual consent is superior to counterfactual consent.
The Arguments from Misinterpretation. Two more
arguments that might be used to justify the claim that AC is
superior to CC make reference to our complex, often fallible
attempts to determine the truth of counterfactual statements
about consent. 1 have already discussed several of the epistemic
problems in attempting to determine the truth of a statement of
counterfactual consent in Chapter IV: the unreliable nature of
assertoric antecedent consent and problematic antecedent consent,
1
1
"We should resort to fictions such as presumed consent only with the
greatest care and caution, for under the guise of "consent" they may imply
a more extensive paternalism than is warranted." Tames F. Childress. Who
Should Decide?: Paternalism in Health Care
.




the inability of a surrogate to make a decision that accurately
reflects the dying person's beliefs and preferences, our inability to
determine what a "rational infant" would choose, etc. Statements
of actual consent have none of these problems. We ought to rely
on statements that are more straightforward than statements
about counterfactual consent, because statements of
counterfactual consent are open to misinterpretation. For
example, often a surrogate is unable to make a decision that does
reflect the dying person's beliefs and preferences. The patient
may have preferences that are in principle unable to be expressed
by a surrogate, or the surrogate may not know enough to make
such a decisions accurately, or, if the patient is an infant or
severely retarded individual, the patient may never have had any
preferences from the onset. If the truth conditions for
counterfactual statements of consent leave open the possibility for
misinterpretation, then we ought to rely on statements of actual
consent. Thus, in cases where both AC and CC are available, AC is
preferable to CC. If the person can give AC to being killed, why
should we rely on CC to justify his death at our hands? Our
interpretation of a statement of AC is never mistakenly, whereas
CC may be mistaken. In cases of voluntary 1 euthanasia, the
person gives actual consent to the act of euthanasia. Cases where
l^It is possible for a statement of actual consent to be tH-mformed, or
coerced, or perhaps just difficult to interpret. However, as 1 have stated
previously, I am understanding "actual consent" to be free, voluntary, and
informed. If actual consent was not free and informed, it would not be
preferable to justify acts of euthanasia using actual consent rather than
statements about counterfactual consent.
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actual consent is available are thought to be the most
straightforward cases. Thus, SACl is true.
A second version of the argument from misinterpretation is
an argument from the claim that both assertoric antecedent
consent and problematic antecedent consent are offered before
the patient is euthanized, whereas actual consent is typically
offered at the time that the patient is euthanized. If a person
consents at time t to being euthanized at t', it is possible for him to
have changed his mind during the time between t and t'. This is
one of the drawbacks of assertoric antecedent consent and
problematic antecedent consent that was discussed in Chapter W
- the person could change his or her mind. Living Wills, for
example, could fail to be an accurate reflection of what a patient
truly wants because the Living Will only states what the patient
wants for himself at the time that the Living Will is composed.
The Living Will does not state what the patient wants for himself
at the time that the order in the Living Will is to be carried out.
But a statement of actual consent, made at t' about an act of
euthanasia at t', is superior to the statement of consent in a Living
Will. Now that t' has obtained, a statement of consent is better
informed than a statement of antecedent consent given at time t.
If a person consents at time t to being euthanized at t', but then
explicitly denies consent at t', which ought you believe? Given
that the denial of consent at t' is informed, free and voluntary, we
are likely believe the present statement of consent over
antecedent statement of consent. Actual consent (or, in this case,
the lack of consent) is better than assertoric antecedent consent or
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problematic antecedent consent. In the same fashion, actual
consent is superior to counterfactual consent. If you could
consider what a person would consent to, and what they actually
do consent to, which version of consent should you act on? The
actual consent, of course! In this way, AC is argued to be better
than CC, and SACl is affirmed.
An Argument for Rejecting SACl
I have catalogued some arguments that have been made, or
could have been made, in support of SACl. While there is some
intuitive appeal to such a principle, I believe those intuitions to be
misguided. I would now like to consider a case of involuntaryl
euthanasia that demonstrates SACl to be false. Consider the
following case:
The Case ofOld Felix: Old Felbc was dying painfully in his
hospital bed. Old Felix's family was gathered in the next room,
trying to decide if euthanasia was the best option for Old Felix.
Old Felbc was perfectly rational and able to give consent to his
own euthanasia, if his family attempted to get it. Suddenly Young
Felbc spoke up: Old Felix was a sensitive, introspective person.
While he might want to be killed, while he would know that it was
the best thing for him at this time, asking him might be a mistake.
He might sit and fret and worry over the decision. The very act of
asking him might make his last moments even more painful than
they already were. Any act that would make his last moments
more painful was wrong. Certainly if asked, he would consent.
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But, it is best not to ask. It would be best to just euthanize him
without his consent, rather than ask for his consent.
Old Felix’s case demonstrates that SACl is not true:
1. If SACl is true, then Old Felix ought to give actual
consent to his euthanasia.
2. It is not the case that Old Felix ought to give actual
consent to his euthanasia.
3. Therefore, SACl is not true.
The first premise makes use of SACl. If SACl is correct,
then every case in which a person can offer actual consent, but
counterfactual consent is relied upon, is wrong. Old Felbc could
have offered actual consent - he was entirely capable. Thus,
relying on Old Felix's counterfactual consent, when actual consent
was available, was wrong.
But as Young Felix argued. Old Felix ought not have been
asked to give actual consent. His last hours would have been
more miserable than they already were, if he were called upon to
give his consent. Better to rely on counterfactual consent in this
case, than to make Old Felix's last hours worse than they already
were. With the counterexample of the case of Old Felix, it has
been demonstrated that SACl is not true.
Defenders of SACl would find the above argument unsound.
They could object to line one or line two. I will consider the
objection to line two first. Defenders of SACl may claim that
actual consent is so valuable in itself, that it outweighs any bad
results of asking for actual consent. Those who choose this line of
reasoning embrace the argument from utility in favor of SACl.
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Certainly Old Felix will be pained and disappointed by having to
give actual consent. But the alternative, relying on counterfactual
consent, is wrought with problems. Relying on counterfactual
consent shows a lack of respect for the patient, argue defenders of
SACl. Old Felbc would appreciate being asked, even though he
would also be slightly pained by having to think about his own
death, but if he weren't asked, he would feel slighted and
forgotten. His insult, in not being asked about his own death,
would result in very low utilities. Using Scanlon's terminology,
the demonstrative value in allowing Old Felix to make his own
choice would be lost. Character traits that Old Felix may value,
such as independence and self-reliance, would not be
demonstrated by him if his family made the choice for him.
Certainly, it is better to have Old Felix feel appreciated, rather
than slighted and forgotten. Thus, actual consent is superior to
counterfactual consent.
Slote uses this defense of actual consent in demonstrating
that social arrangements determined via actual consent are more
just than those determined by actual consent:
When inequalities of reward and the like are
undeserved, only actual consent to their existence
seems to me to be capable of rendering those
inequalities, and the society in which they exist,
completely just. It does not, intuitively, seem enough
that people would have consented to the undeserved
inequalities had they been asked. For even when one
knows that this is so, one may feel resentment and
feel unfairly treated because one wasn't asked.
l^^Slote, p. 344.
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Relying on counterfactual consent to justify an act of euthanasia
when actual consent is available fails to maximize utility. The
utility of getting actual consent is higher than the utility of relying
on counterfactual consent. Old Felix may feel resentment and
anger because he wasn't actually asked for his consent. This
resentment may outweigh the gain in utility that may have
resulted from relying on counterfactual consent. Asking Old Felix
for actual consent may have depressed him and his family, but it
prevented the negative utility of relying on counterfactual
consent. It may seem that asking Old Felix for his consent is a
worse state of affairs than relying on counterfactual consent. But
in fact, since there is a gain in utility in asking for actual consent
rather than relying on counterfactual consent, asking Old Felbc for
his consent is a better state of affairs after all.
There is a reply to this objection. If the example were
changed slightly, line two would still be true. Assume that the
pain involved in getting actual consent from Old Felix was far
worse than described. The suffering that Old Felix and his family
would undergo in asking for his consent could be tremendous.
The pain in asking Old Felix for consent could be so great that it
outweighed any gain in utility that actual consent may have. In
this case, it would result in higher utilities to rely on
counterfactual consent than to get actual consent. Again, using
Scanlon's terminology, it is possible that the instrumental value of
allowing the family to make Old Felix's choice for him outweighs
any demonstrative value that would result. If the pain that Old
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Felix and his family would undergo is great enough to outweigh
the seeming negative utility of relying on counterfactual consent,
then it would still be better to rely on counterfactual consent
rather than actual consent. Thus, upholders of SACl, like Slote,
who believe that SACl is true based on a utilitarian defense, are
defeated on their own ground.
Those who reply to the objection that line two is false by
invoking the argument from rights or the argument from
paternalism in favor of SACl are similarly mistaken. If Old Felbc
does have a right to give actual consent rather than have his
family act on mere counterfactual consent, then the rights of Old
Felbc are not respected by his family acting on counterfactual
consent. However, the view that Old Felix has a right to give
actual consent is not sufficient to affirm that Old Felbc ought to
give actual consent to his own death. There certainly many things
that each of us has a right to do, nonetheless it would be better if
we did not do those things. Having the right to perform an action
does not mean that it is right to perform that action. In the case
of Old Felbc, it is clear-cut that it would be right if Old Felbc were
not bothered to give actual consent. His burden is already too
great. Even if he did have the right to have his actual consent
heard, that is not sufficient to affirm the truth of the second
premise of the argument
have avoided the very difficult question of whether or not a person
does have a right to give his/her actual consent. For a discussion of this
issue, see Dan Brock, Life and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical
Ethics . Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 21-54.
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Similarly, those who object to line one by invoking the
argument from paternalism are mistaken. Perhaps it is
paternalistic to rely on CC when AC is available. But the claim that
an action is paternalistic does not entail that it is wrong. There
are many things that we have a right to do, yet it would be wrong
to do them. In the same vein, it is also the case that there are
many actions that people can perform which are paternalistic, and
yet paternalism is not sufficient to determine that those actions
would be wrong to do. Ruth Macklin claims "Paternalistic
behavior towards infants and young children is justified ethically;
indeed it is ethically obligatory." Paternalistic actions are not by
definition wrong. Young Felix's actions may have been
paternalistic. That is not to say that his actions were wrong.
The defenders of SACl may also object to line one. They
might argue that a true Superiority of Actual Consent Principle
would entail no such thing about Old Felix's consent. In the case
of Old Felix it appears clear that no one should ask for his consent.
However, in all but these very hard cases, it is clear that actual
consent is superior to counterfactual consent.
While the case of Old Felix did demonstrate the
shortcomings in the argument from utility, the argument from
rights, and the argument from paternalism for SACl, I would also
like to say something about the arguments from
misinterpretation. Both of the arguments from misinterpretation
l^Ruth Macklin, "Autonomy, Beneficence and ChUd Development: An
Ethical Analysis", Social Research on Children and Adolescents: Ethical
Issues , ed. Barbara Stanley and Joan E. Sieber, Sage Pubhcations, 1992, p. 91.
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for SACl are based on a mistaken assumption about the nature of
counterfactual consent. These arguments for SACl focus on the
epistemic difficulties in employing counterfactual consent as a
justification for euthanasia. However, as stated above, SACl
contrasts actual consent with counterfactual consent that
"determines beyond reasonable doubt that if (the patient) were
rational and able to give an informed, uncoerced statement of
consent to being euthanized at t, then (the patient) would do so".
Both of the arguments from misinterpretation rely on the
mistaken assumption that CC is less accurate than AC. The
arguments from misinterpretation turn on the epistemic
difficulties in employing counterfactual consent. Each of these
epistemic difficulties implies that counterfactual consent is less
accurate than actual consent. However, given the formulation of
SACl this is a mistaken assumption, and the arguments from
misinterpretation are mistaken. The second argument from
misinterpretation compares actual consent to assertoric
antecedent consent and problematic antecedent actual consent.
Both types of antecedent consent can fail to accurately reflect the
patient's wishes for euthanasia at the time that the euthanasia is
performed, since they are not statements of consent by the
patient as the euthanasia is performed. Thus actual consent is
more reliable than assertoric antecedent consent or problematic
antecedent consent. Those who endorse the second argument
from misinterpretation will claim that similarly, counterfactual
consent may be less reliable than actual consent, for
counterfactual consent is not a statement of consent by the patient
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as the euthanasia is performed. However, this analogy does not
hold. According to the analysis ofAC and CC required to
formulate SACl, actual consent and counterfactual consent are
equally accurate. CC is offered for a treatment when it can be
said truly that AC would have been offered by the patient for the
treatment. The second argument from misinterpretation for SACl
is also mistaken, for it fails to recognize that given my
formulations ofAC and CC, both AC and CC are equally accurate.
Of the arguments discussed in support of SACl, none of
them is sound. Furthermore, the case of Old Felix demonstrated
that SACl is certainly false.
SAC2
The case of Old Felix does illustrate an interesting point
about SACl. SACl has a great deal of intuitive appeal; however,
if the costs in adhering to SACl are too high, then it would be best
to ignore SACl. In the case of Old Felix the costs were too high.
Old Felix's last hours would have been more miserable had actual
consent be sought, rather than merely allowing his euthanasia to
be justified using counterfactual consent. In such cases, it would
be wrong to rely on AC, and instead we should rely on CC. The
defenders of the spirit of SACl might try to salvage SACl. SACl
would be more appealing if it were altered it to reflect the notion
that if the costs are too high then SACl ought to be abandoned,
but if they are not so high, SACl ought to be adhered to:
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SAC 2. If a person is able to offer AC, it is wrong to rely
upon CC, unless it would be better to rely upon CC,
in which case it is right to rely on CC
If SAC2 were substituted for SACl in line one of the
argument, it would be clear than line one was false. It may not be
true that Old Felix should give actual consent according to SAC2.
Old Felix's case may be exactly the kind of case that is an
exception to SACl. SAC2 recognizes that such exceptions do exist,
and thus line one is false.
Those who endorse SACl might not accept SAC2, however.
SAC 2 claims that it is better to get actual consent, unless it would
be wrong to get actual consent, in which case, it would be better
not to get actual consent. This weak endorsement of actual
consent over counterfactual consent is not in the spirit of those
who believe actual consent is superior to counterfactual consent.
While I believe that SAC2 is true, and SACl is false, it appears
that SAC2 doesn't amount to much. To conclude, there is no true
principle that says actual consent is preferable to counterfactual
consent in all cases. Any principle about the superiority of actual
consent over counterfactual consent is a prima facie principle at
bestir.
1^1 would like to thank Owen McLeod for helpful suggestions.
CONCLUSION
Intuitively, counterfactual consent plays an important role
when we are about to perform some morally interesting actions.
Is it permissible to do this? How can I know if what I am doing is
right? Perhaps, if I had permission, if I had consent, to do what I
am about to do, it would make things okay. In lieu of actual
consent, then the fact that if I were dbie to dsk for consent, then
consent would be given, may be enough.
I don't know if it is morally permissible to borrow your pen,
but if I could ask for your consent, surely you would say it was
fine. I borrow the pen. The fact that if consent could be offered,
then it would be offered, seems to count in favor of the claim that
borrowing your pen was the right thing to do.
We stand at a hospital bedside, and wonder if shutting off
the life support machines is the right thing to do. If we were able
to ask for consent to turn off the life support machines, then
consent would be given. The fact that if consent could be offered,
then it would be offered, seems to count in favor of the claim that
shutting off life support was the right thing to do.
On first glance, it seems that counterfactual consent
contributes something to some acts of euthanasia. I have set out
to prove that our first glance may have been too fleeting. I
offered a definition of 'euthanasia' as well as explained both
consent and counterfactuals in Chapter I. I argued that
counterfactual consent is not a necessary part of any act of
euthanasia. Whatever counterfactual consent contributes to an act
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of euthanasia, it is not the case that every act of euthanasia is
counterfactually consented to.
My first question in Chapter II was a simple one - when is it
appropriate to cite a statement of counterfactual consent in an
attempt to justify an act of euthanasia? I argued that
counterfactual consent is appropriately cited in cases of
voluntary 1, nonvoluntary 1, nonvoluntary2, and involuntaiyd
cases of euthanasia. My second question in Chapter II was more
difficult to answer - what is counterfactual consent's role in the
moral justification of acts of euthanasia? Philosophers such as Dan
Brock and Ronald Dworkin have considered the "Principle of Self
Determination" and the "Principle of Autonomy", both of which
appear to demonstrate that the act an agent chooses, or would
have chosen, is by definition the best alternative for the agent. If
either the Principle of Self Determination or the Principle of
Autonomy was true, that fact would demonstrate that
counterfactual consent does justify acts of euthanasia. But neither
of these principles held up under further scrutiny. T.M. Scanlon's
views on the value of choice held more promise in demonstrating
how counterfactual consent can morally justify an act of
euthanasia. However, even Scanlon's approach fell short. I have
argued that at best, some acts of euthanasia are morally justified
by counterfactual consent. Only those acts of euthanasia that are
already among the best alternatives for the agent may be justified
by an appeal to counterfactual consent. The role of counterfactual
consent in justifying acts of euthanasia is not as strong as we may
have thought.
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In Chapter III, I attempted to analyze statements of
counterfactual consent using a possible worlds semantics. What I
found is that the meaning of statements of counterfactual consent
is not what we thought it was. Most counterfactuals are
interpreted in the following manner: if at the closest possible
world at which the antecedent is true, the consequent is also true,
then the counterfactual is true. "If I were to let go of your pen,
then it would fall" means that in the closest possible world in
which I let go of your pen, your pen falls. Counterfactuals about
consent are not interpreted in that manner. Counterfactuals
about consent use a cross-world comparison and an actuality
operator that is not part of the understanding of most other
counterfactuals. Counterfactuals about consent should be taken
to literally mean "If the patient were able to consent to being
euthanized, then he would consent to being euthanized if ever in
the condition that he is actually in." Hence, counterfactuals about
consent do not mean what they appear to mean at first glance.
In Chapter fV, I examined the epistemic justifications for
statements of counterfactual consent. Living Wills, the practice of
surrogacy, the "Best Interests" standard and the "Rational Agent"
standard are mainstays of Medical Ethics literature. Any of them
might be used to epistemically justify a statement of
counterfactual consent. And yet, I have demonstrated that each
one of them is problematic in demonstrating the truth of a
statement of counterfactual consent. Living Wills, as well as all
antecedent statements of consent, can be challenged. Any
antecedent statement of consent is offered long before the action
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to which the agent Is consenting takes piace - what if the agent
changes her mind? What if the agent has never experienced a
situation similar to the one about which she is consenting?
Surrogacy, especially for individuals who have never had beliefs
or preferences about euthanasia, is also problematic. Perhaps the
most significant question is "Are the Best Interests standard and
the Rational Agent standard too objective?" If so, they may not
be appropriate indicators of what patients would counterfactually
consent to, if they were able to consent. While it can be said that
counterfactuals about consent are true or false, the basis upon
which they are declared true or false is somewhat shaky.
Finally, despite all the problems with counterfactual consent
that have been explored in Chapters 11, 111, and W, in Chapter V
I presented an argument that demonstrated that there is no
philosophical reason to prefer actual consent over counterfactual
consent. The Arguments from Utility, Rights, Paternalism, and
Misinterpretation all failed to demonstrate convincingly that
actual consent is always preferable to counterfactual consent.
Many questions remain. If counterfactual consent can
morally justify some acts of euthanasia, namely those that are
already among the best alternatives for the agent, how can we
determine which acts of euthanasia are already among the best
alternatives? If counterfactual consent is as problematic as I have
demonstrated, is actual consent also more problematic than we
currently believe? If actual consent is more problematic than we
currently believe, in which ways is it problematic? Can these
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problems be solved? The many questions surrounding the
concept of counterfactual consent call for further study.
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